SURVEY

a journal of
Soviet and East European studies

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

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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 56 **July 1965**

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OLD AND NEW HORIZONS

Peter Taylor

I LEFT the Soviet Union last summer rather, I suppose, like Bazarov in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*—packing my suitcase with straw to fill an emptiness left by unanswered questions. In the sanctity of Moscow State University I had been largely isolated from the great majority of Russians. If one discounts eavesdropping and the flowing wisdom of Moscow's taxi drivers, my encounters with the proletariat were limited to the extreme but voiceless intimacy of Soviet buses and metro trains at rush hours. Conversation with peasants hardly went beyond the exchange of pleasantries with some *babushki* in Suzdal. Yet, among the young intelligentsia in Moscow and Leningrad, those now in their mid- and late-twenties, it was a year of innumerable conversations and warm friendships. Perhaps because of the current détente, perhaps through the unique and growing self-assurance of this stratum of Russian youth, I was allowed a fascinating glimpse into a small area of Soviet life. The twilight of the Khrushchev era was not to be captured, of course, wholly in the flats or *dachas* of the young elite. But much that was interesting and, I think, meaningful, might be seen and heard there. Some reflections on this experience may be worth recalling, then, despite the straw in my suitcase.

In the wake of Khrushchev's removal, it is tempting to emphasise at the outset those comments by young people which may have presaged, in some way, the great event. For it is true, certainly, that among a remarkable number of young Russians with whom I spoke, there seems to have been an authentic dissatisfaction with Khrushchev as a personality. They would not only have accepted but approved his fall from power. Taken by itself, however, the anti-Khrushchev sentiment of the young intelligentsia may tend to obscure their dominant characteristic as a group; namely, a genuine commitment to the Soviet regime at large. This is, within the elite at least, a loyal generation. Criticism of the *vozhd* grew out of that loyalty; and neither it nor much else that passes for disaffection can be fully understood without some sense of how these young people view the world.

The genealogy of this 'loyal generation' is amazingly uniform. A little younger than Aksenov's *kollegi*, they were born in the late thirties and grew up, most often as an only child, in relatively comfortable surroundings by Soviet standards. Few, for example, remember any great privation even during the war years. Their parents probably belonged to varying strata of the intellectual and scientific elite, but with party membership apparently the exception. They remember Stalin as a distant deity on May Day; they learned the lessons of the twentieth party congress, sometimes traumatically, during their first year or two at the university. Thrown together in the solidly-built apartment houses

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and suburban colonies like Pasternak's Peredelkino, which were the peculiar ghettos of the New Class, they have married among those they have known since early childhood. Their most intimate friends are drawn from the same narrow company. Now they have either begun their professional careers in the arts and sciences or continue in graduate study. Though most were members of the Komsomol, very few appear to regard joining the party as important or desirable. It is, in short, an extraordinary company of young Russians—privileged, secure, well-educated, and potentially influential without direct association with political power. Most important of all, perhaps, they have come to maturity since 1956 and are very much the products of the post-Stalinist era.

MY friendships with this group began, in part by chance meetings, in part by academic contacts, not long after I arrived in Moscow. At the first dinner parties and talks there was little to alter my preconception of a westernised, partially alienated elite. I had a knowing nod of acquaintance for the familiar treasures: the tape-recordings of American jazz, the out-of-date and dog-eared Western magazines, the Italian shoes. We sat there on the expensive Latvian furniture, smoked Bulgarian cigarettes, and began our dialogues, as one expected, with a kind of verbal minuet which established who and what we were. A sense of mutual understanding and trust, an estimate of personality, must come alive before the layers of cant and cliché are shed to expose deeper concerns. This much accorded with the image I brought with me. But beyond this probation, where the discussions began in earnest, I was surprised or even startled by what I learned. The westernisation of these Soviet youth obviously goes far beyond an innocent impatience for style and manner. The privileges of travel abroad, of private film showings, of reading an American novel or a French play a friend has brought back from Helsinki—these have made possible a new sophistication about the outside world. I found myself spending an entire evening and half the night arguing about the symbolism of the dead fish in the final scene of *La Dolce Vita*. And though we could hear the chimes of Spassky Tower from where we sat, there was little to distinguish our discussion from what might have been said in London or New York. Franz Kafka, so tantalisingly introduced last winter in translation, was devoured and endlessly debated. On a given occasion, I might hear an intelligent defence of abstract art, or see two young actors do a splendid Chaplinesque pantomime on man in the over-mechanised world of the future. And this, in turn, would prompt someone's interesting thoughts on the potential misuses of science.

There are, to be sure, definite limits to intellectual exchanges such as these. The gaps in knowledge and experience, though being rapidly closed by educated young Russians, are still more than evident. Meanwhile, ingenuity must be applied to the insights at hand. A young

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Soviet architect, for instance, may form his conception of American cities, not from a tendentious dispatch in *Pravda*, but primarily from J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*. It is not that the other 'meaning' of Holden Caulfield has been missed; *Zvezdny Bilet*, by Vasili Aksenov, was urged upon me as proof of that. Yet it seems possible and necessary to abstract from Salinger, or any other available Western source, something relevant for one's own work. And the architect tells me and his friends that he will help design Soviet cities which are at once more humane and noble than the New York he has seen only in a most impressionistic way. Nonetheless, I found it striking how much the West was known and criticised on its *own* terms. And the more Soviet youth see the West in this perspective, the less appeal it seems to have for them as an historical alternative. If attitudes towards the outside world remain a touchstone for how young Russians evaluate their own society, this disenchantment may be quite significant indeed.

Of course I was soon reminded that there is an air of unreality about all this. The promises and stimulating issues of the future are shrouded by the incredible problems of living in a Russia still so backward. A visit to the countryside with some of these friends made our talks back in Moscow, so real and pressing at the time, seem exercises in fantasy. They always encouraged me to see the ancient church in this or that village and often came along, with bulging parcels of food and the inevitable vodka, to make the outing half tour, half *piknik*. Once at our destination, no one pretended that the great encumbrance of rural Russia was not there. We all saw the drab wooden huts and the withered old women bent under the ponderous sacks of potatoes. One of my less inventive friends at the University might have bothered to 'explain', as he had for their counterparts who chip the ice off Moscow's streets, that these women and all they stood for did not really exist, 'objectively'. My better-dressed and more refined companions seemed, however, unmoved and unembarrassed. Like the electric trains which hurtle them snugly through the shabby outskirts of Moscow on to their *dachas*, they had, I think, somehow by-passed this reality, intellectually at least. This generation, no less than the *intelligenti* of the nineteenth century, has probably managed to escape despair by looking beyond the enormous and unexciting tasks of modernising the *muzhik*. Yet, again as with their forerunners, there is a perverse compensation in the dreadful backwardness. The hope has been kept alive that a Russia still on the threshold of modernity can ultimately avoid the mistakes of the West. The sophistication which makes this escape from reality possible has, I am certain, pointed up the sterility of Marxist dogma. In happy contrast to the provincial types who seem to predominate at Moscow University, this elite does not speak in private like *Pravda* warmed-over. But the vague ideal, the goal of a *better* society, endures. And socialism, which is grasped as the main factor making the Soviet Union *different* from the West, continues to be the focus of their hopes.

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Engaging as this urbanity and idealism may be, however, these elements are sometimes mixed with more common, less attractive qualities. The psychological burden of backwardness might compel the most enlightened of my friends to be shrilly defensive whenever I criticised Soviet society. At worst, this became a querulous chauvinism. More frequently, it simply involved them in humorous inconsistencies. One night I dropped in unexpectedly on a young couple and found them arguing, of all things, over whether abortion was legal in the United States. The husband, one of my more 'hard-nosed' friends, had insisted, surprisingly, that it was quite legal. When I told him that this was not so, he reddened even as he gave the quick reply, 'Well, America is a democratic country, and I thought . . .' Another twist of this sort came at one of the many dinners given by an actor, where questioning me, like the *ananas i shampanskoe*, furnished the dessert. In this instance the topic was civil rights in the United States and, as usual, I began by admitting readily that there was a great problem. Suddenly I was interrupted from across the table by Alexander, who was celebrated for his commitment to Freudian psychology. 'You criticise the oppression of capitalism', he said smugly, 'but this means that subconsciously you really support it'. Before I could answer the girl next to me shot back, 'And Sasha hates America because he really loves it'. The howls and jibes that followed were good humoured, but I was never subjected to amateur analysis again.

AS anyone who has lived among Russians can testify, probably their most charming quality as a people is the wonderful simplicity and sincerity of their relationships with one another. The young elite is no exception in this respect. The ties which date from childhood appear, to the eye of a Westerner, astonishingly strong and supple. Tightly-knit circles of this kind were, of course, distant towards an interloper. Midway through the year I began to watch with some interest as a budding film-director introduced his mistress into one of these groups. She came from an entirely different background; and at first, she was (rather pitilessly, I thought) left out of the banter on Okudzhava's lyrics or the gossip about another old friend. However, by the time I left she had been accepted and was receiving, as I had, courteous verbal footnotes on the more recondite conversations (for example: 'You see, my father and Misha's were working on a play in the Crimea, and we were strictly forbidden to make a noise in the *dom tvorchestva*, but one day . . .'). On the other hand, arguments within the circle were seldom, if ever, personalised. An extraordinary incident occurs to me to illustrate this and perhaps much more as well. I saw a pretty and frail young girl reduced to tears one night after passionate words over whether the Ukrainians were given sufficient opportunity to study their own language. It was a very sensitive issue and I stayed attentively on the sidelines; when everyone else had left the table, I

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went over to her and tried to offer some comfort. She quickly rejected the idea that anyone was angry over this. 'You understand, I am not crying for myself', she explained as she sniffed back the tears, 'I am weeping for the Ukrainians.'

My experience gave scant support to suggestions that young Russians have become disengaged from the larger issues. True, some of my friends seemed ready to leave rural reconstruction to the *apparat*; and perhaps this is to resign from the most fundamental problem. I did see students distracted and dozing at a *Komsomol* lecture, but that showed only that they were uninterested in stale rhetoric. The new East German raincoat *is* important, and securing a job in Moscow or Leningrad, rather than the provinces, even more so. I do not think it follows, though, that the same young people are mainly self-serving and have retired to cultivate their own tiny gardens. Solzhenitsyn is having a tremendous impact on Russian youth; and in the countless times I heard his work discussed, not once did the conversation fail to go well beyond purely literary subjects. The insatiable curiosity is still there and is being fed more than ever, particularly among the privileged strata. This seems to be true, by the way, from a passing glance at least, for young intellectuals in places like Riga and Tbilisi as well as at the centre. I left Russia convinced that the question is no longer whether Soviet youth is engagé, but rather how its commitment to critical thought is translated into political terms.

THE attitude of my friends towards the Soviet past was fairly unambiguous and conformist. They excused their parents from Stalin's crimes on the unconvincing grounds that they did not know about most of them and considered the rest to be just and necessary actions at the time. As I was told by a brilliant young linguist, 'Our fathers fought to defend the Revolution and made great sacrifices for us . . . it is very difficult for us to condemn them for their mistakes'. In this view, the twenties may often be depicted, by both the fathers and the sons, as a golden era when everyone was free, and marvellously creative, and full of hope. No one hesitated to add, certainly, that Stalin, 'our tragedy', destroyed all this and discredited the idea of socialism in the eyes of the world. I was interested to discover that politically-conscious young Russians seem inured to the contortions of party historians. They have evidently taken the longer view that the whole record will be put right eventually. Unless a rehabilitation touches, as it might, the family of a friend, they seem unstirred by the mechanics of re-writing the last thirty-five years. More than one suggested to me, and quite casually, that Bukharin would soon be taken out of limbo, as indeed he seems to have been. Naturally, there was a cautious and dispassionate note in their comments to a foreigner on political affairs, both past and present. Their opinions on current politics must usually be laboriously distilled from their points of view on more abstract subjects. If I have

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any basis at all for an observation, it is only because the extraordinary events of the past eighteen months worked as an altogether unusual catalyst in this respect. At least two experiences—the colossal harvest failure of 1963 and the assassination of President Kennedy—were quite obviously charged with emotion for many young people in the USSR. They seemed to evoke an uncommon frankness, even in dialogues with a Westerner; and in this context, talks with Russian youth suggested an anti-Khrushchev sentiment of exceptional uniformity and breadth.

To the young urban elite, the bread shortages of last winter and the resort to purchases of American wheat were a source of embarrassment and, in some cases, national humiliation. Resentment among graduate students and professional elements in Moscow and Leningrad was barely concealed and tended to focus directly on Khrushchev. (It was in Moscow, in March 1964, that I first heard Khrushchev accused of doing things in a 'harebrained' way—a term which has, by striking coincidence, acquired a more public vogue since last October.) Similarly, every young person I met was deeply affected by the death of President Kennedy. There were a number of reasons for this, but principal among them was the compelling image of a youthful, dignified, attractive leader. By contrast, and contrast was inevitable, the figure of a paunchy and garrulous Soviet Premier was clearly disappointing.

Of these two examples, economic fiasco and an unfavourable comparison with a foreign leader, it is the latter which most graphically illustrates Khrushchev's lack of popularity among the younger generation. Given the continuing vexation with the agricultural problem in nearly all ranks of Soviet society, discontent over a disastrous harvest might not have indicated a negative opinion of Khrushchev as a ruler. In any case, criticism by the young intelligentsia was largely confined to the man, rather than embracing matters of high policy. It was the manner and style of leadership, not its specific content, which aroused dissatisfaction. In the eyes of my friends, Khrushchev was, quite simply, *nekulturny*, an uncultured man in the broad sense of a Russian word which describes a multitude of sins. The sometimes earthy rhetoric, the folksy air of the Donbas miner-made-good, were regarded as boorish (*muzhikovaty*) and unbefitting the head of a great power. This view might not have been so significant had it been limited to the relatively small number of generally dissident Soviet youth. But among the otherwise loyal and committed majority of the young elite, this image made a desired identification with the leadership altogether impossible. Having acquired a stake in the symbols as well as the substance of their nation's greatness, these young Russians appear to have found Khrushchev a distasteful anachronism.

I encountered varying manifestations of this attitude. Shortly after the death of President Kennedy, I was lunching with a graduate student in Moscow. He expressed his grief at the loss of a 'wise' man and added, as if in a cheering afterthought: 'But soon we will have a young and good-looking leader'. In Leningrad I told a close friend about

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the description given by Milovan Djilas of the drinking and eating orgies in which Stalin and his associates indulged during the war. Instead of commenting on Stalin, as I had expected, he answered quickly: 'At least such things were hidden from the masses. Now we see uncultured behaviour quite openly'. And finally, I was told at Moscow University that a particular style of fur hat was scorned among some students because it was known in student slang as a Khrushchevka; the Premier had been seen to favour this hat in his public appearances.

THERE is more to this, I think, than the familiar problem of generations. The terms in which these sentiments were most often couched reveal a curious sociology of power in the relationship of the Soviet leadership to a sizeable body of its young subjects. It might well be asserted that most Russians now between twenty-three and thirty years of age have profited a good deal from the changes in Soviet society under Khrushchev's rule. Their material welfare has been increasing, albeit haltingly, and they seem confident they will be the first to benefit from each new increment. Nevertheless, this does not seem to have encouraged any sense of the national leader as the source or sponsor of these improvements. A number of times I was told that the development of the Soviet Union in this direction was, after all, 'historically inevitable'. When I suggested that Khrushchev showed political courage in breaking with Stalinism, the reply was, almost invariably: 'Yes, but if he had not done it, another person would have acted . . . it had to be so'. Ironically enough, however, it was probably the obverse of this impression—the distinct personalisation of political power by Khrushchev himself—which seems to have opened the wider possibilities for criticism of the individual ruler. To some degree this has been the product of Khrushchev's own logic of destalinisation; that is, the separation of the leader, as a legitimate object of disapproval, from the Soviet polity, which remains beyond reproach. If the lessons of the past seven years are well absorbed, and they seem to have been by some, one may thoroughly dislike the *vozhd* while remaining scrupulously loyal to the regime at large. This psychological basis for a 'loyal opposition' may be commonplace in the West, but I thought it significantly novel for young people in the Soviet environment.

Moreover, Khrushchev also discarded the imposing *physical* aloofness of the leader. While Stalin watched carefully-staged films of the countryside in the guarded privacy of the Kremlin, his successor tramped through fields and factories with obvious relish. This, after all, was one of Khrushchev's goals—to replace the god-like gestures from atop Lenin's tomb with a more homey and, presumably, more popular exercise of authority. But in the unprecedented exposure of his personality, he became fair game (privately, to be sure) among those young people impatient for a more sophisticated presence. This is not

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to say that there was no appreciation of the essential differences between Khrushchev's rule and the more patent tyranny of Stalin. Quite the opposite; changes for the better seem taken for granted. Khrushchev's failure was the inability to conduct the transition with poise and dignity.

As for the great silent majority of Soviet citizens, I can only guess at their reaction to the change in leadership. No doubt sheer lack of interest or intimidation explains much of their acquiescence. Perhaps the same qualities my friends found repugnant, the lack of subtlety, the 'common touch', will be missed by the ordinary Russian. I once stood in a crowd watching Khrushchev leave from a railway station. The unmistakable blue-green *Chaika* had come speeding up to the entrance with a motor-cycle escort. He walked quickly across the sidewalk and up the steps into the station, looking vigorous and healthy. The peasant and proletarian faces around me seemed happily excited at a glimpse of 'dear Nikita Sergeyevich'. The longing of the young intelligentsia for a new symbol, a new technique, could only have been a fringe benefit to those who carried out the coup for reasons divorced from popular sentiment of any kind.

In some cases, I think, the present regime may be sounding a responsive chord among those who were critical of Khrushchev. The fetish of efficiency and competence, embodied in Premier Kosygin as a leader-technician, does coincide with the working ethic of a large part of the intelligentsia. For the time being, at least, what appears to be quiet, methodical administration may be a welcome contrast to the 'hare-brained' approach. And if the succession crisis demands a dull and colourless public image, perhaps even this will seem somehow more *kulturny*. In the larger sense, it is unlikely that the regime will curtail the privileges already granted to the 'loyal generation'. This policy reflects the confidence that the interests of the young intelligentsia can be more or less accommodated. And to maintain the loyalty of these youth, it becomes important to create the impression that much of their criticism is tolerated and even considered. There is a memorable scene in *Zvezdny Bilet* where the older party intellectual speaks to the young scientist who has just advanced a new theory rather brazenly.

> You see yourself as a sort of herald of truth. . . . For four years I have watched you and your like with mixed feelings. I could not understand you too well. What are they after, I asked. Is it just to take everything to pieces, to reject everything? But now I believe I can see what you are after, and I believe it is the same thing I am after myself.

I wonder, however, if my Soviet friends are aware that 'young and good-looking' leaders are not always the most enlightened. Perhaps there will yet come a time when being 'uncultured' is a lesser sin than it has appeared.

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THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV

A Tentative Analysis

P. B. Reddaway

THESE notes can only be tentative both in the questions raised and the highly provisional answers suggested. A mere five months separate the deposition of Mr Khrushchev from the CPSU Plenum of March 1965 (an arbitrary end-point). In this time, the emergence of any even near-stable equilibrium between the main political forces in the USSR seems to have been delayed largely by three factors. First, no leader of outstanding personality was available or able last October to succeed Khrushchev and exert a strong unifying direction over the government of the country. Secondly, and in consequence, different and often rival pressure groups have had enough scope to induce hesitancy and indecision in the Party's approach to many of the urgent problems bequeathed by Khrushchev. And, thirdly, the last half-year has seen two vitally important and interrelated problems of foreign policy—the Vietnam war and the future of the world communist movement—come to a head at a time that is extremely inconvenient for the still unstable Soviet leadership, which is not at all in a position to control them to the extent it would like.

The rulers of a totalitarian state may be said to be limited in their actions by three main sets of forces: the less than infinitely malleable traditions of society; the need to run the economy rationally enough to stimulate economic progress (however defined); and the need to maintain full political control over the population in the short- and the long term. None of these considerations may be disregarded without a risk of the political order breaking down.

In the USSR, the rough limits imposed by the forces of tradition have for some time been clear, especially since the thaw of 1956 showed many traditional Russian aspirations to have been more dormant than dead. Thus the most tricky problem for policy-makers in recent years has been to balance the often conflicting claims of economic rationality and political control. This dilemma is made particularly acute because the increasingly sophisticated Soviet economy requires greater specialisation in many of its functions, and these often inevitably decentralised activities are difficult or prohibitively wasteful to control politically. The problem has been most explicitly reflected in the USSR of late in the sporadic but always intense controversy about the relative importance of *ekonomika* (i.e. economic rationality) and *politika* (political control). That this controversy tends to surface whenever factional struggle is acute within the Party leadership suggests its great importance. It should be remembered, however, that the positions taken up by factions or individuals are not always a reliable guide to their real

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views. As in all political systems to greater or lesser degree, opportunism is a factor. It may tend to be particularly common in communist systems, not because more potential leaders than in other systems aspire to the very top posts (this may well not be true), but because survival in the oligarchy is much more vital and impels even the least ambitious to 'preventive' factional activity. To lose a Whitehall ministry is not to be sent to Kazakhstan.

The economics vs. politics dispute has been conducted in public and specifically in such terms, above all in the periods 1962–63, when Khrushchev's position was seriously weakened, and since last October. Naturally, though, it is closely analogous to the Left-Right controversies of the twenties, and to the heavy industry-light industry dispute between the Khrushchev and Malenkov factions in 1954–55. Although the latter dispute was far more a matter of factional tactics than the former, Khrushchev, as the victor, not surprisingly drew the historical parallel: 'These "theoreticians" . . . are trying to prove that at a certain stage of the construction of socialism, the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task, and that light industry then can and should outstrip all other branches of industry. These are totally wrong views . . . nothing but a slandering of the party. They are a belching forth of the right deviation . . . of views hostile to Leninism, which in their time were preached by Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk.' [1]

To trace the underlying causes of Khrushchev's fall, we should recall that it was from about 1959 onwards that he developed the integrated long-term Party strategy which issued in the third Programme of the CPSU, approved by its 22nd congress in October 1961. This strategy was in effect as follows: the prime party aim must be to satisfy popular demands by a rapid and steady rise in Soviet living standards; this requires reduced military spending and a more rationally run economy; this requires a genuine, if limited, détente with the West, and a limit to the amount of aid to foreigners, whether communist or otherwise; and this requires standing up to the Chinese whenever they object.

This strategy, too radical, at least at first, for many Soviet apparatchiks, was nevertheless both realistic and logical: the basic premise about living standards, for example, must have seemed more than ever realistic when food price increases caused rather widespread popular discontent in June 1962. Khrushchev's mistake was that he failed to evolve tactics suitable to his strategy. Ultimately, we suggest, it was this fact which above all precipitated his fall.

IN 1962 two mutually exclusive sets of tactics were being urged on Khrushchev by different pressure groups. One was based on the primacy of economics over politics, and favoured decentralisation, economic incentives, and a greater role for the state vis-à-vis the Party

[1] *Pravda*, 3 February 1955.

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hierarchy. The other favoured increased political and economic discipline, to be achieved largely through a traditional type of central direction. At first, Khrushchev seemed to favour the former set: the constructive 'Liberman debate' was begun in *Pravda* (9 September 1962), a new Lenin document of 1918 was found (ibid., 28 September), conveniently stressing the primacy of economics over politics, and de-stalinisation themes prospered in cultural life. The Cuba reversal in October, however, seems to have weakened Khrushchev: the Liberman debate was soon damped down, and the Party line on culture, destalinisation, and the primacy of economics was significantly modified. Most important of all, though, is the fact that Khrushchev's sweeping and undebated Party reform (*Pravda*, 20 November 1962) appears to have been an ill-considered attempt to compromise between the two mutually exclusive courses being urged on him. Dividing the Party into industrial and agricultural streams in order to involve its cadres more closely in production decisions, he hoped to assert the primacy of economics and thus please the decentralisers. Predictably enough, however, he did not. The change brought greater inefficiency and thus increased the managers' resentment at Party interference: the less expert Party cadre did not usually make such rational decisions as the manager. The centralist pressure groups (mainly economic and ideological apparatchiks), while gratified at several economic recentralisation measures further reducing the powers of the sovnarkhozy, did not approve the change in the role of Party cadres from that of guiding to one of near-administration. The ideological apparatchiks were particularly worried, perceiving quite rightly that the reform was intended to force many of them either into production or out of business.

At the time of Khrushchev's greatest weakness, in March 1963, pressure from his opponents seems to have resulted in the institution of a somewhat anomalous Supreme Sovnarkhoz in an attempt to sabotage some of his personally-fashioned channels of command. Its powers as 'supreme state organ for the coordination of industry and construction', not made public in any detail until July 1964,[2] appeared partly to duplicate those of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Sovnarkhoz USSR (instituted in November 1962). Until the summer of 1964, however, it seems that Khrushchev managed successfully to keep it almost inactive, or at least unpublicised, and its chairman, D. F. Ustinov, one of two first Deputy Premiers, out of the high Party post which his powerful position apparently demanded. The publication by the Supreme Sovnarkhoz in September 1964[3] of an important regulation which it had made a month earlier, and which was possibly held up by Khrushchev, may now be seen as a sign of his failing grip. Now, after his fall, this Supreme Sovnarkhoz may be on the decline, its new

[2] *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, v. 5, pp. 95–98 (signed for press 9 July 1964).
[3] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 26 September 1964.

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chairman, since March 1965, being only a Deputy Premier, V. N. Novikov, who was in the past, however, a close associate of Ustinov.

It is interesting to note that while the Supreme Sovnarkhoz seems eventually to have contributed to curbing Khrushchev's personal power in the industrial sector, what may have been an earlier attempt by his opponents to do the same in the agricultural sector evidently failed. For mysterious reasons, the plan for a complete reorganisation of the agricultural management system[4] of March 1962 was only effectively carried out on the lowest level, that of the new territorial kolkhoz-sovkhoz production administrations. These, it was intended, should be the lowest rung of a complete hierarchy of party-state agricultural committees, all subordinated to a supreme coordinating body, the Union Committee for Agriculture. The new system seemed to contain many contradictions, and possibly to be the compromise outcome of disagreements in the Party presidium. For while at the province and republic level the committee chairman was to be the first Party secretary, the Union Committee was to contain only one member from the top Party organs as against six from the state hierarchy, with one of the latter as Chairman. During the weeks of delay before the Union Committee was finally appointed (*Pravda*, 30 April 1962), there were signs of manoeuvring. Among other moves, the replacement occurred of two men, V. A. Karlov and M. Olshansky, whose posts qualified them for membership. Karlov was replaced as head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee for the union republics by V. I. Polyakov, and Olshansky was replaced as USSR Minister of Agriculture by K. G. Pysin. The fact that the latter, dismissed a year later, and Karlov, have both been restored to high office since Khrushchev's fall, and that Polyakov and Olshansky (made President of the Academy of Agricultural Science in 1962) have both fallen, confirms the existence of allegiances which there was reason to suspect earlier. In any case, the Union Committee for Agriculture, under Deputy-Premier N. G. Ignatov as Chairman, appears never effectively to have operated.[5] From this, one may tentatively conclude that Khrushchev was, first, unable to get the personnel he desired in this potentially high-powered committee, but, second, powerful enough to prevent it operating, preferring to retain for himself the supreme direction of agriculture.

THE foregoing rather cursory discussion of various tensions in Soviet domestic politics over the last few years should serve as a good indicator to some of the underlying reasons for Khrushchev's fall in October 1964.

[4] See Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda*, 6 March 1962, and detailed resolution, ibid. 24 March.

[5] Ignatov was dismissed as a Deputy Premier in December 1962, without any mention of the Union Committee. The *Ezhegodnik BSE* for 1963 does not mention any activity by this committee, nor by any republican agricultural committee, except that

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To consider, first, foreign policy, it now seems clear that Khrushchev's fairly logical intentions, given his basic philosophy and the political circumstances, of deliberately courting a break with China by drawing nearer to the West (for the sake particularly of economic cooperation), were too radical for most of his colleagues. It now appears that under Khrushchev the danger existed of provoking the Chinese even as far as serious border skirmishes, for example through Soviet agents fomenting discontent in Sinkiang.[6] Further, the economic irrationality of bringing all cooperation on the state level to a halt has now been emphasised by the reported renewal of such cooperation. Finally, fear of the serious repercussions which might well follow a formal break with China shows particularly clearly in a recent statement by Shelepin: 'We have considered and still consider that no matter how great our differences have been, they cannot and must not serve as the basis for a split in the socialist camp and the entire communist movement' (*Pravda*, 6 February 1965). Hence, while there has been virtually no sign of any ideological compromising with the Chinese, the question of whether or not to summon a new world conference of communist parties has been left in the balance, without as much loss of face as at one time seemed probable.[7]

Concerning West Germany, the political unorthodoxy of the projected state visit by Khrushchev as well as the danger of undermining the East German regime, were clearly worrying certain presidium members last autumn.[8] Moreover, the mustard gas attack on a West German diplomat near Moscow on 12 September seemed to confirm the impression left by a series of provocative incidents involving Westerners, noticeable particularly from November 1963, that the Committee for State Security (KGB) could be manipulated by presidium members anxious to prevent or at least limit Khrushchev's détente with the West. It was also noticeable after Adzhubei's visit to West Germany in July 1964, that a divergence appeared between *Izvestia* and *Pravda* in their coverage of West Germany: the friendly tone of Adzhubei's paper contrasted with the relative coldness of *Pravda*[9] and suggested that Khrushchev was losing full control of the latter. Moreover, it was evidently only with much difficulty that Khrushchev, on 13 October, his last day in power, pushed through an apology to the Germans for the mustard gas attack, a month after it occurred. Three days later, *Izvestia* fell into line by publishing a caricature of Erhard, and thereafter reflected

for the RSFSR. This committee is stated (p. 145) to have been formed and to have met, some discussions in September 1962 being the only activity mentioned in detail. It seems possible that other republican committees were never formed.

6 As was almost explicitly charged on Peking Radio, 28 December 1964.

7 Communiqué on the Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, *Pravda*, 10 March 1965.

8 See Suslov's militant speech in praise of Ulbricht's regime (*Pravda*, 6 October 1964), and similar speech by Brezhnev in East Germany (ibid. 7 October 1964).

9 E.g., the *Izvestiia* report (7 October 1964) of Suslov's speech (see note 8) omitted his praise of Ulbricht. *Izvestiia* of 8 October omitted the most militant anti-Bonn parts of an Ulbricht speech, which was fully reported in *Pravda* of 7 October.

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a definitely hardened Soviet West German policy. Finally, it is clear that Khrushchev's tendency to allow inter-state frictions to generate highly personal quarrels between himself and, most notably, Mao Tse-tung and Gheorghiu Dej, only helped to make such frictions worse.

In the domestic field, the extent of Khrushchev's inability to produce results in exactly those areas of the economy where his insistent promises had put both his own and the Party's prestige at stake, has now become clearer. Thus it may well not have been the gradual drop in the national income growth rate in recent years (to an average of about 5 per cent) that was most held against Khrushchev, although it is true that the exceptionally bad 1963 rate, now officially stated as 2·7 per cent (in current prices), became known at a specially awkward time.

Probably more important was the economy's failure significantly to raise living standards, especially in the three key sectors of agriculture, housing, and consumer goods. It was recently indicated that, despite the good 1964 harvest, the average annual increase in the gross agricultural product between 1958 and 1964 has been 1·7 per cent, a figure lower than that for the population growth, and this was confirmed by Brezhnev at the recent March plenum (*Pravda*, 27 March 1965). Concerning housing, recent Soviet figures permit the calculation that the construction targets of the 1959–65 plan will not be reached by roughly 14 per cent in the towns and 50 per cent in the country.[10] And, as for consumer goods, the 1964 figures showed disappointing increases of only 3 per cent in light industry and 2 per cent in the food industries (*Pravda*, 20 January 1965). As Soviet sources stress, some of these goods are never sold because of bad quality or design. Indeed, according to *Trud*, Soviet shops have recently been returning to the factories as substandard 20 per cent of clothes deliveries, 9 per cent of shoes, and 10 per cent of socks and stockings.

These disappointing results are now being revealed by Khrushchev's successors more frankly than hitherto, with the clear hint that Khrushchev should take the blame. *Kommunist* has stated that 'Our progress in communist construction . . . in raising living standards, could have been more substantial if economic and cultural development in the last few years had not been hampered by the negative effect of some organisational measures that were a product of subjectivism and haste' (1964, No. 16, p. 5).

THAT Khrushchev's division of the Party into two streams was the most harmful of these measures is clear from the speed with which his successors agreed to its revocation. According to *Kommunist* (loc. cit.), the division 'gave rise to so many difficulties, complications, and errors of different sorts that it was obvious, on balance, that the minuses easily outweighed the pluses'. Brezhnev has pointedly quoted Lenin's words that 'We have terribly many who love to reorganise in every

[10] See *Pravda*, 8 February 1959; Kosygin's speech, ibid. 10 December 1964.

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possible way, and these reorganisations result in such a calamity that I have never known a worse one in my life' (*Pravda*, 7 November 1964). And with special reference to agriculture, he recently complained that 'the numerous, sometimes arbitrary reorganisations gave rise to an atmosphere of nervousness and agitation (*suyeta*), deprived leaders of any perspective, and undermined their faith in their own powers' (*Pravda*, 27 March 1965).

As for the possibility of still further reorganisations last autumn, centralist-minded and pro-politika Soviet leaders were probably alarmed by what seemed to be a Khrushchev-sponsored reopening of the Liberman debate (Trapeznikov in *Pravda*, 17 August 1964). In a speech in late September, unfortunately only paraphrased in a delayed *Pravda* report (2 October 1964), he seems to have indicated to an important joint session of the Party presidium, the Council of Ministers, and many other top Party and state officials, that he favoured Libermanism. Worrying to many more people, however, must have been his new plans for completely reorganising the agricultural system on the basis of separate administrative hierarchies for the production and marketing of different agricultural products. These plans only reached print as an editorial in the specialist weekly *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*,[11] this in itself being a sign of Khrushchev's weakness.

In addition to the reintegration of the Party streams, other organisational changes made since Khrushchev's fall add further weight to the conclusion that the charges against him in this sphere are not greatly exaggerated. First, the Ministry of Agriculture is again becoming, by dint of much reorganisation, the chief coordinating body on the union and republican levels. Second, Khrushchev's 'groundless restrictions' on the private garden plots of peasants and others have been lifted, because they were imposed 'despite the fact that the economic conditions had not yet ripened' for them (*Pravda*, 11 November 1964). That the new leaders are determined that this concession should yield results has been clear from a series of decrees and press articles which have urged the sometimes reluctant local authorities to assist with both the production and the marketing problems of the private sector.[12] Third, by refashioning the marketing rules for the collectivised sector to provide added and more practicable incentives, by discarding such follies as Khrushchev's compulsory maize campaign, and by setting a target for capital investment under the 1966–70 plan which envisages almost twice as much investment per annum as was achieved under the 1958–65 plan (*Pravda*, 27 March 1965), the new Soviet leaders seem to have made as many concessions to economic rationality as are possible within a basically collectivised system.

[11] 3 October 1964. Khrushchev's earlier mention of the plans had been briefly reported in *Pravda*, 10 August 1964, together with his comment that 'some comrades' thought it premature to make them public (no doubt because they opposed them).

[12] See *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 November 1964; article by Sonin in *Politicheskoe Samoobrazovanie*, No. 2, 1965; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 6 and 10 March 1965.

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In the industrial sphere, the fate of the sovnarkhozy has clearly been in the balance and some public discussion of the issue has gone on. Evidently the new leaders are living up to Brezhnev's statement that they 'regard it as their duty to carry out necessary measures to improve the management of the economy, doing this cautiously and without fuss or haste' (*Pravda*, 7 November 1964). But on balance the trend seems to be towards the abolition of the sovnarkhozy, and in favour of the setting up of industrial ministries roughly on the pre-1957 model. Meanwhile, within the severe limits of an unrationalised price system, some of Liberman's ideas are at last being tried on a significant scale, in 400 factories of light industry and also in a few of heavy industry. Against the background of this first tentative step towards a system of market socialism, the vigorous debate about planning methods continues, the goal being to raise the economic growth rate without significantly undermining political control.

TURNING from organisational questions to budget allocations, it is still not clear how great a role these played in Khrushchev's fall. In his speech in late September to all the leading members of the regime, he was clearly sticking closely to what had been his basic outlook since about 1959: 'Whereas during the period of the first 5-year plans and in the post-war years we laid chief stress on the development of heavy industry . . . and on strengthening our defence capability, now, when we have a mighty industry, when the defence of the country is at the proper level, the Party is setting the task of the more rapid development of the branches that produce consumer goods' (*Pravda*, 2 October 1964). It seems probable that Khrushchev thus antagonised both the Party's 'metal-eaters' in general, and the planners in particular, by trying to dictate consumer goods targets which were not only detrimental to heavy industry, but also unrealistically high for the inflexible planning system. The planners had been similarly antagonised in December 1963 by his over-ambitious fertiliser targets, which were slightly cut almost immediately, and once again after his fall. The military, too, were probably annoyed by the cut which Khrushchev must have envisaged for their budget, almost certainly a larger one than that made by his successors.

That Khrushchev's cult of his own personality antagonised his colleagues was fairly clear well before October 1964. While he was politically weak in early 1963, to take one of several examples from this period, Marshal Malinovsky wrote an article about the battle of Stalingrad (*Pravda*, 2 February 1963) in which he showed Khrushchev's role as considerably smaller than that claimed in his 'cult literature'. Malinovsky also ventured to mention the name of Marshal Zhukov, disgraced by Khrushchev in 1957. More recently, it was widely noted in West Germany last July that Adzhubei's visit was arousing a certain resentment in Soviet official circles at Khrushchev's irregular methods. Finally, the publication in *Pravda* on 10 September of the full text of

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Togliatti's memorandum was probably, in view of its clear message that the USSR under Khrushchev was still to a disappointing degree stalinist, pushed through as a result of pressure from his critics (although the opposite interpretation, that Khrushchev wanted to use it as an extra tool for purging his critics as unregenerate Stalinists, cannot be excluded.)

After Khrushchev's fall, since when much evidence of the nature of his cult has emerged, Brezhnev reiterated Togliatti's point in carefully calculated phrases: 'The plenum of last October (1964) was an important landmark on the path of implementing the decisions of the twentieth congress. The plenum was a further proof of the attentiveness shown by the Central Committee to the observance of the norms of party life' (*Pravda*, 7 November 1964). However, despite unofficial reports of new measures to prevent the reappearance of a cult, it seems probable that in fact none has yet been taken. A *Pravda* editorial (1 November 1964) expounded the general line of the Party as being towards greater democracy at all levels and spoke of 'the principle of the collectivity of leadership' as 'the greatest political asset of our party': both themes reminiscent of the early post-Stalin period. It also recalled that 'in its Programme and Statutes the Party envisaged a number of measures aimed against the excessive concentration of power in the hands of individual officials and their escape from the control of the collective', but did not state definitely that these measures had been implemented in the past, nor that they were about to be. Its condemnation of 'rule by fiat' clearly referred to Khrushchev's dictatorial tendencies, as did also the condemnation elsewhere of the type of leader who, 'besides conducting, tries to play all the instruments himself' (*Pravda*, 5 December 1964). Further unofficial evidence on the same theme, mostly from communist sources, is abundant. Like Stalin, Khrushchev evidently came to call fewer and fewer presidium meetings.

Other aspects of Khrushchev's cult, and of the way he manipulated it to outflank his opponents, have been emphasised by events since his fall. His nepotism and his creation of a group of personal lieutenants drawn from outside the highest Party organs, were reflected in the almost immediate dismissal by his successors of his son-in-law Adzhubei, Satyukov, the editor of *Pravda*, Kharlamov, the head of broadcasting, and also the principal members of Khrushchev's private office. The new first Party secretary is not regularly referred to and praised in servile terms, as had become the rule for Khrushchev. Khrushchev's works have been withdrawn from sale, and the process of rewriting all the standard works containing exaggerated praise of him has begun. The granting of lengthy interviews to the foreign press, much practised by Khrushchev, appears to have been banned by his successors. And finally, sessions of the Central Committee now take place, in contrast to Khrushchev's huge and well-publicised gatherings, in considerable secrecy and without the hundreds of outsiders invited under Khrushchev, thus facilitating the expression of divergent views.

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NEITHER the role played by party-military relations in Khruschev's fall, nor the post-Khrushchev trend in this sphere, is yet clear. To gain some perspective, it should be recalled that the limited autonomy accumulated by the military in the years after Stalin's death was reduced on Zhukov's fall in 1957 and came under further pressure from about 1960 onwards. Khrushchev wanted to make substantial cuts in the military budget allocations, largely at the expense of the most vulnerable item, the conventional ground forces, in order to invest more in consumer industries. To rationalise this militarily, he was obliged to lay down the law about military doctrine, and he favoured the 'cheap' strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. On the three main party-military issues of allocations, strategy-formation, and the degree of party control in general, the majority of the military leaders consistently tried to resist Khrushchev's pressure. Whenever Krushchev felt his position to be strong, as in January 1960, spring 1962, and December 1963, he was on the offensive. Whenever he was weak, in June 1961, February 1963, and August 1964, the military (with support in the presidium?) counter-attacked. The military challenge of August 1964 [13] was so provocative that it may possibly have been sanctioned by a presidium faction opposing Khrushchev and anxious to win the military's sympathy. Whatever the case, Khrushchev seems to have counter-attacked at about this time by breaking up Marshal Chuikov's ground forces command and putting its different sections directly under the Ministry of Defence. His final counter-attack on budget allocations has already been discussed. It may be that his claim about the USSR possessing 'a terrible new weapon', made to a delegation of Japanese socialists and soon publicly retracted (*Izvestia*, 19 September 1964), was intended to help him in his efforts to rationalise a cut in the military budget.

One of the most insistent themes of the new Party leaders, immediately after Khrushchev's fall, was their assertion that the Party and the government 'have taken and will take' measures to strengthen the country's defence capability.[14] Since then, the most notable events have been, first, the 4 per cent cut in the declared military budget for 1965, which may well have been at least partly compensated by the unexpected increases in other items which are not shown as being partially military; and, second, Marshal Sokolovsky's assertion at a press conference that the current strength of the Soviet forces is 2,423,000 men, a figure Khrushchev declared as his aim in January 1960, and one significantly lower than current Western estimates.

Concerning strategy, the military has, not surprisingly, taken the opportunity to criticise Khrushchev, although not by name, and some of his policies. In the words of Marshal Zakharov, 'A subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained schemes and superficiality

[13] Articles by Marshal Sokolovsky and Major-General Cherednichenko, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 and 28 August 1964.

[14] See speeches by Kosygin, *Pravda*, 20 October, 26 November 1964; *Pravda* editorial, 17 October; *Krasnaya Zvezda* editorial, 23 October 1964.

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can . . . cause irreparable harm '.[15] The Chinese have also resumed their previous cautious effort to drive a wedge between the 'revisionist' CPSU leadership and the (as they hope) less anti-Chinese military, by stating that Khrushchev 'did not hesitate to damage the defence capabilities of the Soviet Union itself' by signing the nuclear test-ban treaty.[16] The Soviet military seem, however, to have made a positive gain in the recent clear hints that the Khrushchev strategy of massive retaliation is being changed to a Western-style one of flexible response.[17] But lest they might think that de-khrushchevisation means significantly less Party control, a full-scale drive for political instruction at all levels of the armed forces was announced in January.[18]

Perhaps to try to compensate for the unpopular increase in political control, as well as for the failure to promote any military men in the leading Party organs, as occurred after the 1957 upheaval, the Party has been making a considerable effort to flatter the military in various ways. Zhukov's rehabilitation seems to be gathering momentum; four military leaders, executed after false denunciations in Lenin's day, have been rehabilitated [19]; the Organisation of Soviet War Veterans has held what was only its second all-union conference since its foundation in 1956, amid much publicity and with addresses by Shelepin and Yepishev.[20]

REVIEWING all these data, it may even seem surprising that Khrushchev was not ousted earlier. In domestic affairs particularly, but also in external affairs, crises appeared last autumn to be multiplying uncomfortably. In both spheres Krushchev had very little room for manoeuvre. With his belief in the possibility of surmounting any difficulty if given the right organisers, he must have wanted badly to shake up the presidium, for its opposition to many of his plans was impelling him to increasingly devious and inefficient outflanking devices. He was unable to resort to dismissals, as a deliberate solidarity had evidently arisen among presidium members against any purging, no full member having been dismissed during the three years since the twenty-second congress. Now, however, in the summer of 1964, it seems to have become known that Khrushchev intended to promote Adzhubei to high office; if this were so, it must have aroused fears in presidium members that he might be preparing to force through a purge, for there was unlikely to be a majority for someone whom they regarded as an unlikeable opportunist. It would be natural for them to unite, not merely for negative opposition to Khrushchev, but in order to demand that he either

[15] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 4 February 1965.
[16] *People's Daily*, 18 November 1963; *Red Flag*, 20 November 1964.
[17] See, e.g., the communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, *Pravda*, 22 January 1965.
[18] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 January 1965.
[19] *Nedelya*, No. 8, 1965; *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 19 March 1965.
[20] See *Pravda*, 25, 26, 27 February 1965; Moscow Radio, 25, 26 February.

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submit to collective leadership or retire. Both those who believed in the primacy of ekonomika and those who stressed politika must have considered the ageing Khrushchev not only dangerously unpredictable, but above all unsuccessful in maintaining the economic growth rate and raising living standards. The former group was probably closer to his general intentions than the latter, and must have been particularly annoyed by his superficial and illogical methods for putting these intentions into practice. The second group doubtless considered the loss of discipline and strong central control, caused by Khrushchev's constant reforms, to be the main reason for the economic failures.

There does not appear to be any reliable evidence as to how long in advance it had been planned to present what was probably an unacceptable ultimatum to Khrushchev. Clearly, opposition to him had been frequent since at least 1962, and clearly also, the bold step of presenting him with an ultimatum required preparations which could not be made in a few days, and which also required the cooperation of the KGB. It seems possible that, as unofficial communist sources have stated, the catalyst to determined action was the publication on 2 October of the paraphrase of Khrushchev's speech at the expanded joint session of the Party presidium and the Council of Ministers. The session is said to have ended in deadlock because of disagreements over basic resource allocations for the 1966–70 plan. The publication of Khrushchev's views alone, together with an editorial note announcing that Gosplan had been instructed to make new recommendations on the 'basic directions' for economic development, strongly, but falsely, implied that Khrushchev's views had been accepted. This version is supported by the fact that the meeting had never been announced and that the first account of it was delayed by a week. Furthermore, there followed what seemed to be the start of a press campaign in favour of Khrushchev's views. (*Pravda* editorial, 12 October, and articles in support of Libermanism, *Pravda*, 4 and 8 October.) Finally, it should be noted that the 1965 budget of the new leadership (*Izvestia*, 10 December) shows only small changes in allocations for the military and consumer industries. This suggests that those groups wanting to modify Khrushchev's plans may have been at least partially appeased.

In any case, with Khrushchev's latest outflanking operation safely launched, the most prominent members of his inner group, except for Adzhubei, had by 13 October dispersed: Satyukov and Kharlamov abroad and Khrushchev himself to the Black Sea. It appears that on 12 October the presidium, minus Khrushchev, met in Moscow and decided unanimously to act. The prime movers, probably among others, seem to have been Suslov, Polyansky, and Shelepin. The latter was not on the presidium, but was a Central Committee secretary, ex-head of the KGB and, since 1962, head of the Party-State Control Committee. Probably on the same day, most of the members of the Central Committee except, it seems, for some who were well known to be Khrushchev supporters, were called to Moscow. On the morning of the 13th,

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Khrushchev was summoned to Moscow. In reply to the presidium's ultimatum, he demanded to appeal to the Central Committee, as the presidium had anticipated. During a long session extending through the night into the 14th, the Central Committee heard lengthy speeches from Suslov and Polyansky, the former dwelling particularly on Khrushchev's cult, the latter on his agricultural failures, and also a long self-defence by Khrushchev. Khrushchev was then voted out, apparently gaining about 30 per cent of the votes.

The report from the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, 16 October) states that the decrees relieving Khrushchev of the premiership and appointing Kosygin were approved unanimously, whereas the report from the Central Committee states only that Brezhnev was elected as first Party Secretary. Although Brezhnev has since been appointed to succeed Khrushchev as chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission, Khrushchev still holds formally his seats in the Supreme Soviet and the Party Central Committee.

Since his fall, there have been numerous changes in Party personnel, many of which have removed Khrushchev supporters and restored men he had demoted, which suggests that he had often made able men into scapegoats. The most notable examples are Marshal Zakharov, removed as Chief of the General Staff in 1963 and restored after the death of Marshal Biryuzov (19 October 1964); V. V. Matskevich, removed as Minister of Agriculture at the end of 1960 and now restored; D. Kunayev and M. B. Beisebayev, respectively first Secretary of the Kazakh party and Premier of Kazakhstan until 1962, now restored to these posts (*Pravda*, 8 December 1964); I. V. Kapitonov, dismissed as first Secretary of the Moscow obkom in 1959, now appointed head of the Central Committee department of party organs for the RSFSR; A. V. Basov, dismissed as first secretary of the Rostov obkom in 1962, now appointed Minister of Agriculture for the RSFSR (*Pravda*, 3 March 1965); V. N. Novikov, dismissed as a USSR Deputy-Premier in 1962, now restored (*Pravda*, 27 March 1965); and Karlov and Pysin, whose fall and rise have already been mentioned.

THE present personnel in the top Party and state posts number twenty-one or twenty-two (the position of Titov is not quite certain). The accompanying chart shows significant changes since Khrushchev's fall. There is still an air of uncertainty about the present structure which seems likely to continue until a single dominant leader emerges to co-ordinate policy. It is hard to forecast who this might be; the five most likely candidates are Shelepin, Brezhnev, Polyansky, Podgorny, and Demichev. Of these, it will be noted that Shelepin (aged 46) is the only one to be represented in three of the four most important bodies, the presidium, the secretariat and the Council of Ministers. His elevation to full membership of the presidium at last November's Central Committee plenum, thus by-passing the usual stage of candidate, is almost

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certainly to be explained by his important role in the dismissal of Khrushchev. This probably consisted in ensuring the cooperation of the KGB, which he ran from 1958 to 1961. Before 1958 he had made his entire career in the central apparatus of the Komsomol, rising to become first Secretary in 1952. He seems to be of the calibre to rise to the top, his main handicap being the distrust aroused in others by his close association with the two principal control agencies. Partly, perhaps, in order to compensate for this, and also to present himself as being pro-ekonomika as well as pro-politika, his Party-State Control Committee passed a resolution proposing various ways of giving special assistance to the lagging light industries (*Izvestia*, 17 November 1964). On the other hand, his signature under some military obituaries suggested that the new collective leadership had appointed him, at least temporarily, as the Party's overseer of the military.

Brezhnev (58) was widely regarded last October as a compromise choice as first Secretary. He was thought to have been chosen partly in order to show a certain continuity, as he had been Khrushchev's designated successor, and partly because he would not antagonise any particular faction. He was also considered too easy-going, relatively speaking, to grow into another Khrushchev. At first his failure to gain any additional important posts, coupled with his generally unassertive leadership, seemed to confirm this view of him as a transitional figure who would remain only until more powerful political forces had had the time to issue in a resultant. Since February, however, he has become more prominent, and begun to act in a state capacity as well as in a Party one, although he holds no state post. Thus it is possible that he is entrenching himself, and if so, he might well gain the chairmanship of the RSFSR Bureau. The succession to this important post, effectively vacant since Khrushchev's fall, must evidently be causing dispute.

Podgorny (61) seems, like Brezhnev, not to be over-committed to either politika or ekonomika, yet to be considerably more dynamic in character. Charged last November with supervising the reuniting of the Party streams, he evidently became second Secretary in overall charge of cadres. In the past, however, he was a particularly close collaborator of Khrushchev's, and he made this embarrassingly clear in a speech printed as late as 11 October (*Pravda*). The recent appointment of Titov as second Secretary of the Kazakh Party, presumably indicating his dismissal as a Party Secretary, would seem to be a blow for Podgorny, whose protégé Titov has long been, first in the Ukrainian Party apparatus, and later in the central secretariat.

Polyansky (47) has been less prominent than expected since Khrushchev's fall, in which he evidently played a considerable role. A tough but cultured man, he is an expert on agriculture and is probably the chief Party overseer in this field. He holds a Deputy Premiership, and seems to have the bias of a practical man towards ekonomika. Demichev (46), a Party Secretary since 1961, was made candidate member of the presidium last November. Previously head of the Central Committee

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bureau for the Chemical and Light Industries, he has recently been unofficially reported as having replaced the dismissed secretary Ilyichev, Khrushchev's personal ideologist, as head of the Central Committee's ideological department. (The fate of Ilyichev's ideological commission is not yet clear.)

Of the eight remaining full members of the twelve-man presidium, Kosygin (60) has been the single most prominent man in the new leadership, probably because he is too much of a 'praktik' to aspire to the first secretaryship and can thus speak his mind without too much thought for factional manoeuvres. Suslov (63) has been very active in his duties as overseer of international communist affairs, but his health is poor, and he is too committed an advocate of tight political control to have much chance for the first secretaryship when the trend seems to be in the other direction; Mikoyan (69) is President of the USSR and an experienced negotiator, but his age and poor health suggest that his influence must be on the decline; Mazurov (50), after nearly eight years as a candidate, was surprisingly promoted at the recent March plenum to full presidium membership and also to the first Deputy-Premiership, possibly to be a genuinely party-minded overseer in the state apparatus; Kirilenko (58), the only first Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau and probably the acting Chairman, has been responsible for the industry of the RSFSR, but he was closely associated with Khrushchev and seems now to be weak; Voronov (54) is the Premier of the RSFSR, but his close association with many of Khrushchev's agricultural schemes appears to have put him on the decline; Shelest (56) is the tough, unintellectual first Secretary of the Ukrainian party, elected to full presidium membership last November; and Shvernik (76) is almost inactive.

Of the six candidates, the second most powerful, after Demichev, is probably Ustinov (56). At the recent March plenum he was most surprisingly relieved of his first Deputy-Premiership and, having spent all his career in the state apparatus, notably in running the defence industries, was appointed to the Party secretariat, thus balancing the curious switch by Mazurov. Efremov (50) seems to be on the decline, as last December he was appointed first Secretary of the Stavropol kraikom, thus presumably losing his first Deputy Chairmanship of the RSFSR Bureau (with responsibilities for agriculture). Finally, Grishin (48) is head of the trade unions, and Mzhavanadze (60) and Rashidov (50) are first Secretaries of, respectively, the Georgian and Uzbek parties.

Of the (probably) nine Party secretaries, the three not yet mentioned are Andropov, responsible for ruling foreign communist parties; Ponomarev, a close associate of Suslov and responsible for non-ruling foreign communist parties; and Rudakov, responsible for heavy industry and construction.

Since the election of eight new full members to the Central Committee at last November's plenum, it is clear, from a comparison of the present structure of the committee with its structure at the time of the

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22nd Party congress, that representation of the Party apparatus has increased significantly, at the expense of the state and the military. It was also a notable feature of the November personnel changes that while the military gained no promotions at all, the forces of political control were rewarded for their part in ousting Khrushchev by the elevation of Shelepin to the presidium, and of Semichastny (head of the KGB) and Yepishev (head of the Main Political Administration of the Army) to full membership of the Central Committee. The KGB, which was already trying to develop its public image through the press before last October, has been doing so even more noticeably since. But there have been no real signs of any increase in its general activity, contrary to the expectations of some observers.

The total membership of the Party, including candidates, is now 11,758,000 (*The Times*, 24 May 1965), of which a fifth are women (*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 3, 1965). The net rise over the last three years has thus been about eighteen per cent.

Concerning the atmosphere of Party life since last October, along with a considerable drive for 'greater democracy' and franker speaking there has been a hint of an intended purge of Khrushchev-type leaders in the lower ranks, whose methods 'can only revive the morality of the period of the cult of personality' (*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 20, 1964, editorial). Accounts of the reuniting of separate obkoms do not, however, suggest any very drastic changes. Their new membership has generally been very similar to what it was before December 1962, the industrial or agricultural first Secretary taking over as the new leader depending on whether industry or agriculture predominates in the oblast. Although all Party members were given a report on Khrushchev's errors, the ban which has clearly been imposed on criticising him in public must be hindering the new drive for plain speaking. There are indications, however, that the Central Committee may, if perhaps only temporarily, be becoming more important as an arena for genuine debate.

Central Committee			*Council of Ministers*
Presidium	*Secretariat*	*Bureau for the RSFSR*	
Brezhnev	Brezhnev		
Kosygin	(1st Sec.)		Kosygin (Chairman)
Mazurov			Mazurov (1st D. Ch.)
Polyansky			Polyansky (D. Ch.; probably responsible for agriculture)
Shelepin	Shelepin		Shelepin (D. Ch.; Committee of Party State Control)
Podgorny	Podgorny		
Suslov	Suslov		

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Central Committee			*Council of Ministers*
Presidium	*Secretariat*	*Bureau for the RSFSR*	
Kirilenko		Kirilenko (1st D. Ch.)	
Voronov		Voronov	
Mikoyan			
Shvernik			
Shelest			
Efremov		Efremov	
Grishin			
Mzhavanadze			
Rashidov			
Demichev	Demichev		
Ustinov	Ustinov		
	Andropov		
	Ponomarev		
	Rudakov		
	Titov (?)		
		Egorychev	Dymshits (deputy chairman, USSR Sovnarkhoz)
		Enyutin	Lesechko (deputy chairman, Commission of Presidium of Council of Ministers for Comecon)
		Ignatov	Lomako (deputy chairman, Gosplan)
		Kapitonov	Novikov, I. T. (deputy chairman, Gosstroi)
		Karlov	Rudnev (deputy chairman, Coordination of Scientific Research)
		Tolstikov	Smirnov, L. V. (deputy chairman, probably responsible for defence industries)
		Yasnov	Novikov, V. N. (deputy chairman, Supreme Sovnarkhoz)

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IF an attempt is to be made to sum up tentatively the general trends in Party policy since last October, two useful indicators must be studied: changes in cultural policy and in ideological theory. The Party line on culture has, by its zigzags, clearly shown the impossibility of developing any consistency until a fairly stable balance of forces has been reached in the leadership. In the last months there have been six major Party pronouncements on culture, five editorials in *Pravda* and a long article by its new editor, Rumyantsev. The first post-Khrushchev editorial (1 Nov.) was very 'dogmatist' in tone, stressing the need for 'partiinost' and 'narodnost', perhaps in reply to Tvardovsky's impressive list of liberal writers (*Lit. Gaz.* 27 Oct.), whom he intended to publish in *Novy Mir* in 1965.

The second (22 Nov.) was somewhat more 'liberal', but the third (9 Jan.) contained a sweeping condemnation of 'bourgeois, dogmatist, revisionist and aesthetic conceptions' of art, and the fourth (17 Jan.) continued this trend by particularly praising certain well-known 'dogmatist' writers, evidently trying to boost their position at the forthcoming meetings of the Moscow and Leningrad branches of the Union of Writers. Although the fifth editorial (24 Jan.), together with the weekly *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (29 Jan.), criticised the speeches of certain 'liberals' at the Moscow meeting, the tone was more moderate than a week earlier. Both in Moscow and Leningrad, the liberals had had much more success than the dogmatists in the elections for the branch organs and also for the branch delegations to the second congress of the RSFSR Union of Writers. Before its opening, Rumyantsev's *Pravda* article appeared (21 Feb.) under the title 'The Party and the Intelligentsia'. Stressing the need for a conflict of styles and theories in science and art, and stating that the situation now resembled that of the twenties, it was the most liberal Party statement for many years, despite the assertion that all creative activity must still go on within the framework of socialist realism and dialectical materialism. Perhaps to balance this, the dogmatist writer Yu. Barabash wrote a characteristic article in *Pravda* a few days later (26 Feb.), praising such fellow-thinkers as Kochetov and Markov. Significantly, however, no *Pravda* editorial appeared on the same lines.

Although the congress of the RSFSR Writers' Union passed without, rather mysteriously, any liberal voices being raised, a probably outstanding turning point was reached with the dismissal of Ilyichev and a resounding attack in *Pravda* (28 March) on the chief dogmatist journal, *Oktyabr*. The latter was said to be 'dismal in content, weak in literary quality and repetitive in form'. This turn of events, coupled with the well-publicised liberation of Soviet biology from the yoke of Lysenkoism, strongly suggests that, for the moment at least, the majority in the Party Presidium favours a liberal line in art and science.

Such a line would clearly seem to be more in accord with a pro-ekonomika than a pro-politika overall policy. That the emphasis of the new Party leadership does indeed seem to be on the former is not

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surprising when both the overall complexion of the leaders and also the Soviet economy's need for modernisation are considered. Nevertheless there has been considerable public dispute on policy since last October, reflected in ideological conflicts, and this doubtless explains the hesitancy of the regime to take any big new initiatives. The biggest initiative so far has been the new agricultural policy, but the tricky task, if it is to be carried out, of reducing other allocations in order to find the finance does not yet appear to have been carried through.

To sum up briefly the ideological discussion so far, we should recall that immediately after Khrushchev's fall there was a campaign to stress the 'increasing role of the Party' and the great importance of Marxist-Leninist theory. In *Izvestia*, however, there soon began to appear articles emphasising the need for 'economic levers' and appropriate organisational changes (e.g. 10 and 17 Nov.), and for more independence for workers in the government apparatus, it being noted that 'as a result [of Khrushchev's 1962 Party reform] their role in economic construction was lowered, . . . and services to the population developed difficulties' (27 Nov.). It would appear that an attempt to mediate in this conflict was made in an important *Pravda* article (6 Dec.), entitled 'The State of the whole people', where it was claimed that in such a state ekonomika and politika were naturally in harmony. There followed however (*Pravda*, 13 and 16 Dec.) militant assertions that communists must always 'answer for everything' and increase their role in the economic and cultural life of the country. By devious reasoning, this line was later shown to be in harmony with the growing democratisation of the country (*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 2, 1965, article by N. Lomakin). The most recent authoritative line, however, argued by L. Leontiev in *Pravda* (7 March), is to proclaim the 'unity of politics and economics', while in fact giving more emphasis to the latter and cautiously stressing the need for economic reform. Whether cautious reform will suffice to set the Soviet economy on the desired track is uncertain, but until further shifts occur in the CPSU leadership this will probably remain the basic approach.

* * *

To tie these rather diffuse reflections together, it is worth summarising the main lines of argument. Khrushchev's strategy for raising living standards probably had wide approval, but for various reasons, some deriving from the man's character and political style, the goods were just not being produced. Consequently, other Presidium members had cause to think out and discreetly canvass their own remedies. Moreover all of them, including Khrushchev, must have feared that they would be cast as the scapegoats by some dominant faction or individual. Khrushchev therefore sought to make his own situation impregnable, and also devised various ways of pushing his ideas through by outflanking the opposition in the Presidium. However, the country's economy continued virtually to stagnate in the sectors affecting living standards.

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This aggravated the resentment of Presidium members at Khrushchev's methods and at their inability to influence them, thus creating a state of tension in which Khrushchev would eventually have to purge his main opponents, or they would have to get rid of him. In the event, Khrushchev's cult and his organisational defences were not strong enough to save him, although one may well ponder the intriguing question: how much did the opposition owe their success to his carelessness? How 'inevitable', in fact, was his fall? That there have been only slight changes in the Party's domestic policy since last October can probably be explained on the assumption that Khrushchev was defeated by a coalition of very diverse forces among whom conflicts of policy have not yet been decisively resolved.

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PARTY AND GOVERNMENT REFORMS

A Provisional Balance Sheet

Boris Meissner

STALIN'S AUTOCRATIC RULE rested on a state of equilibrium between the apparatus of the party, the machinery of government (including the administration of the economy), the police, and the armed forces. Liaison between these four pillars of power was provided by his private secretariat, which increasingly came to control the levers of power.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev brought these almost autonomous power structures one by one under party control, and in this way replaced Stalin's absolutism by that of the party, which in turn was run on the principle of collective leadership. This made Khrushchev's position far more dependent on the goodwill of the party bureaucracy than Stalin's had ever been, as was clearly revealed at the March 1962 plenary session of the CPSU central committee, when Khrushchev failed to gain support for his conception of the communist welfare state. Two subsequent leadership crises led to his downfall. Though he had restored party rule and was responsible both for the abatement of the terror and an incalculable improvement in the whole climate of social relationships, he did not tamper with the basic totalitarian features of the regime.

Stalin's personal despotism has been responsible for the altogether exaggerated importance attached to the part mass terror plays in a totalitarian system. No such form of government will ever be able to dispense completely with fear as a means of social compulsion, but this is not to say that it has by definition to rely on it. In fact, the essence of totalitarianism seems to lie not so much in the extent of its terror, as in its absolute control over all aspects of life and thought, linked to a kind of 'legalised terror' which, backed by the penal code, lays down norms of behaviour in such key areas as the economy. Hence any Soviet-type totalitarianism can be distinguished by the three main criteria which have been taken over unchanged by all Stalin's successors.

1. *The supremacy of the party*

In the Soviet Union the single party at one and the same time upholds the permanent dictatorship, controls all the activities of the government, and acts as the centre of a world-wide movement. Based on concepts evolved by Lenin and put into practice by Stalin, the 'party of a new type', having achieved absolute power, begot the 'new type of state'. One of the salient features of the single-party state was that from the very beginning it marshalled the masses into huge social organisations, which Stalin called 'transmission belts' or 'levers'. Their object was on the one hand to communicate party decisions to the masses, and on the other to create the illusion that these edicts were solidly supported by the people. The entire system of mass organisations, including the party itself, served as the mechanism of

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the dictatorship, articulating the structure of the totalitarian state. Within this framework the Soviets, whose structure and function as the machinery of government were laid down in the (still valid) 1936 constitution, were but one of many such transmission belts. Stalin called the party the 'very hub of power', but it is not the same as state power.

This system, based on the permanent dictatorship of the party, continued unchanged under Stalin's successors. Indeed, the 'undivided leadership' of the 'ruling party' is continually emphasised in Soviet legal literature, which is at pains to prove that the 'leading role' of the CPSU in relation to all other organisations in Soviet society is firmly rooted in the constitution itself.

How can this self-asserted and unrestricted rule of the party be reconciled with Khrushchev's contention, embodied in the 1961 party programme, that the USSR had progressed from the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to 'the state of the whole people'? Where does the withering away of the dictatorship and the growth of democracy manifest itself in the Soviet state's transition to communism? Until now, it has been contrary to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state to differentiate between 'the dictatorship' and the state. Until this withers away completely, every state is said to be the political organisation of a class and consequently forms a dictatorial power structure. The dismantling of the dictatorship implied in the doctrine of the ultimate withering away of the state, which Lenin took over from Marx and Engels, presupposes the disappearance of the coercive state powers and of the entire state structure.

Khrushchev supported his deviation with the argument that the CPSU had changed from the 'vanguard of the proletariat' into a party of the people as a whole, and that the class struggle in the Soviet Union had come to an end. If this were the case, it would follow from accepted doctrine that in response to the altered class structure of society, the party as the ruling body was bound to 'wither away', together with the state, at an accelerating pace.

Khrushchev tried to bring developments into line with the desired 'withering away of our state' when, at the twenty-first party congress of January-February 1959, he proposed that the governmental functions of the Soviets, that is of the state machinery, should be transferred to the 'social organisations', that is to the party and the other mass organisations. His remarks revealed the extremely limited character of the changes he had in mind. Examples he gave related to cultural and medical matters, to sport and the maintenance of public order. The health services, he suggested, should be run by the trade unions in the towns and by the local Soviets in the villages; sport, he thought, should become the responsibility of voluntary bodies. As to the maintenance of public order—pre-eminently a prerogative of the state—he suggested that this could in part be handed over to a people's militia and to the comradely courts.

These proposals, most of them carried out by now, do not signify any decline in the power of the state. They represent no more than a mere reshuffling of functions within the machinery of dictatorship, or what is nowadays called 'the mechanism of socialist democracy'. Not even the wholesale transfer of governmental activities to the party and

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its subordinate mass organisations would materially affect the autocratic nature of the regime, for in the political and sociological sense these are state-political bodies. A much more significant departure from established theory is the doctrine of the 'party's immortality' which Khrushchev first introduced in 1958. It implies nothing less than that the 'classless society' (quite apart from its utopian character) remains forever unattainable, since the disappearance of all coercive powers is, according to Marx, the precondition for the emergence of the millenial communist society.

Whatever utopias may still be entertained, the measures so far taken to strengthen Soviet democracy have been trifling. Statutory retirement and the principle of collective leadership, now part of the operative constitutional structure since they are embodied in the party programme and statutes, stress rather than minimise the oligarchical features of the regime. Yet these measures, and particularly a cut-back in the number of full-time party functionaries, could, if they were really put into operation, promote the move towards greater democracy. However, no such liberalisation was really contemplated. Every proposal designed to abolish or weaken the principle of 'monolithic unity' and so to allow for some measure of dissent within the party, was firmly rejected. Compulsory retirement, designed to renew part of the leadership cadres within stated intervals, stopped short of the hierarchy of party secretaries, who as a body form the backbone of the party bureaucracy and are the actual executors of the party permanent dictatorship. For all the talk of 'internal party democracy' during the last few years, the autocratic party structure remained as inviolate under Khrushchev as the totalitarian organisational principles on which it rested; a new label has been devised, 'the state of the whole people', but the party has not surrendered any of its absolute power.

On the contrary, Khrushchev's administrative reforms enlarged rather than curtailed the area of party authority. In the legal field its organs not only took over the legal functions entrusted to government agencies, but also the greater part of those hitherto discharged by the state.

On the other hand Khrushchev managed to put an end to the cult of the leader and to other symptoms of degenerate despotism, rampant towards the end of the Stalinist era. He also initiated a limited decentralisation of the party administration, and modified its structure in other respects. Within today's enlarged and strengthened party bureaucracy the decision-making powers are delegated, as they were in the twenties, to a 'leadership-collective' which, by using the coopting device, can in practice perpetuate its own existence. This small body of men not only takes all political decisions, but also directs every one of the processes that vitally affect social integration and change.

Only two institutions, exclusively representative of Stalin's personal autocracy, were completely scrapped. The post of 'Vozhd', which never had any constitutional basis, and his private secretariat, with Poskrebyshev, Stalin's loyal liegeman, at its head.

The new leadership, more oligarchical in character, is also more unstable, and hence increasingly dependent on the central committee and the forces it represents. The party, which under the aegis of Stalin was exclusively controlled from above, is now also open to pressures from below, which favours any move towards a relaxation of totalitarianism.

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2. *Total controls*

Apart from his personal autocracy, Stalin's decisive contribution to party rule was the introduction of 'controls from above', embracing every social organisation and every aspect of corporate life, including the means of communication and the sources of information. The use of mass terror testified to the effectiveness of these control mechanisms. They destroyed all personal initiative and became particularly noticeable by their paralysing impact on all cultural and intellectual activities. In the last years of Stalin's life the stagnation spread to the economy, where it caused increasing tensions. Not even the strait-jacket of cunning differentials, which Stalin had forced on Soviet society, could compensate for the loss of individual initiative and social mobility.

The more recent social developments were marked by Khrushchev's efforts to attain greater social spontaneity and to adapt the control mechanism to changing internal needs, while at the same time trying to uphold the totalitarian pretensions of one-party rule. Since he clearly realised that without social spontaneity no progress was possible, he tried simultaneously both to stimulate and to control the impulses making for social change. In the long run the demand for greater voluntary effort and the claims of the unified control organs of party and state will, however, prove to be irreconcilable.[1] The erratic course taken by Khrushchev's administrative reforms reflects the pressures with which the Soviet Prime Minister and party leader had to contend, as he strove to balance the requirements of a unified leadership against the continuous demands for change generated by an evolving society. The same unresolved problems are now facing the new leadership.

3. *Total planning*

Planning in the Soviet Union is designed to accord with the ideological aims of the state-party, and is therefore determined by political objectives. It covers not only the economy and culture of the country, but also whatever goals are aimed at in the political sphere.

The object of total planning is the creation of the new man in the image of communist ideology. The impulses needed for the transition of the existing socialist society towards the achievement of full communism were believed to be mainly of an evolutionary nature, though none the less susceptible to ideological control and educational effort. Revolutionary interference 'from above' would be applied only in very exceptional circumstances. The common denominator of all these managed social transformations is their planned character, and it is this element of total planning, rather than the emergence of the new revolutionary man, which represents the characteristic constituent of the totalitarian regime. The enduring changes wrought in the social structure by the application of detailed planning procedures supply the ultimate justification both for the party's monopoly of power and for the totalitarian social controls it exercises.

Because any retreat from the final objective—the attainment of communism—would deprive the party of its raison d'être, Khrushchev

[1] See B. Meissner, 'Die Grosse Verwaltungsreform Chruschtschows', *Osteuropa*, 1963, p. 82.

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not only clung to it desperately, but even committed himself in the party programme to the date on which the transition was to be achieved. A date which, significantly, his successors have so far not modified.

Khrushchev's administrative reforms

The Soviet Union remained under Khrushchev, what it had been under Stalin, a tightly centralised and totally planned state. From these structural characteristics two conclusions can be drawn: First, without a significant reduction in the function and activities of the inflated administrative and planning apparatus, there is little hope for a relaxation of totalitarian rule. Liberalising tendencies are hamstrung both by the structure of the state and the dictatorship of the party. Second, in the given framework of the Soviet Union's governmental, economic, and party organisation, decentralisation is feasible only within very narrow limits.

Khrushchev's reforms of 1957 represented the first attempt at decentralisation by vesting some real authority and decision-making powers in local and regional bodies. The administrative reforms of 1962 reflected similar tendencies by granting greater independence to industrial concerns and wider planning powers to the Union Republics. These centrifugal trends were, however, counterbalanced by a greater degree of centralised economic direction exercised in the rural areas primarily by the party, which was also given extensive supervisory powers over the whole economy.

Irrespective of the self-contradictory moves in the decentralisation issue, two problems have invariably confronted any administrative reformer in the Soviet Union. These concern the question whether the administration should be organised along departmental or funtional lines, and whether it should be based on regional or industrial principles. Stalin's 1934 reforms, while favouring departmental organisation at the administrative level, represented a compromise between the regional and the industrial principle. The institutions on which the entire social and constitutional order rested were based on the regional-industrial relationships evolved between 1934–1962. The party was modelled on them and their salient features were incorporated with only minor modifications into the new party statutes of 1961.

The industrial-territorial structure, geared to a departmentalised administration, made for clear-cut divisions between state and party, and allowed the central authorities direct control over the industrially and regionally organised administrative units.

The party's organisational scheme closely paralleled that of the regionally-based state authority. The only exception was the party group at the lowest level, which was organised exclusively at the point of production. Although there were party cells in all factories, kolkhozy, and sovkhozy, none was found in the village communities (selsoviet), the lowest unit of administration in the countryside.

The economic councils (sovnarkhozy) of May 1957 came under the aegis of the regional party authorities and tended to stress organisational principles conceived on regional lines against those that favoured the

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production principle. In this way the horizontally structured economic councils began to replace the vertically integrated ministerial organisations.

The 1962 reforms marked a swing in the opposite direction. The administration of the economy was remodelled to conform more closely to the governmental machinery, while at the same time remaining under the authority of the party. After the dualism of state and party under Stalin, and the incipient trialism of state, party, and economy in the post-1957 era, a certain tendency towards a monistic fusion of the various administrative functions now became evident. At the same time, in both party and state structure, the production rather than the regional administrative principle acquired added emphasis. However unlike the 1957 reforms, those of 1962 deeply affected, and indeed transformed, the organisational structure of the party itself.

The party, down to its local level, was divided into two distinct columns of unequal size; one, composed predominantly of industrial workers and the 'intelligentsia', had an approximate membership of 7·5 million, the other consisted mainly of peasants and mustered 2·5 million members. At the level of the Union Republics the two columns reunited again. This bifurcation along occupational lines was to give the party's executive organs control over production both in industry and agriculture. The party, no longer confined to a mere advisory role as before, was now to assure direct executive powers in the administration itself.

By thus allowing the clear-cut distinctions between party and state to become blurred, Khrushchev violated one of the basic concepts of Lenin, which had hitherto been axiomatic in Soviet constitutional and administrative thinking. It stipulated that the party was to inspire and supervise, but not to run the machinery of government.

The reforms of March 1963 represented a further departure by creating a kind of supreme economic council (VSNKh). Almost a cabinet in itself, but concerned exclusively with economic matters, it totally ignored the federal principle. Khrushchev's attempt to give the agricultural party organisation wider powers, and place his son-in-law at its head, was perhaps the move which triggered his fall.

While the party was enabled by the new reforms to concentrate on agricultural production, it yielded ground on the industrial sector, where the 1963 resolutions definitely extended the area of state authority. In introducing these reforms Khrushchev appears to have been motivated by the following considerations:

1. The conviction that a streamlined administration, making the best use of the qualified leadership cadres in the various technical and economic branches, was bound to produce the significant rise in output needed to solve most of the economic problems.

2. The firm belief that the party can only justify its continued existence in a dynamic industrial society if it accepts responsibility for promoting increased productivity and economic growth.

3. The intention to revitalise the party, overcome the bureaucracy's inertia, especially in its middle reaches, and thus to undermine the power basis of the entrenched reactionaries.

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It was hoped to replace the blinkered party all-rounder, steeped in the holy books of Marxism-Leninism and willing to toe any current party line, by a more flexible official with a better training in and understanding of economic and managerial problems. Khrushchev expected this new type of official to support the progressive forces within the party leadership and give him greater freedom of manoeuvre at home and abroad. But these expectations were not to be fulfilled. His opponents, having learned their lesson from the ill-starred 1957 anti-party group, now operated far more astutely. Khrushchev's failure to gain acceptance for his new party reforms, equally suspect to the reactionary and progressive factions in the leadership, led to his downfall.

The plenary session of the CPSU central committee of 16 November 1964 revoked the party reorganisation along occupational lines. By reuniting the elements artificially divided when the party's infrastructure was deliberately split, the traditional concept of a unified party, organised along regional-industrial principles, which had been in force since 1934, was once more restored. The central committee resolved that the party committees on the kolkhoz-sovkhoz production boards should be transformed into regional party committees. It is, however, not quite clear how the difference between the rural districts, which have not grown greatly in size, and the kolkhoz-sovkhoz administrations, which have been considerably enlarged, is to be overcome. This could only be done by extending the territorial jurisdiction of the rural districts until they approximate the Okrug administrative unit.

The other important change resulting from the latest reforms concerns the reconstitution of the unified provincial and regional committees and the corresponding party organisations in the autonomous republics and territories. Here, too, differences of scale between the regions and the considerably larger areas under the economic control of the super-sovkhoz created by Khrushchev's 1962 reforms, continue to present a difficult problem. The only solution is either to split the super-sovkhoz into smaller units, or to amalgamate provincial and regional organisations into even larger conglomerations, a device that has, on occasion, been used before.

Towards the end of December 1964 the decree incorporating all the Central Asian republics with the exception of Kazakhstan into a single economic unit was rescinded. In the same way the enforced bifurcation of the Soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol organisations at the regional level was also ended. What still remains to be seen is whether the administrative reforms relating to the central committees of the non-Russian autonomous republics will also be revoked.

These changes show that the new party leadership is fully alive to the fact that the major problems facing the increasingly complex Soviet economy are beyond the remedies open to mere bureaucratic manipulation. While the party's new self-restraint gives more power to progressive managers, the failure of Khrushchev's reform measures suggests that there will be a further hardening of the bureaucratic arteries. On the other hand, the reorganisation of the party administration has so far not affected the state and economic machinery set up by the 1962 and March 1963 reforms. Only the Central Asian state committees for construction and building, and the two Central Asian

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administrations which were subordinate to the USSR production committee for irrigated agriculture and water conservation, seem to have been dissolved together with the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz.

So far the regional economic councils have also been left intact, even though Kosygin had hinted that plants of national importance might come under the direct control of the central authorities. Such intentions, if carried out, would mean the resuscitation of the ministerial system as it existed before the 1957 reforms, and by the same token a significant weakening of the sovnarkhozy. It would, moreover, strengthen tendencies towards the same extreme over-centralisation that was reflected in the partial reforms of 13 March 1963. Possibly the new Prime Minister believes that only by such means is it possible to bestow on individual plants and their associated concerns the independence they require.

Plans for constitutional reform

As early as January 1959, at the CPSU congress, Khrushchev disclosed that constitutional reforms were under consideration. They were needed, he asserted, to give legal and constitutional sanction to the vast changes which since 1956 had transformed life in the Soviet Union and in the political world as a whole. The CPSU's 1961 programme also drew attention to the social and political changes which were to find expression in the new federal constitution.

It was consequently expected that the rota system regulating the retirement of party cadres, as provided by the 1961 statutes, would eventually be extended to the Soviets and the other mass organisations. According to the party programme, one-third of the Soviets are to be replaced in each legislative period. Leading officials are not to be re-elected more than three times running. Particularly important and highly qualified officials may be re-elected for an additional term, provided they muster a three-quarter majority. Members of the Supreme Soviet are not, however, mentioned within the context of this rule, which incidentally applies only to elected members and not to full-time officials. The programme merely intimates that the principle of eligibility and accountability is to be gradually extended to cover all 'leading functionaries' in the government administration. While the number of full-time civil servants is to be greatly reduced, it is worth noting that the contemplated cuts are to apply only to Soviet officials and not to party functionaries.

The party programme also provides for a marked increase in the authority of the standing committees of the local Soviets. The Union Republics are also to be given wider powers. The setting up of economic boards with powers extending over several republics, as projected in the party programme and temporarily realised after the introduction of the great administrative reforms, seems, on the other hand, hardly likely to promote trends towards greater independence. The idea of introducing a comprehensive administrative unit on the district (rayon) plane, that was to be responsible for all factories, institutions and organisations operating on this level, has meanwhile been dropped. The standing of such mass organisations as the trade unions, Komsomol, etc., was already so assured that their new right to propose legislation will have hardly added to their status. According to

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the new party programme provision will also be made for particularly important legislative proposals to be decided by popular referendum.

In his declaration of 25 April 1962, on 'the preparation of a draft for a new constitution for the USSR', Khrushchev demanded a constitutional framework reflecting the present stage of Soviet development. The Soviet Union, he asserted, after having safely established socialism, had now entered the era of burgeoning communism. During this advance the state of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' had been transformed into the 'socialist state of the whole people', and 'proletarian democracy' into 'democracy of the whole people'. Moreover, the Soviet Union was no longer surrounded by hostile capitalist countries; on the contrary, it now formed the centre of a powerful system of communist states. The new constitution was also to reflect the principle of 'peaceful co-existence' and the 'new type of mutual relations' characterising relationships between the communist states, as well as the special relations to the former colonial territories. Khrushchev made it clear that the proposed constitutional reforms were closely related to the ideological principles which, although of more than doubtful Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, had informed his party programme.

On the strength of his report and the central committee's proposals based on it, the Supreme Soviet passed the resolution of 25 April 1962 setting up 'a commission for the preparation of a draft for a new constitution for the USSR'. It had ninety-six members and Khrushchev was appointed its chairman. It met for the first time on 15 June 1962 and decided to set up nine sub-committees. To judge by the last report published under Khrushchev's chairmanship, the work of the commission and its sub-committees seems to have progressed very slowly. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev, who was appointed by the Supreme Soviet to take over the chairmanship of the commission from Khrushchev, will be able to proceed faster.

In October 1960 Romashkin, one of the preparatory commission's two constitutional lawyers, outlined in considerable detail some of the characteristic features of the proposed constitution.[2] Like those of the Leninist era, it was to be preceded by a preamble setting out Khrushchev's basic concepts. The transition to the 'state of the whole people' was to be indicated by renaming the Soviets. They were now to figure as the delegates of the 'people' and no longer as those of the 'toilers'. The intelligentsia's claim to equality with the workers and peasants was expected to receive the formal recognition already conceded in the party statutes of 1939 and the Czechoslovak constitution of 1960. The party was to be given pride of place. Strangely enough, it was completely ignored in the first two Soviet constitutions, and received only one mention in Stalin's constitution (article 126). According to Romashkin, the leading role played by the CPSU is to form the centrepiece of the whole preamble. It will also occupy a prominent place in the sections dealing with social structure and fundamental rights and duties. The chapter on the structural changes in society will dwell on the gradual fusing of the two forms of 'socialist property', owned either by the state or by the cooperatives and collectives. Under this heading the

[2] P. S. Romashkin, 'Novy etap razvitii Sovetskogo gosudarstva', in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1960, No. 10.

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abolition of income tax, the reduction in working hours, industrial morale, and related subjects will also come up for discussion.

The provisions defining the basic rights and duties of the Soviet citizen are to receive far more detailed attention. The importance of the subject is being stressed by allocating it a prominent position. Following immediately after the key section on the social order, it will provide constitutional safeguards for the social benefits and services envisaged in Khrushchev's conception of 'welfare communism'. In this section the precepts of communist morality and social obligation, which will be instilled in the young generation, are to be dealt with at length, as well as the wider issues of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism which are to animate the various peoples of the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's remarks, as well as Romashkin's commentary, show that the new federal constitution is not intended to establish either true democracy or the rule of law. Its essentially programmatic and propagandist character may, however, lead to a wider awareness of the discrepancy between constitutional forms and realities, both among the Soviet citizens and the world outside.

Changes in constitutional law

Soviet constitutional realities are reflected in a whole body of legal codes which, although they exist outside the constitution, have nevertheless the status of constitutional enactments. These are the laws, statutory instruments, codes and rules of the 'social organisations' which form an integral part of the 'mechanisms of the dictatorship'. Among them one would have to mention the 1935 kolkhoz charter, revised in March 1956, as well as the regulations of the various government organizations and state enterprises. No doubt the projected 'industrial law' will eventually form a particularly important part of the constitution's *de facto* background.

The following analysis of the party's constitution is confined to only one, although a very important one, of these extra-constitutional codes. All party enactments are, however, of overwhelming importance and bear powerfully on the legal and constitutional realities prevailing in the Soviet Union.

Unlike the governmental machinery of the Soviets, the party is not organised along federal lines. The communist parties of the fourteen non-Russian Union Republics are simply large regional units within the tightly organised single party. Significantly, it has called itself from the very beginning 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union'. The provisions of the new party programme necessitated certain modifications in the statutes. Consequently, the twenty-second party congress of October 1961 had to adopt, with its new programme, a revised constitution. It is introduced by a preamble adumbrating its fundamental innovation, the concept of 'the party of the whole people'. Among the other new terms given formal recognition is that of 'Soviet patriotism', which, together with the obligation arising from 'proletarian internationalism', receives considerable prominence. The stressing of the 'collective leadership' principle, not only in the preamble itself but also under article 29 of the statutes, represents another weighty departure.

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The organisational principles have, however, survived unchanged; such concepts as 'democratic centralism' or 'monolithic unity' have neither been modified, nor, for that matter, has the requirement of 'iron discipline' been relaxed. Much has also been added to the duty side in the catalogue of party members' rights and duties, to which a moral code has been added.

The politically most important amendments are to be found in chapter III, in which the organisational structure of the party, and the question of 'intra-party democracy' are set out. Some of the changes elaborated here are outlined in the preamble, others deal in detail with the renewal of the leadership cadres. Article 28 extols 'collective leadership' as the party's 'supreme guiding principle' and a necessary precondition for the achievement of 'intra-party democracy'. The 'personality cult' as well as its later Stalinist derivative the 'leader principle', are denounced as incompatible with 'Leninist principles of party life'. Nevertheless, the rules relating to party elections and to freedom of expression within the party follow closely the earlier text, but for occasional rephrasings, thus demonstrating that at least on the issue of 'intra-party democracy' nothing has changed since Stalin's days.

On the other hand party elections are, apparently, not managed as efficiently as they used to be. An editorial (September 1957) and subsequent articles in *Partiinaya Zhizn* give vent to the leadership's annoyance at the 'formalistic misconceptions' of 'inadequately schooled' comrades who interfered with the smooth functioning of the electoral process. Animated by wrong-headed ideas about the meaning of intra-party democracy, they had 'obstinately insisted that electoral lists should show more candidates than positions to which they were eligible'. Predictably, the secret ballot 'failed to return many good and deserving officials', some of them even party secretaries. However, when party officials have to be warned that 'elections must be closely supervised and cannot be allowed to proceed on freewheeling principles', and that they had to give 'due consideration to the opinion of superior party committees', it suggests that among the lower echelons at least there is a growing pressure for greater freedom.

The only novel device designed to achieve some degree of intra-party democracy is entrenched in the procedures (article 25) for the renewal of the leadership cadres. At each election the presidium and the central committee of the CPSU are to retire one quarter of their members, the central committees of the Union republics and the provincial and regional committees one third, and the lower authorities on the local, municipal etc., level at least one half. As a rule officials are allowed to stand for re-election not more than three times, although exceptions for particularly qualified personnel are permitted, provided they command a three-quarter majority. After a due interval of retirement, members can present themselves for re-election.

The rotation of retirements, even though intended by the party programme to extend to the administrative machinery of the state, does not represent a really radical departure. The whole system bears a striking resemblance to what was known in Stalin's days as 'the circulation of the apparatchiki'.[3] This device, by transferring officials from one

[3] See B. Meissner, *Russland unter Chruschtschow* (Munich, 1960), p. 199.

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administrative branch to the other, assured constant movement within the leadership cadres, prevented bureaucratic stagnation, and kept them responsive to central direction. The system has now received constitutional sanction and is also being applied in far greater measure to the uppermost layers of the leadership than (apart from the great purges) it was under Stalin. Nevertheless, by nominating the candidates for party office and the officials due for retirement, the hierarchy of party secretaries still remains in firm control of the entire party machine. All that can be said is that the Stalinist terror has been replaced by forms of selection less wastefully destructive—one merely has to recall the Voznesensky case—and a good deal more civilised. Temporary retirement or transfer to other departments now offers an alternative to the blind workings of the purges, and not only makes it easier for the leadership to renew and rejuvenate cadres, but also provides an exit for leaders defeated in inter-factional struggles. Even though they have contributed to the loosening of the totalitarian structure, the new dispensations were primarily meant to make party life more rational rather than more democratic.

The formal ascendancy of the larger authoritative organs (party congress, central committee, central revision commission) over the smaller executive bodies (presidium, secretariat, committee of party control) is emphasised in the new statutes by a number of amendments, redefinitions, and changes in the sequence of the articles. The party congress has been explicitly empowered not only to 'examine' and 'alter' but also to 'ratify' the party programme and statutes (article 33, section b). Section c of the same article outlines the most important prerogative of the party congress, the right to formulate the general line of political action.

After 1956 there was a tendency to restrict the powers of the committee for party control, but Khrushchev's administrative reforms reversed this trend and introduced unified control machinery for party and state. Taking over from a committee that had more or less been reduced to the function of a party court, the new control authority commands a hierarchical apparatus that supervises state administrations down to the kolkhoz-sovkhoz level. If anything, Khrushchev's fall has increased the scope and power of this party-state control body.

Local and regional party organisations have been considerably strengthened since 1956 and much additional power has been conferred on them. Their status is discussed in great detail in chapters V and VI of the new party constitution. But the constitution is not always consulted and such resolutions as those passed at the plenary session of the central committee in November 1962 have deeply affected the lower-ranking party organisations, notwithstanding the fact that they lacked all constitutional sanction.

Changes in the party leadership

In the course of his administrative reforms, Khrushchev introduced modifications in the party structure of such a fundamental nature as only a party congress was constitutionally entitled to initiate and pass. Nor did he show more respect for the state constitution. In fact, he was not at all averse to circumventing the constitutional order so long

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as he received the formal support of the central committee and its executive organs. Apparently, the party autocracy was as ready under Khrushchev as it had been under Stalin to regard itself above the law, a contention strikingly supported by the way it acquiesced in the removal of Mr Khrushchev himself. Although not susceptible to purely legal analysis, the processes by which power is exercised and controlled at the top are, obviously, an issue of the utmost importance to the entire political atmosphere in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's overthrow bears all the marks of a palace revolution although carried out within the bounds of formal legality. The central committee was no doubt just as entitled to elect a new first secretary in plenary session on 14 October 1964, as the presidium of the Supreme Soviet was to accept the resignation of the head of the government on 15 October 1964. Nor was the presidium constitutionally barred from ratifying the decreed appointment of a new chairman of the council of ministers, even in such exceptional circumstances. To become legally valid, such a decree needed only the consent of the Supreme Soviet. In this respect Khrushchev's removal differed materially from the methods he employed against the anti-party group in 1957, a manoeuvre more in the nature of an improvised coup d'état.

Khrushchev's overthrow could be engineered because he had become steadily more dependent on the party's goodwill. He was fully alive to the dangers inherent in his position, and tried to meet them by broadening the central committee. But although its sessions were eventually attended by more than a thousand members, Khrushchev failed to ensure that these vast assemblies were given statutory status. Moreover, he much preferred to appeal over the heads of the party bureaucrats directly to the people. In doing so he used the popular press, radio and television rather than the party-controlled agitprop machinery. In posing as the tribune of the people, Khrushchev was bound to antagonise not only the leadership of the party but also the hierarchs of the other great bureaucracies, already outraged by his meddlesome unpredictability. Nachalniki and apparatchiki alike resented the way he interfered with their work, ignored their jurisdiction, and failed to pursue a consistent policy. All this created misgivings and ill-will.

The success of the palace revolution shows that to stay in power in a totalitarian autocracy it is not enough to concentrate most of the important offices in one pair of hands, unless those hands can also control the sources of power. Khrushchev, more anxious to impress the masses than to placate the party leadership, allowed himself to become increasingly detached from the apparatus; and he travelled too much to give close and personal supervision to the exercise of the vast powers he had accumulated. Furthermore, in the effort to maintain his personal position, he committed the grave mistake of sacrificing his followers, people personally devoted to him, to his confederates; hence there was this time no Furtseva to warn him of the impending doom.

The disposal of the leader gave further impetus to the principle of collective leadership and the trend towards oligarchy. One of the most significant features of the post-Khrushchevian scene is the separation once again of the post of First Secretary of the Party and the post of Prime Minister. The popular assumption that the merging of these two offices is normal, natural, and inherent in the Soviet scheme of things,

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is not borne out by facts. For 22 of the 47 years of Bolshevik rule the two offices were independently held (1924–41; 1953–58); throughout this time, with the possible exception of periods of close in-fighting for the control of the party itself (1924–29; 1953–57) the party secretaryship weighed infinitely more heavily in the scales of power. In the new Brezhnev-Kosygin duumvirate, authority seems much more evenly matched, for a number of reasons. One of them is that after its reorganisation the party itself acknowledged the inherent dualism of the Soviet constitution. The other factor making for the new equality between the two functions is that Brezhnev is a less overwhelmingly powerful figure than his predecessor, while the experienced Kosygin has not only first-hand knowledge of the state and the economy, but also enjoys the support and confidence of the leading hierarchs of the other bureaucracies.

After Stalin's death a number of personalities emerged who, together with the leader of the government and the party, formed the very core of the 'leadership collective'. These included the first deputy prime ministers of the USSR, Beria (until his removal in June 1953), Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin. In the current set-up Mikoyan, Suslov, and Podgorny have to be counted among the top oligarchs. Compared with 1961 the average age of the leadership collective has not been significantly lowered. Among the full members it is now 59 years; it is characteristic of the age structure of the group that it elected to key positions only three representatives of the middle generation, Kosygin's associate Poliansky, Shelepin, and the candidate presidium member Demichev.

The marked reluctance to fill a number of important vacancies, and faint though audible contradictions in the treatment of internal problems, all point to disagreements at the top. Although personal factors and allegiances always played their part in the struggle for ultimate control, much of the controversy has concerned fundamental issues, and these remained unresolved by Khrushchev's dismissal. Any state without clearly circumscribed functions for its governmental agencies and established procedures for the handing over of power, inevitably invites those convulsive clashes among the contenders for ultimate control for which an autocracy like the Soviet Union has become known.

Social change within the totalitarian structure

This analysis has shown that the realities of totalitarian rule have continued to overshadow and modify what legal and political progress has been made since Stalin's death. Destalinisation, although it has brought about substantial easing of the pressures, has failed to rid the country of totalitarian rule. This is probably due to the fact that even the present leaders are unable to overcome the gravitational pull of their own past. For, if really free, they would feel bound to exonerate Stalin's opponents and their followers among the heroes of the October Revolution. But this, of course, would imply that a number of prominent Soviet leaders would have to answer for the destruction of the opposition and its leaders, for men like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. It is because such a public confession of guilt

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remained quite out of the question that Khrushchev, for all his denunciation of Stalinist excesses, clung so desperately to the concept of continuity in the history of the party.

In a system still predominately run on Stalinist lines, liberalisation can develop only within exceedingly narrow limits. If it had proceeded straight from the Leninist model, advance might have been much faster. Although the transition from totalitarian to authoritarian rule, as in Yugoslavia, does not represent an advance towards genuine democratisation, it would nevertheless have meant a vast improvement for Soviet society.

At present the social forces responsible for such limited headway as has been made are still too weak to bring about more substantial changes. But they are steadily gaining in strength, while the party dictatorship is showing increasing signs of wear and tear. More and more Soviet citizens have come to appreciate human values which the Marxist-Leninist ideology does not regard as basic. Moreover, an incipient public opinion is beginning to exert pressure on the rulers. Soviet writers and other representatives of the ' creative intelligentsia ' are in the forefront of the agitation for faster and more far-reaching social reforms. But the technological intelligentsia, as the Liberman debate shows, is also on the march. Soviet society, more complex and closely knit than before, is now facing problems which are no longer amenable to the kind of administrative remedies the party can dispense. The technological intelligentsia seems to be particularly aware of this state of affairs. Political life in the Soviet Union is still dominated as much by the unrepentant representatives of the totalitarian autocracy as by the confrontation between reactionary and progressive forces. While the claims of truth point backwards, towards the past and its redemption, demands for greater freedom involve the future. Both claims, together with increasingly vociferous protests against social evils, seem to apply moral criteria to the present, and to insist on the changes necessary to measure up to them.

(Professor Meissner's article was written at the end of February and therefore takes no account of any subsequent changes.)

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THE LITERARY CLIMATE

Outlook: Unsettled

Victor S. Frank

SOME forty years ago that wayward and morally suspect, but immensely gifted writer, Alexey N. Tolstoy, published an intriguing science fiction short story.[1] An international syndicate of ruthless businessmen (so the story runs) decides to buy up the world by creating a panic and buying shares on the cheap. To this end they bombard the moon with rockets. The moon disintegrates into fragments, the shares tumble, and the syndicate rules the world, economically and politically:

> The Union of the Five [the name of the syndicate] possessed the undivided, uncontrolled ownership rights over factories, works, transport, trade, troops, police, the whole apparatus of power. Had they so wished, the Union of the Five would have been able to force the entire population of America to walk upside down. Since the times of ancient Asian empires the world had not seen such a concentration of political and economic power . . .

But all is in vain. The disintegration of the moon has unexpected psychological effects:

> The tense preoccupation, the struggle of ambitions, of wills, the iron grip, discipline, order—the entire organism of a great city, so convenient for administrative purposes—began gradually to turn into something softer, more diffuse and intangible . . . The Union of the Five began to feel as if surrounded by soft feather-beds and pillows. They made the rules stricter, but nobody was impressed. They published orders, decrees, thundering articles—but nobody read the papers any more. At the same time, however, youths in open-neck shirts in coffee houses and in the streets recited verse of a nebulous and alarming content. And only the Five were too dense to understand that in this vortex of life they, the Five, the dictators and masters, had become completely and utterly redundant.

Finally, the terrible truth dawns on them:

> 'We are a mirage. We are gods to whom nobody wants to make sacrifices any more.'

The conspiracy ends in dismay when the office door is flung open and a friendly young man tells them politely: 'We need the premises for our club. Please clear out . . .'

Alexey Tolstoy, being his own inimitable self, evidently hoped that the Soviet regime would collapse (that is what the story is

1 *Sem dney, v kotorye byl razgrablen mir* [Seven Days during which the World was Looted], first published in the Leningrad almanac *Kovsh* in 1925, two years after Tolstoy's return to Russia from his exile.

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clearly about whatever its camouflage) by the onrush of an irresponsible, frivolous *ohne-mich* spirit. Five years later Stalin promulgated the first five-year plan, and that was that.

After 1956, however, and, in particular, after Khrushchev's dismissal in October last, reality has been catching up fast with Alexey Tolstoy's S. F. True, the physical moon, though circumnavigated, hit, and photographed by American and Russian spacecraft, has not been split. But the political skyscape has altered beyond recognition. And as to psychological effects, Tolstoy proved to be partially a true prophet: youths in open-neck shirts *do* recite more and more verse, and *do* listen less and less to what the political fuddy-duddies have to say.

But cynical contempt of politics is common among the young in most advanced countries and in this sense is of only limited specific interest. What is far more intriguing in the Soviet Union is the gradual emergence of a different type of defiance, of a spirit of mutual responsibility (*krugovaya poruka*), particularly among the higher ranks of the intelligentsia. Even more intriguing is the evidence of the party's partial retreat in the face of this new spirit of defiance. This is especially noticeable in the domain of what, for want of a better word, may be described by the Soviet term, *culture*.

To be sure, the cultural establishment is still firmly entrenched. As *The Times Literary Supplement* said in a recent thoughtful editorial (18 March 1965), 'it is easy to forget how many interests and careers are vested in the Soviet system of cultural control—of censors, publishers' editors, literary managers, union officials and the rest . . . All establishments resist demolition, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that progress in Russia should be slow and contradictory'.

Slow and contradictory it may be, but it's there nonetheless. On 24 March, Mr Leonid Ilyichev was removed from his posts as Secretary of the Central Committee and as Head of the Ideological Commission.[2] This must have come as a severe jolt to the establishment (not to mention Mr Ilyichev's own feelings: What a come-down it must be to have the sour Mr Gromyko as one's boss after the mad, mad years spent in Mr Khrushchev's exhilarating company!).

But personnel changes, however radical, are something that any well-drilled establishment takes in its stride. What must appear as a far more disturbing omen to the apparatchiks (and remind them of Alexey Tolstoy's fantasy) is the fact that they have become a target for jokes; that the satire is allowed to go unpunished, and that they themselves are compelled to issue the imprimaturs so as not to appear even

[2] The Ideological Commission was one of the bodies created by Khrushchev in his campaign to dilute the professional Central Committee functionaries by the introduction of outside specialists into the party bodies, much as he used to invite agronomists and sovkhoz chairmen to the deliberations of the Central Committee. The Ideological Commission appears to have been disbanded. The Ideological Department, however, staffed by permanent officials, continues in being. Another Central Committee Secretary, Mr Petr Demichev, a man of less stained antecedents than Ilyichev, appears to have been placed in charge of it.

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more ridiculous than they are. Here, for instance, is what a young critic, Mark Rozovsky, has to say of them:

> An aggressive philistine does not even try to disguise himself by wearing modern garb. In fact, he is at pains to discard any notion that there is anything intellectual about his make-up. The brain of such a type consists of neatly stapled rings of salami. So does his heart. Ask him what he does for his living and, oddly enough, he will say: 'I sit on culture' (*Ya sizhu na kulture*). And he is right. Sit on culture he does in his office, as on a cushion. The cushion raises him above his desk and warms his bottom. That is why things like this can happen:
>
> Three young artists worked for over a year on a mosaic panel. Placing coloured stones in position on an enormous wall, they gradually infused their work with all their zeal and all their skill. And when it was over and done with, when the glittering feast of beauty was about to be revealed to people thirsting for art, along came one of those who 'sit on culture'. He glanced at the wall and, rather inarticulately, uttered four words: 'Bstract! Hack it down!' Whereupon a sturdy lout in his entourage grabbed a crow-bar and rushed at the wall. The artists met him halfway and barred his progress with their bodies. Later on, they all but slept in front of their wall, since the crow-bar lout was likely to re-appear any minute.
>
> Some progress! Some culture! The 'I-sit-on-culture' type did not have the foggiest notion of the conventions of modern monumental art. To him the fight against abstractionism ('bstract') was merely another pretext for grabbing a crow-bar. What for? Oh, well, just to slug someone or other, just to growl: 'Now, now, no nonsense!'
>
> Fortunately, this particular case had a happy ending. In the very last instant other arbiters were found, more competent than the man with the salami brain. But it was well on the cards that the artists might have been too late, and that aggressive philistinism might have triumphed.[3]

WHETHER Mark Rozovsky's fable is based on fact or is mere fiction is uncertain. But Mr Egorychev, First Secretary of the Moscow Town Party Committee—surely an unimpeachable source—tells a very similar true story. In a recent lament over the mood of Soviet youth,[4] he spoke of the tendency of 'inexperienced young people to interpret [official] criticism of certain works as oppression, as curtailment of creative freedom, and as return to the cult of personality methods'. And he quoted the case of the young artist Glazunov. (Ilya Glazunov's exhibition of paintings, inspired by the tradition of ikons, created a stir in Moscow late in 1963. The official Union of Soviet Artists ordered the closure of the show, but the Ministry of Culture, faced

[3] *Yunost*, No. 2, 1965. The immediate target of the piece is evidently Mr Khrushchev (the 'salami-brain type') and his attack on abstract art in December 1962; but the fable has obviously a more general implication.

[4] *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1965, pp. 15–28.

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by a near revolt by a determined crowd of young people, authorised the exhibition to go on.) Egorychev says: 'Glazunov was rightly criticised in a Moscow paper, whereupon a group of young people on the staff of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations rose to his defence. They sent an angry letter to the editor in which they praised Glazunov's work. It transpired that Glazunov and other young artists used to be invited to the Institute and to arrange private shows on its premises.'

Budding Soviet diplomats 'rising in defence' of a maligned heretical artist! Things have come to a pretty pass indeed. No wonder Mr Egorychev complains that 'political passivity, immaturity and scepticism' are ripe among the young; that 'boys and girls treat the entire heroic history of their country with disrespect'; that 'criticism of isolated defects [i.e. of the Stalin era] tends to degenerate into a total negation of the history of the party and into attacks on Marxist-Leninist doctrine and on the party's general line'.

A case when the will of Mr Khrushchev himself was defied by prominent scientists was related by 'Monitor', the Russian affairs correspondent of *The Times* (7 April 1965). According to a Soviet source,

> last summer Mr Khrushchev proposed the election to the Soviet Academy of one of his own men. It was a turning point in Soviet history when the members of the Academy voted against this official candidate . . . Mr. Khrushchev insisted, but the scientists refused to accept this outside nominee. Mr. Khrushchev's response was to lose his temper. He shouted that the academicians were overpaid and undisciplined, and that he would have their ivory tower disbanded (*raspustit*). Eventually he was dissuaded from this impetuous move.

The courageous intervention of a group of Leningrad writers and teachers on behalf of the young poet Iosif Brodsky who, after a farcical trial, was declared a 'parasite' and exiled to the Far North, is another instance of the *krugovaya poruka* mentality.[5]

A case when a group of academicians and other scientists successfully challenged an organ of the Central Committee to defend the honour of a maligned scholar, came to light recently. In December last *Partiinaya zhizn* (whose editorial board consists of high-ranking Central Committee functionaries, among them two secretaries, A. P. Rudakov and V. N. Titov), carried a stinging attack on Alexander Chizhevsky, a man of sixty-seven with no academic qualifications, but apparently of great originality of thought. The author, A. Erokhin, described Chizhevsky as a charlatan and an imposter and poured scorn on scientific bodies and journals which paid attention to his mad theories. (Chizhevsky appears to have died shortly after the publication of Erokhin's attack, for in a later issue of the same journal the dates of his birth and death

[5] On Brodsky's case see my note in *Encounter*, November 1964, and Georgii Stukov's introduction to Iosif Brodsky, *Stikhotvoreniya i poemy* (Washington, 1965).

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were given as 1897 and 1964.) Three months later, however, the party journal admitted that it had received scores of letters of protest from prominent scientists (among them the cosmonaut B. Egorov); it also reproduced two long and well-reasoned documents in Chizhevsky's defence drawn up by an *ad hoc* committee formed by the Academy of Sciences for the specific purpose of vindicating Chizhevsky's reputation. The committee categorically rejected Erokhin's findings and praised the late scientist's intuition. 'The editorial board—*Partiinaya zhizn* said meekly in a note—publishes the full text of the committee's findings and, in so doing, makes good its error'.[6]

Literaturnaya gazeta, an organ not usually given to non-conformist attitudes, engaged both the Government paper *Izvestia* and the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the USSR, N. Zhogin, in a running fight on behalf of a man who, in the opinion of the paper, had fallen victim to a miscarriage of justice. The paper refused to give ground in the face of Zhogin's counter-attack and concluded its campaign by printing a fine fighting article by that sturdy protagonist of the rule of law Professor Strogovich.[7]

The much vaunted Lysenko case, i.e. the final dismissal of Trofim Lysenko, the *de facto* dictator over the whole field of biology and genetics, in March 1965, does not quite fit into this category of cases, since the campaign gathered momentum only after Mr Khrushchev's dismissal and hence did not require any act of civic courage. The positive aspect of the case—apart from the benefit which Russian science is likely to reap from it—was, however, the call for political restraint made by the President of the Academy, Professor Keldysh, the man who appears to have made use of his standing as a full member of the Central Committee for a good cause. In his address to the Academy he said: 'Let us now concentrate on research and organisational problems and abstain from any administrative [i.e. police] methods, any exertion of pressure, any labelling of people.'[8]

THESE are a few *known* pieces of evidence, testifying to collective defiance of authority in specific cases. There must be many more. They still do not add up to a continuous front; they still form only isolated pockets of resistance. But they possess a common denominator composed of two factors: all have occurred among 'top people', and all are directed against acts of *individual* injustice on the part of the authorities. Their growing incidence points to greater self-assurance and a diminishing fear among the top-level intelligentsia. A distinction ought

[6] *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 24, 1964, and No. 6, 1965.

[7] See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 27 February and 3 April 1965, and *Izvestia*, 16 and 27 March 1965.

[8] *Pravda*, 4 February 1965. When Lysenko was still very powerful, in 1961, one of the outstanding Russian biologists, Professor Dubinin, was summarily dismissed from his post as Director of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics at Novosibirsk. He was given research facilities in Moscow thanks to a private act of generosity and civic courage by another scientist, the corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, Professor G. M. Frank. See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 24 November 1964.

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to be made at this point. As far as we know, scientists have recourse to these often courageous acts out of a powerful *esprit de corps*, whenever one of them is unfairly treated or maligned. This attitude cannot be thought of as explicit *political* opposition, which presupposes the defence of some general principles. It looks as if a budding *political* opposition is present only among two sub-groups of the intelligentsia—the writers and the lawyers. A man like Solzhenitsyn, for instance, battles for certain fundamental principles—not only in his famous story of the camps (which, after all, is concerned with the past, a past which—so members of the establishment will claim—has been successfully overcome), but in his shorter pieces. A lawyer like Strogovich equally fights for certain fundamental principles, respect for law, presumption of innocence, and so on.

However that may be, this defiant mood appears to be already influencing the party's tactical thinking. Since the intelligentsia can no longer be coerced into full conformity, since in fact any attempt—à la Khrushchev—to bully and hector them, may have the opposite effect, the intellectual elite must be wooed into conformity.

These are the tactics outlined in the now famous article by *Pravda's* new editor, Mr S. Rumyantsev, 'The Party and the Intelligentsia' (21 February 1965).

The article is quite clearly a tactical retreat to prepared positions, carried out in perfect battle order and with consummate propagandistic skill. Nevertheless, a retreat it is. It contains the element of flattery and bribe. The intelligentsia is indispensable:

> The transition to communism is tied up with the constant perfection of methods for the scientific direction of society, particularly in the economic sphere . . . This fact explains the growing importance, the enormous role to be played by the vanguard of our intelligentsia —scientists and technologists, physicists, chemists, biologists, sociologists, economists, jurists, engineers, and technicians.

There will be no more 'subjectivism' and 'arbitrariness', no more 'scornful' treatment of scientists: 'the collectivity of leadership' is the best guarantee of this reformation.

> No wonder: a single leader, convinced of his own infallibility, used to consider himself the supreme arbiter in all fields of human activity and, first and foremost, in the field of intellectual endeavour. In other words, such a man claimed to be the one and only true intellectual in the country. That is why he treated members of the intelligentsia with suspicion and intolerance.

As to arts and letters, here, too, the intelligentsia is needed, for,

> the constant rise of the cultural level of Soviet people produces an organic desire not only to raise their material well-being, but also to enrich their minds. The intelligentsia working in the field of art sees the main purpose of its work in the solution of that noble task.

There follows an astutely mixed dose of promises and stern reminders of 'out of bounds' limits, culminating in the psychologically clever

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reference to the 1925 Central Committee decree ('on the policy of the party in the field of letters'). The reference is clever because the very date (1925, the blessed time of NEP; the year, incidentally, when Tolstoy's story of the moon was published!) is likely to evoke positive reactions, while at the same time it does not commit the party to any substantial relaxation of controls. (After all, the 1925 decree, while curbing the more extreme revolutionary sectarians, reminded the writers of the importance of 'class warfare' in literature and was designed generally to dash the hope that NEP was a half-way house to complete cultural freedom.)

It is not very likely, however, that the intelligentsia—whether scientists or writers—will be taken in by the studiously moderate tone of Rumyantsev's article. There have been too many apparent amnesties before, which subsequently turned out to be deceptive or short-lived. More positive proofs of the leadership's changed line will be required.

The intellectuals are more likely to be influenced by another argument in Rumyantsev's article, by his reminder that, after all, there are not just two protagonists—the party and the intelligentsia—in the long drawn-out affair, but three, that the third force must be taken into account in determining the rationale, and that this third force—the inarticulate, semi-educated vast mass of the people—is equally hostile to both protagonists. Here is the operative paragraph:

> It is absurd and politically wrong to maintain that a people's intelligentsia in a socialist society is opposed to the working class and the peasantry, and so to stimulate mistrust against it. A long time ago our party discarded the mistaken and nonsensical notion that the intelligentsia, irrespective of its status in society, suffers from a congenital 'inferiority complex'. Some people used to allege that an engineer, a teacher, a doctor, a scientist, an artist, a writer, were but 'second-rate' builders of socialism and communism. Evidently such an attitude towards the intelligentsia, à la Machajski,[9] only hampered the great cause of the communist transformation of society.

This paragraph is followed by transparent allusions to Mr Khrushchev's latent anti-intellectual bias, as if to remind the people concerned that, however 'mistaken and nonsensical', these sentiments are still very much alive even in our day. The party, Mr Rumyantsev says,

> rejects vulgar ideas about science, rejects all simplifications, all attempts to ostracise scientific trends on the ground of their alleged

[9] J. W. Machajski (1867–1927), originally a Polish social-democrat, became a prominent syndicalist in pre-revolutionary Russia and developed a theory on the place occupied in the body politic by the intelligentsia. He maintained that the intelligentsia was a separate and an exploiting class, and that its interests were opposed to those of the proletariat. His theory both reflected and stimulated the latent 'intellectual-baiting' tendencies of the time. Its cultural vandalism and nihilism were characteristic of the outlook of many party members until 1936, when Stalin declared that the intellectual-baiting was no longer applicable to the new, Soviet-grown intelligentsia (cf. S. V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought*, pp. 160–63).

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> irrelevance to practical needs . . . [The party] condemns any manifestation of subjectivism and arbitrariness, any inability or unwillingness of individual leaders to take account of conclusions reached by progressive science; it condemns a contemptuous attitude to scientists.

The implied threat is, of course, that, unless the intellectuals fall in with the party's requirements, unless they realise that, materially and socially, their interests and the interests of the party run on parallel lines (for, after all, what is the much-vaunted 'transition to communism' if not a radical modernisation of society by the combined efforts of the party *and* the intelligentsia, likely to benefit both of them?), they run the risk of being thrown to the wolves.

This threat is not abstruse sociological theory. It is a brute reality just round the corner, and the educated classes know it. Shorthand notes taken of comments by the crowd during Iosif Brodsky's recent trial in Leningrad, provide some choice examples of the hostility with which the mass of the semi-educated view the cultural elite:

'Writers! To hell with them all . . .' 'Intellectuals! They're a stone round our necks!' 'You've seen how they work: they use other people's labour.' 'The whole lot of 'em ought to be chucked out of Leningrad: that will teach 'em!' . . .[10] Such sentiments are to be found just under the surface of society, ready to erupt whenever there is a pretext, such as the trial of one particular 'intellectual' on charges of 'parasitism'.

Of course, the intellectuals want a more civilised existence, better protection against arbitrary decisions on the part of ignorant functionaries, higher respect for their skill and their labour. Of course, they have found a new self-assurance arising from the knowledge that the society and the state could not exist without them. Of course, they have now learned to protect each other against blatant injustice. At the same time they also know that all their privileges, social and material, depend on the goodwill of the party machine. The two protagonists are tied to each other by mutual needs.

So, though the political moon, the untarnished reputation of the party, has cracked beyond repair, though fear is on the wane, though indifference towards politics is spreading, no spectacular changes ought to be anticipated in the near future. Perhaps it is better so for all concerned. Far too many spectacular changes in the past have resulted in the last analysis merely in more overt suffering and covert hatred.

Indeed, perhaps the most spectacular thing about the post-Khrushchevian skyscape in Russia is the fact that it contains so few spectacular features, that politics have come to matter so much less, that so very few people now care to pay attention to speeches at writers' congresses and to articles in party journals. It is a healthy sign.

10 *Vozdushnye puti* (New York), IV, p. 302.

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RUSSIAN POETRY 1963-1965

Pierre Forgues

AT THE TIME OF THE renewed freeze which followed Khrushchev's attacks on Soviet intellectuals in March 1963, the young Russian poets (mainly Evtushenko and Voznesensky) were singled out for special attention. By the end of 1963, after several months silence, they had all reappeared in the columns of Soviet newspapers or reviews. The purpose of the present article is to examine their writing since that event, which marked a chronological break in their work. For some writers no more than a break. But the events of 1963 obviously weigh heavily on Evtushenko's poems, from *Return to Zima Station* (September 1963) to the two poems which preceded *Northern Journey* (*Dolgie Kriki* and Mail Boat). It can also be sensed in Akhmadulina's *Rain* and the preamble to Voznesensky's *Lonjumeau*. Apart from that, the storm seems to have receded.

We shall be examining only the younger poets, which means that we shall disregard works like *Vasili Tyorkin in the Other World*, whose poetic merit is, in any case, almost inversely proportional to its satirical value. For reasons of space, our examination will also exclude traditionalist poets such as Issayev and Firsov. Finally, we shall examine each poet's work with a complete disregard for categorisation. No one school has emerged in the course of the major trend towards poetic emancipation which has stirred Russia in the past five or six years, and each poet has advanced, as it were, in skirmishing order. References to 'liberal' poets carry only a conventional meaning. Sosnora is published by *Oktyabr* and *Zvezda*, both ultra-conservative reviews, Slutsky and Evtushenko are ultimately conservative in form, Vinokurov soars above any kind of political preoccupation and could hardly be described as an enthusiastic innovator—but then picturesque disorder is one of the effects of art. . . .

Andrei Voznesensky

Voznesensky was one of the young writers most severely attacked by Khrushchev in March 1963. It was he who wrote in The Florentine Torches, published by *Yunost* in the same year: 'I am the guilty son of Socialist-Realism'. His 'self-criticism' was a prime example of mocking courage. 'I shall work, I shall work', he declared. He was sent without further consideration to Vladimir for some months. He returned loaded with poems which included Mayakovsky in Paris, published in the November 1963 issue of *Yunost* and reprinted in *Den Poezii 1963* together with The Latvian Saga, a dramatic poem of twenty-five lines, and the rather insipid Polish Lessons. In the same month, November 1963, *Znamya* published a group entitled The Poetry Post Office. This comprised *Lonjumeau*, a cycle devoted to Lenin, poems about Paris and Italy, and Monologue of Marilyn Monroe. All these poems were reassembled (together with The Hare Hunt, published with two other pieces in the July 1964 issue of *Yunost*) in his fourth collection of verse. Printed in an edition of 60,000 copies and aggressively entitled

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Anti-Worlds, this may be regarded as a representative selection of the author's works. His new poems are accompanied by the best of his earlier pieces, e.g. The Masters, Anti-Worlds, I am Goya, Parabolic Ballad, Roots and Crowns, Ballad on the Scaffold, etc. One missing item, apart from Fire at the Architectural Institute, is The Negroes are Singing, doubtless considered too symbolic for inclusion. As for The Florentine Torches, they have undergone a conspicuous form of amputation which dutifully suppresses the line quoted above. This collection had only just come out when the October 1964 number of *Molodaya Gvardia* published another new work by Voznesensky entitled Oza.

Lonjumeau won the poet almost undivided praise. Three examples which may be cited are: an article by Dymshits in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (12 November 1963), another by A. Mikhailov in *Moskva* (February 1964), and the pages devoted to him by Novikov in *Znamya* (September 1964). The first is wholly devoted to showing that Voznesensky has *at last* 'caught on', that he has stopped playing unpleasant pranks—in short, that a *new* Voznesensky has emerged: 'I often discussed Voznesensky with Aseyev . . . "Why do you criticise Voznesensky?" he asked me irritably. He found the poetry in The Triangular Pear pleasing. I gently explained. Then came the poems One-and-a-half-ton Truck, Farewell to the Polytechnic Institute, and others. Aseyev was irritated by them. "It looks as if you were right", he told me. "They're bagatelles, and have nothing to do with poetry". But with *Lonjumeau* Voznesensky has, to my mind, discovered the lucid poetic form without which no popular art can exist. A short while ago the interplay of resounding repetitions destroyed all logic in him, and sense was swamped by sound. . . . His comparisons were eccentric, extravagant, always drawn at the expense of meaning. Now things are different:

. . . the planet
like Lenin
is wise and profound . . .'

Great poetry indeed!

Mikhailov's article in *Moskva* pursues a similar line with greater caution. He begins by asserting that 'critics have often justly accused Voznesensky of sacrificing content to form', and supplies a generalised and rather curious explanation of this indictment. 'A poet who intoxicates himself with the vivid colours of this world cannot pierce the shell of his own being'. This is a devious way of saying that Voznesensky fails to penetrate things with the nonchalant ease to which he lays claim. 'Voznesensky is on the right track. He occasionally makes a "detour" or advances along a "parabolic trajectory", but only a course set by a Leninist compass can lead the poet to make genuine artistic discoveries.'

In *Znamya*, Novikov writes that '*Lonjumeau* testifies to a great change in the work of Voznesensky'. Mounting his hobby-horse, he congratulates the poet on having 'fused lyric and epic in an indissoluble way'.

In the introduction to *Znamya*, Voznesensky momentarily appears to side with his new-found admirers when he says: 'It is idiotic to preoccupy oneself with formalism and formal affectations.' However, it is hard to detect any trace of orthodoxy in the more positive half of this

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apologia. 'Like contemporary architecture, poetry should be transparent, full of light and depth, wholly centred upon man.' The shallow comparison praised by Dymshits and others of the same ilk is not actually representative of the whole.

Lonjumeau consists of a preamble, seven episodes composed of disjointed mental pictures and meditations, and an epilogue. The preamble opens with a profession of calm confidence:

'I embark on this poem like someone entering a new era.'

The bitterness born of the poet's recent experiences and the humility with which he approaches his great task are not inconsistent with this self-confidence. Far from it, for Voznesensky goes on:

Russia,
I am your capillary vessel,
and you suffer when I am in pain . . .

A similar sense of assurance finds expresssion throughout the remainder of the poem in its lack of constraint, and in the comparison, at first implicit but ultimately explicit, which Voznesensky establishes between Lenin and himself or Lenin and poets in general:

Lenin was
one of those
who lay bare
the heart of things.

In the introduction to The Triangular Pear Voznesensky claims this faculty. In the fourth episode of *Lonjumeau* he describes Lenin's activities in terms which closely recall the symbolic flight of Gauguin in Parabolic Ballad. In the sixth episode Voznesensky visualises a sculptor who, having just finished a bust of Verlaine, is carving one of Lenin. He exclaims (platitudinously in the extreme):

Ah, the symbolic trait!
Revolutionaries and poets
have the same skull.

This platitudinous quality, which appears in the majority of the quotations from *Lonjumeau* given here, mars the poem and conveys the impression that it was written rather hurriedly. The epilogue is particularly verbose. Voznesensky strives vainly to re-ecreate the litany-like rhythm so dear to him by indefatigably repeating (fourteen times): 'The school of Lenin!'

In the midst of this uneven mixture of poetry and prattle can be found images which transfix the poem with vivid intensity:

Men flee and telescope on the buttresses of night
the fiery autographs of their course.

Like crabs upon the shore, cathedrals
rear their flaming claws into the sky.

From the other poems published before Oza two ideas can be elicited. Voznesensky's vibrant sensibility gives him an amazingly intimate knowledge of objects and living creatures. The constant interaction between the external world and himself is the true source

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of his inspiration—hence the extremely large number of images, banal and otherwise, which his poetry contains. In him, observation activates the mechanism of association, as he explains very clearly in the little note with which he prefaces Paris without Rhymes.

His vision of the world is both unconstrained and tragic, but his spirit is essentially dramatic. The Latvian Saga, a dramatic poem in twenty-five stanzas, relates with uncharacteristic baldness the story of a woman who denounced her lover for fleeing to the West, intending never to return. She waits for him for ten years, and he comes back and beats her savagely every day. Mayakovsky in Paris and Monologue of Marilyn Monroe disclose a vibrant sense of participation in two tragedies which weigh oppressively on the poet himself. Monologue adopts the time-honoured technique of endlessly repeating a key-word which symbolises the steady advance of destiny. The obsessive repetition of this word proclaims the inexorable upsurge of the suicidal impulse in a hunted mind—though whether ensnared by reality or its own delusions the poet does not state. This technique traditionally (e.g. in Evtushenko) aspires to thematic expansion, but here the poem descends in ever-decreasing spirals, contracting like a noose about a trapped animal. The Mayakovsky poem begins with a mental image (Mayakovsky's likeness painted on a bridge in Paris and trodden underfoot by passers-by) which Voznesensky transforms until after a few stanzas Mayakovsky becomes the bridge itself. The poem does not possess the immediate impact of Monologue, but the concluding meditation on Mayakovsky, swung as a bridge between yesterday and today, is both emotionally restrained and touching.

Despite all the differences between these two human destinies, Voznesensky finds them similar. Writing of them at an interval of several weeks, he employs the same imagery for both:

> Like a wound,
> Mayakovsky, painfully prophetic,
> lies daubed on this bridge . . .
>
> In a biblical sky,
> amid showers of stars,
> above a steppe adorned with bill-boards,
> Marilyn panted,
> her eyes resembling wounds.

These two poems and the others in the group (especially Paris without Rhymes) show that, like all great poets, Voznesensky is a poet of *analogy*. He is a prey to the analogical demon which Mallarmé saw as the fateful symptom of creation. In Voznesensky, however, form is not serene but nervous and convulsive—at least in his best moments: when he is being verbose, nothing remains but stylistic tics.

In the 31 October 1964 issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Voznesensky published several extracts from a new work, *Oza*, which appeared in the October number of *Molodaya Gvardia*. He prefaced these extracts with a short note: '*Oza* is written in the form of a diary left behind by someone in an hotel. Oza is the name of the heroine. Passages of verse alternate with prose chapters representing the world that is alien to us—" the wild, programmed, planned beast ", pitiless and inimical to

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man. For a long time now, evil in art has assumed the guise of phantasmagoria. I have tried to conform to this tradition. The subject-line is broken by monologues from the Physicist, Historian, Raven, Poet . . .'.

The poem is built round a character with two names and two shapes. This is Oza-Zoya, who probably symbolises humanity in its most exalted form, the soul.

> It is the only eternity on earth,
> like the light of a vanished star,
> and this perpetual refulgence
> has been given the name of ' soul '.

This symbolism runs through the phantasmagorical description of a world trapped by the reversibility of time, a description interrupted by lyrical or critical monologues in which the poet dons the guise of various characters. It would take a whole article to examine this poem seriously and reveal the value of its contribution. In a study partly devoted to it which appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on 12 December 1964 Sergei Narovchatov pointed out a certain number of obvious weaknesses in the work. One cannot, for instance, fail to note the awkwardness of the Oza-Zoya transition, which is effected by means of the single phrase ' But perhaps she is called Oza ', nor the rather shallow naïvety with which certain ' ideas ' are directly expressed, e.g.:

> All forms of progress are reactionary
> if men crumple beneath them.
>
> Death lies in wait for the technicians and
> powerful men
> who pass close to us.

This is pretty prosaic stuff, there is no denying. There is also a certain schematism in the way in which Voznesensky illustrates the theme of chronological reversal. Finally, although Narovchatov somewhat pedantically indicts Voznesensky for ' errors of taste ', he fails to see the wood for the trees when he looks upon *Oza* as a retrogressive step. On the contrary, it marks a major advance towards a symbolic and polyphonic poetry capable of expressing the physical and psychological complexity of a universe which has been violated by science.

Robert Rozhdestvensky

This prolific writer has not published a collection of poems since *To People of My Age* (1962), but extracts from his work have appeared in a number of newspapers and reviews, chiefly Letter to the Thirtieth Century in *Yunost* (October 1963), The Nomads in *Znamya* (July 1963), Time in *Znamya* (March 1965), and more verse in *Den Poezii 1963* and in the April and July 1964 numbers of *Yunost*. Moreover, the imminent appearance of his seventh volume, a collection of the verse of this period entitled *Radius of Action*, has already been announced.

Rozhdestvensky strives to don two different poetic mantles, the polemical and the lyrical. These are united in Letter to the Thirtieth Century, to which is added the epic dimension of the author of Requiem. In these various guises he increasingly resembles a pale and

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anecdotal imitator of Mayakovsky. The verbosity he delights in is accentuated by a desultory dismemberment of phrases which suggests that he expects them to derive their entire poetic richness from such a technique. Rhythm, which in Mayakovsky stemmed from an original poetic temperament, here becomes merely a formula which throws the profoundly prosaic nature of his insipid litanies into sharp relief.

For instance, the death of Nazim Hikmet inspired Rozhdestvensky to write a poem entitled Nazim. Hikmet was a great enough writer to have provided a genuine source of poetic inspiration, but all he inspires Rozhdestvensky to produce are banalities of the worst sort and platitudes which are proffered with an academician's solemnity. To quote:

> He loved / congenial / women. / (In fact / he also / encountered / bad ones.) / Some / called him a good chap. / Others a highly-strung / original. / I won't argue. / But I see / now / he wasn't / an original. / He wasn't / a good chap. / He was a poet and a man, / that's all. / A poet and a man, etc.

Letter to the Thirtieth Century, which attains a higher level, arouses Novikov's enthusiasm by virtue of the lyric-epic fusion which the author achieves. However, the idea underlying this blend of historical fresco and lyrical meditation surpasses the poet's capabilities, and he frequently takes refuge in facile rhetorical expatiations on revolution or love. An emphatic beat and incantation, Rozhdestvensky's two favourite rhythms, seem to have been imported from outside and veneered onto the body of the poem, not thrown up spontaneously in the course of poetic creation—as is so clearly the case with Voznesensky. The poet's natural eloquence enables him to write some fine lyrical passages such as the one quoted below, which conveys the anguish inflicted on mankind by the threat of nuclear war:

> Pale
> dawns
> flare up.
> The final day arrives.
> The final spring advances
> in a breath of wondrous
> tenderness.
> The lily of the valley smiles at the world with new lustre.
> The dew loses itself in the rainbow of flowers,
> the streams
> swell
> with a strange heat,
> mad streams
> traverse the summer.
> All things approach their end,
> their end,
> their end.
> All is fulfilled,
> each thing awaits its final moment . . .
> and in a hospital
> is born
> a child of man . . .

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These moments are rare. Rozhdestvensky's success as a poet is far less manifest than his social success. Since March 1963 he has twice visited the USA as a member of Soviet writers' delegations, whereas no other young 'liberal' poet has left the confines of the USSR. Being an ambassador obviously has its charms.

Viktor Sosnora

Sosnora has not added anything much to the works published by *Oktyabr* (October 1962 and January 1963) and *Zvezda* (February 1963) apart from some small poems which have appeared in Leningrad's *Den Poezii* (1963 and 1964) and in *Vecher Poezii*, all of which are inferior to the foregoing. This group is to form the nucleus of a second slim volume, *Triptych* (90 pages), to be published in mid-1965.

Sosnora is a descriptive poet who selects sundry details from a landscape or scene, sculpts them and picks them out against a vague, lightly sketched background. He paints with little impressionistic dabs, but his drawing is neat, precise, and a trifle dry. His rhythm is usually as economical as his painting—a succession of lines comprising two or three words grouped in pairs, like short dance-steps:

Shadows skim the walls,
shadows,
frontiers drawn
obliquely.

In the better passages, vision and rhythm expand, enabling Sosnora's poetry to avoid the brittleness and fragmentation which threaten it:

Mosquito-bites
of rain on benches.
The leaves walk, like geese,
on their enormous red feet.

Do you build space, blacksmith?
Do you make the beacons flame?
Do you tend the night above mankind?
Do you mend the ocean?

There is often a breathless quality about this poetry—a weakness which becomes particularly marked when Sosnora tells a story or indulges in anecdote, as in the two fables Fishes and Snakes and Why Dragonflies no longer have Wings (*Zvezda*, February 1963). Yet it was Sosnora who defined inspiration in a poem whose great impetus spurs it into a long single phrase which culminates in a piece of rich imagery reminiscent of Voznesensky at his finest and most felicitous:

Inspiration is
an uninterrupted breath
which aims at the sky . . .
then advances
along concrete highways . . .
. . . so that rhythms,
like razor strokes,
blaze up towards the sun!

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Sosnora is not prolific, and one gains the impression that he finds it an effort to write poetry. His entire published output between 1958 and the present day covers only two hundred pages. In his case, originality is *acquired* by a dogged concentration of effort on rather meagre material. His imagery, though not rare, is often delicate, fresh, and sometimes, as in the concluding lines of Inspiration, dazzling.

Boris Slutsky

Slutsky published his third collection, *Yesterday and Today* in 1963, and his fourth volume, *Work*, appeared as scheduled at the end of 1964. Recalling Slutsky as he was at the time of Stalin's death, Evtushenko writes in his autobiography: 'He lived in a tiny room on cheap tinned foods and coffee, but his table was littered with astringent, harsh, sometimes Baudelairian poems—poems which he did not submit to publishers so as not to waste his own time'—a lightning portrait of a 'proscribed' poet of whom Evtushenko tells us that he had published only *one* poem by the time he was thirty-five. It is a little difficult to understand the ostracism of yesteryear. One's first impression is that Slutsky's poetry conforms to rationalist requirements. These requirements are neatly expressed, for instance, in an unnamed poem which appeared in the October issue of the review *Prostor*:

> What lessons the ocean imparts to man! / When he has bent his ear to the waves he can hear all . . . / The sea which licks our feet / also sets our soul in motion. / The waves of the sea not only calm and soothe us, / they also answer our questions.

Slutsky seeks the *idea*, the *lesson* inherent in every object and spectacle. His poetry fully reflects the *desiccating* quality peculiar to such an approach. In it, expression is sacrificed to the intellectual and moral values which the poet upholds. Slutsky's exacting severity manifests itself in content but scarcely in form:

> I am a man, not a carpet.
> I think, and do not decorate.

Expressed thus, such austerity might seem to be artistically dangerous. Does not an artist who proclaims that he 'thinks and does not decorate' impoverish his work by entirely depriving it of the ornamental, aesthetic quality essential to every genuine work of art? Slutsky himself seems to be vaguely aware of this. Two divergent conceptions of poetry war within him, conceptions which unite in their condemnation of the verbal turgidity and complacent rhetoric which have prompted socialist-realists to hide reality behind a sadly clownish mask. In *Yesterday and Today* he writes:

> Poetic language is not a Lutheran Mass
> in which all is clean, cold and luminous,
> but without images or candles . . .
> . . . in which music forsakes words, and words are
> devoid of imagery.

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Some months later, in a poem published in the December 1963 issue of *Yunost*, he adopts a considerably more 'Lutheran' approach:

> The sculptor separated with hammer-blows
> the superfluous from the indispensable,
> removing the superfluous bulk
> with movements strong and pitiless.
> At his side I learned
> to stress, to summarise,
> to distrust pompous gestures,
> to tame impetuous ebullience.

In general, Slutsky succeeds only too well in taming the 'impetuous ebullience' of poetic inspiration within himself. His poetry is rigid and didactic, and its rhythm is often monotonous. It verges on prose, and fresh imagery is rare:

> Mouths opened
> and, in the city,
> like a cavalry squadron,
> beauty arose.
>
> Like a newspaper, the day crumples behind doors
> and scurries like a belated schoolboy.

Bella Akhmadulina

Since her first collection, *The String* (1962), Bella Akhmadulina has published only two major poems: Rain, in *Literaturnaya Gruzia* (1963, No. 12), and My Genealogy, in the January 1964 number of *Yunost*. As far as I know, the first poem evoked no response apart from an article in *Zarya Vostoka* denouncing an allusion to the meeting between Khrushchev and the intellectuals in December 1962. Except for a short critique in *Lit. Gaz.* (17 March 1964), none of the leading literary reviews devoted an article to My Genealogy, which is surprising in view of the poem's artistic merit, until the February 1965 issue of *Voprosy Literatury*.

Rain is a symbolic poem. The story is simple and straightforward: pursued by the Rain, which clings to her tenaciously, 'pushing her from behind like a wing' or 'perched on her shoulders like a monkey' according to her varying reactions, Bella makes her way to a social function, conscious that the Rain will not be allowed to accompany her indoors. Her hosts' initially sour reception gives way to gushing cordiality. Having allowed the Rain to enter, they catch it and beat it, armed with brooms and brushes.

> Reconciled, the men lift their trouser-legs
> and drive their heels into its face.

Confronted by this spectacle, Bella, who a few moments earlier had been cursing the Rain for being 'her demon', suddenly rebels:

> Don't touch it—it's mine!
> The master of the house whispered to me:
> for your information,
> you'll have to answer for this incident.

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I burst out laughing:
I know.
You're revolting.
Let me leave!
. . . Outside on the dry asphalt I kissed
a little spot of water.

The symbolism is as transparent as the underlying idea is straightforward. Rain is the poetic inspiration or spirit which fertilises everything in the midst of aridity and torrid heat. At first distrusted and then fêted, the poet momentarily curses her fructifying genius before recovering herself and refusing to sacrifice the divine power which can engender life in the middle of a desert. Bella Akhmadulina refrains from explaining her symbolism in detail and avoids being unduly precise in her personifications. Although the Rain is endowed with human reactions, this does not entail any over-explicit symbolism. All is suggestive.

My Genealogy differs greatly from Rain. The basic idea, an equally simple one, is the rediscovery and reconstruction of a personality through the sketchy, fragmentary, allusive portraits of its ancestors. The thread of the story is constantly interrupted by the author's reflections and monologues, and the poem as a whole is unified only by the increasingly inevitable and imminent approach of the birth of the unique being known as Bella Akhmadulina. Everything and everyone seems to have conspired against her, beginning with a distant forebear named Igrek, who wanted to put his daughter into a convent, thereby imperilling Bella Akhmadulina's existence for ever. The whole poem is animated by a mood of lyrical but restrained exaltation. Life—effervescent, triumphant, and defiantly joyous—gradually nears its advent. The tone is set by the first stanza:

And I slumbered throughout past ages,
luminous and calm in the bosom of nature.
In the moist earth, darker than a rough copy,
the green corn of my soul was faintly taking shape

In dense and at times elliptical language, she conveys with abundant power and suspense both the striving for life and the vague presence of one who is yet to be born:

Shall I ever see the day when my first cry
ravages my throat,
when I breathe, O Life,
your harsh and fiery air, which rends
my lips?

Imagery and similes are endowed with a power which has hitherto been absent from her work:

. . . just as a man wandering across the steppe
feels on his neck the approach of the stars.

With Rain and My Genealogy, Akhmadulina has probably become, after Voznesensky and in company with Okudzhava, the most interesting of

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the young poets of today. Voznesensky himself said in Paris in December 1962: 'She expresses poetry at its maximal purity'. If these words are the exaggeration of a friend, they do nevertheless suggest the quality of her writing.

Evgeny Evtushenko

Evtushenko has not published a great deal since the attacks which shook his equilibrium in March 1963: *Return to Zima Station* and three short poems in the September 1963 number of *Yunost*, a small group of poems entitled *For You, Men*, in the February 1964 issue of *Moskva*, brief excerpts from a future work 'dedicated to the founders of the Bratsk hydroelectric power station' in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 3 March 1964, a few poems in the July 1964 number of *Novy Mir*, a poem on Lermontov in the October 1964 number of *Moskva*, a rather more substantial group entitled *Northern Journey* in the January 1965 issue of *Znamya*, and a short Ballad of the Poacher in the January 1965 issue of *Novy Mir*.

These poems contribute nothing new. They are still constructed round an anecdote, an idea, a scene, a story—sometimes a combination of all four. Rhythm and rhyme serve to pass off as poetry what is often insipid verbiage which only stands up by leaning heavily on the crutch of verse-form. Thus *Return to Zima Station*: a man ought to love his country, because that is how he ends by loving the whole world; I have recently been subjected to harsh criticism—justified, I may add—but one evening not long ago I read my poems to some Komsomols at Zima, and this restored my confidence; I told myself that my country needs goods, not words; while I was pondering this I saw a woman who had lost her son in the war, etc., etc. There follows a long meditation on the evils of war and the need for peace. Evtushenko does not baulk at banality:

> What conclusion ought you to draw?
> Work, lad, that's the ticket.
> There's a good rule in our country:
> 'Those who don't work don't eat.'
>
> My sister was pressing my trousers for me
> and eagerly trying to convince me,
> sometimes tenderly feminine, sometimes severe:
> 'You'll see, Yenka, everything will turn out right . . .'

Evtushenko's composition is often extremely schoolboyish. A case in point is The Third Memory, in which he explains that, apart from the memory of the heart and intellect, there exists a third memory—that of the body. Six successive stanzas are devoted, respectively, to recollections of the feet, cheek, forehead, back, fingers, lips. . . . This form of discursive poetry virtually excludes imagery, but when Evtushenko momentarily allows himself to float away on a wave of metaphor he leaves his dull and didactic sermons far behind—as, for instance, when he writes of Piaf:

> Tousled as a sick-eyed screech-owl,
> heavy and drooping on its broken wings . . .

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she eyed us as one eyes the Seine . . .
. . . In her were mingled tocsins, downpours, cannonades,
imprecations, groans, shadowy murmurs . . .
from her throat came anguish, faith,
from her throat came stars and the tolling of bells . . .
The screech-owl sang like a chimera
fallen to the stage from the towers of Notre Dame.

Evtushenko gives undue weight to the 'missionary' aspect of his poetic activities, and he is too well aware that his personal charm and superb delivery can carry off anything in front of any audience to cherish a genuine regard for true poetic form or modes of expression, which in him are reduced to the status of auxiliaries to the voice and hands.[1]

Bulat Okudzhava

Okudzhava's third collection, *The Merry Drum*, appeared in December 1964 (but the present writer has so far been unable to get a copy). This volume apart, the work published by Okudzhava in the past two years has been scanty. It includes a few poems in the February 1963, February and December 1964, and January 1965 issues of *Yunost*, two poems in *Den Poezii 1963* and three in the Leningrad *Den Poezii 1964*. Songs form only a minority of this new group, although they obviously represent the form most natural to Okudzhava's poetry—light, impalpable, and dance-like, with a rhythm which (in the original) sets the foot tapping in sympathy:

It's bound to come, it's bound to come,
and it's inevitable.
Birds will sing above the town,
bands will play again,
the air will grow transparent,
the frontier troops
will come home singing.
It's bound to come, it's bound to come.
I'm sure. They'll melt down all the armour-plating . . .

Here, the essential content of the poem has no real importance but is submerged in the rhythm of the song.

The soldiers' ballads, or songs about life in the army, of which *Grani* published a good selection in its October 1964 number, are half-songs, half-poems. Beneath the simple words, rhythms, and phrases, can be sensed the throb of veiled, bitter-sweet tenderness. Okudzhava achieves the mood and rhythm of the popular ballad without any of the affectation that traditionally besets imitators of folklore:

I take my greatcoat, pack and helmet,
daubed with khaki paint,
and march along the winding lanes.
How simple it is to be a soldier, to be a soldier!

[1] These comments were written before the publication of Evtushenko's last big poem on the Bratsk power station in *Yunost*, April 1965.

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It matters little to him—or to us—that he expresses simple sentiments and ideas. We sense that his is no orchestration of a theme that has already been done to death, but the 'naïve' avowal of a man who reveals himself to us with a genuine poetic candour which restores freshness and novelty to the most hackneyed subjects (e.g. the idea that peace on earth can spring only from individual purity of heart, as expressed in The Rest will Come, censured for its fallacious 'position' in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 5 March 1964).

This candour, which recalls the style of 'primitive' painters or illuminators, coupled with a keen appreciation of the savour of life, lends particular strength to the turbulent blend of joy and melancholy which animates some of Okudzhava's more recent poems, e.g. Song of the Painter Pirosmani, The Palms of Your Hands, and François Villon. It also testifies to his remarkable skill in handling the most diverse metres, from the bald rhythm of the first to the broad phrasing of the last, or of Grasshoppers.

His knees are skinny,
his expression strained,
but glutted elks
stare out at him from his pictures.

Lovely Marguerite
lies in the thick grass,
a mole throbbing
on her bare breast.

His art reaches its zenith when he is being evocative or allusive, as in The Light at the Window or The Palms of Your Hands, which show that Okudzhava also has a sense of imagery—though it is pretty rather than powerful:

I pluck the leaves from your palms . . .
. . . noisy hordes of our past
who fly towards the bushes
like tits . . .
. . . I fall
into your burning hands; I drown
in the joy of your blue veins.
Is someone crying?
No one.
Down below, urchins play at war.

Okudzhava is more than a mere humorist or ballad-writer—though he is certainly that as well. His work has echoes of Yves Montand and Georges Brassens, and the rhythms of song rise unbidden to his lips, but he is more of an epic poet in a minor key. His symbolic poem The Grasshoppers conveys the full grandeur of his conception of poetry, unencumbered by the social or missionary traditions which are still so dutifully exhibited today. With considerable humour, Okudzhava likens poetic creation to the labours of two grasshoppers in a world which is

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nothing more than a riot of colour. Like poetry, the two tiny creatures pit themselves against all comers:

> Snow batters them, heat torments them, rain whips them.
> Wearily the terrestrial globe grinds round,
> but between summer and winter, joy and woe,
> there grows, immutable,
> the deeper meaning of their creation.

So it is with Okudzhava.

Evgeny Vinokurov

Vinokurov published two volumes of poetry in 1964. The first, part of the *Library of Soviet Poetry*, is an anthology covering his work between 1945 and 1963, and the second, *Music*, groups together all the poems published in 1963 and early 1964, as well as some hitherto unpublished works. Vinokurov has since added a few short pieces in *Yunost* (April and October 1964), *Molodaya Gvardia* (September 1964), and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (13 June, 10 October, 8 December 1964, and 23 February 1965).

Music, the title of his new collection, is programmatic, and this is further emphasised by the line from Zabolotsky which Vinokurov has used as a superscription: 'Word, become music'. Reading his new poems, one does not gain the impression that they fulfil this lofty ambition much more successfully than their predecessors. It is more profitable to seek a definition of Vinokurov's poetry on a slightly lower plane, i.e. in passages from his own writings, of which two are particularly germane: 'A few words about myself', which serves as a brief introduction to his anthology, and the poem The Angel, which introduces *Music*. 'Genuine inquiry . . . does not evolve in the realm of poetic technique, where progress is measured in millimetres, but in the realm of the human mind and of thought, where one can leap forward hundreds of kilometres at a time. Technique is not a way of fabricating a dummy, but of helping to bring forth a living child.' He adds: 'I have been given two conflicting pieces of advice simultaneously: "Don't let a day pass without writing poems!" and "Only write when you can't do otherwise!" I am the latter type.' Hence the extreme care which Vinokurov lavishes on the content of his work, eschewing all poems which are not centred upon an anecdote, scene, or idea imbued with a (discreet) moral. Poetry ought to possess significance and, if possible, direct significance. It must not be cryptographic.

In The Angel, Vinokurov asserts (in an indirect and figurative manner whose evocative power makes this poem one of the finest he has ever written) that poetry is closely linked to his personal experience of life. He has not, like Lermontov, been endowed with the terrifying gift of poetic inspiration:

> The terrible angel did not entrust her lyre to me.
> I was not ordained a prophet.
> I was timid, and the secret sources
> of my music sprang from elsewhere.

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War! I was stretched out ailing on the plain
beneath a heavy shroud of snow.
A prolonged sob, rising to my ears,
heralded the advent of the word . . .

Concerned with the ordinary and constructed out of little scenes lacking in imagery and marshalled into little poems, this type of verse is very often 'mundane' in its poetic range and resonance. Vinokurov's poetry often verges on prose, and he seldom goes beyond commentaries upon or descriptions of banal sights or experiences. This entitles him to utter profounds truisms, e.g.:

What a blessing it is to marvel/and what folly!/
How beneficial it is!/How good/the man who marvels,/
even if a little foolish!/Wonder is moving./It is
an art,/great and complex./It is not given to all./
The capacity for wonder is a gift./Not everyone is
worthy of it . . . etc. etc. etc.

These homilies are no more felicitous when unencumbered by a moral:

Long live the respiratory process!
Breathe, breathe! May a long inhalation
gradually become transformed into exhalation . . .
Breathing, when all is said and done, means
living!

One might be forgiven for mistaking this for a quotation from a pharmaceutical brochure or a poster advertising a system of physical training!

Grey and futile verbiage of this sort still constitutes the vast majority of Vinokurov's work. Out of the two existing anthologies of his poems, *Lyric Poems* and the volume quoted above, barely one poem in twenty escapes monotony or seems to be tinged with poetic grace. Although his poems are tending to become shorter, the above proportion has not altered in his recent work. Vinokurov is a static poet.

Osip Brodsky

This young poet was—unhappily for him—introduced to the world in 1964, although none of his work has yet been published in the USSR. A youthful protégé of Akhmatova, he owed his emergence from obscurity to the bewildering trial which ended in his being sentenced to five years corrective labour—followed by two unfounded announcements of his release. It is hard to understand the whys and wherefores of Brodsky's trial and equally difficult to understand what prevented Soviet officials from publishing his poems, which are so devoid of any social or political connotation that one can only marvel at the ostracism that has afflicted them and recoiled so savagely on their author.

Brodsky's poetry is hectic, born within the disturbed and disturbing confines of dream and daily life, nightmare and personal experience—in his case so cruelly intermingled. Voivodin, a witness for the prosecution at his trial, rightly declared that one of the fundamental ingredients

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of his work is a sense of estrangement from the world. (This being a somewhat slender justification for sending a man off to cart dung for five years, Voivodin added, needless to say, that Brodsky's poems were also pornographic and unpatriotic.) This feeling of 'apartness', blended with melancholy hope, finds splendid expression in Christmas Song:

There floats in the haze beyond Moscow
a swimmer weighed down by fate.
Fleetingly, a Jewish accent drifts
down a dismal yellow staircase,
and between love and sorrow,
on this eve of Christmas and the New Year,
there floats an intoxicating beauty
which cannot explain its own sadness.

His lyricism is veiled, constricted, and entirely alien to the traditional trumpetings of Soviet poetry. He speaks in an undertone, as though stifled by the anguish which he voices without affectation or outcry, whether in The Jewish Cemetery or Monument to Pushkin:

His poems,
realised in blood,
lapsed
into a slow
and tender gaze . . .
above them, quivering, sang
the stars . . .

Brodsky has a keen sense of rhythm. Monument to Pushkin consists of short, fragmentary lines which seem to die, unfinished, with the poet. Christmas Song, which closes on a note of despair, expands into long, protracted phrases. The Elegy for John Donne is a great lyrical vision built up by the accumulation of brief phrases.

Brodsky's oeuvre is uneven. The cold and precious symbolism of Fish, the fluent, fanciful romanticism of The Black Horse, the dryness of Verses on the Conception of the World—all demonstrate clearly that, here as elsewhere, genius is the fruit of a lengthy concentration of effort on oneself. Even Brodsky's least good poems confirm the assessment of Professor Etkind, a defence witness at his trial: 'His clarity in the rendering of poetic language, the musicality, lyricism, and power of his poetry made a strong impression on me. . . . I realised that I was in the presence of a man endowed with a very rare gift . . .'[2]

Alla Akhundova

Lack of space forbids an examination of the work of lesser poets such as Novella Matveyeva, who published her second volume, *The Little Ship*, in 1964. In her case, description and idea join hands in an excess of transparent symbolism. A poem published in the September 1963 number of *Novy Mir* unwittingly explains the preoccupation with

[2] A volume of Brodsky's poetry was published in the United States in April 1965.

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rationalism which inhibits her from allowing imagery or rhythm to detach themselves from their immediate significance:

> I love the harmonies, branches and boughs
> of a mysterious tree called poetry.
> But I do not love the harmonies that are
> young birch-branches grafted on to a pine.

One young poet who declines to accept this flat rejection of the *unexpected* in poetry is Alla Akhundova. In June 1964 *Yunost* published three short poems by her. Their concentrated nature throws into sharp relief the power and novelty of her imagery, the rhythmic drive, the freshness of vision and subtlety of the very adolescent charm with which their author toys with the world:

> It is I who, from the sky, in dew,
> have lain along the branches.
> It is I who launch myself
> into space, green and naked,
> and make crosses with my feet
> before soaring to the sun.
> It is I who fly away,
> melt upon the cheeks of fate,
> glide over the rounded waves,
> cry out like a fish beneath the sea,
> rear up like a stone in the city,
> freeze like the steel of railway lines.
> And, through the measureless forest
> and up to the sky,
> my voice sings of the world.

Alla Akhundova was born in 1939 of a Russian mother and an Azerbaijani father. She published her first poems in *Komsomol of Moscow* in 1958, entered the Gorky Institute of Literature, which she has just left, and published nothing more until the *Yunost* poems referred to above. Since then, three short poems by her have appeared in the 10 January 1965 issue of *Komsomol of Moscow*. They are slighter and drier, but their inspiration, though a trifle precious, confirms the hopes to which her lively sensitivity gives rise.

* * *

Finally, despite yelps of bureaucratic protest, Soviet poetry is undergoing a process of development which has yet to affect Soviet prose. *Den Poezii 1964* illustrates this development in its own way. Voznesensky, Evtushenko, Vinokurov, Akhmadulina, Okudzhava, and Sosnora are not represented. Instead, the collection opens with some verse by A. Prokofiev, the 'poet' who, in his capacity as Secretary of the Leningrad Writers Union, demanded that Brodsky should be hailed into court for 'sloth'. The police have always been strangers to poetry. *Den Poezii 1964* obviously represents what it can, but it is not essentially representative of Soviet poetry in the past year.

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HISTORY AND THE HISTORIANS

Kurt Marko

SOVIET historians are still engaged in a tug-of-war for a new version of Soviet history. During its first stage, between 1956 and 1961, this struggle took the form of public attacks on the heritage of Stalinism. In the more recent past the struggle has become more indirect and semi-concealed. Open attacks are very rare. The half-concealed attacks, on the other hand, cover a field which tends to become both broader and more complex. The many personal and ideological problems which are coming to the fore with the rise of a new generation, are being further complicated by all sorts of disputes concerning the organisation and administration of research and teaching, both within the USSR as a whole and within the various Union Republics. There is evidence of a marked desire to produce at last a definitive view of history or, at least, finally acceptable versions of certain historical events.

However, it has not yet proved possible to master the past, which remains beset by all the well-known pitfalls and memory-gaps. The desire for a definitive history thus remains frustrated, quite apart from the fact that it has also to contend with the difficulty that any new version would have to satisfy both the party authorities and a generation of historians increasingly concerned with scholarly accuracy and their own autonomous rights. The party representatives are searching for a version of history which, though based on facts, is above all effective as propaganda and capable of helping the party to overcome the post-Stalin crisis of confidence and restore its own credit and credibility. Yet the very crisis of confidence which the revelations about the Stalin period produced throughout the communist world, has also enabled the Soviet specialists, and the historians in the first place, to insist, in the name of scholarship, on greater autonomy as well as on certain changes in ideology, institutions, and personnel.

The undisputed starting points for both party and specialists—though the two groups do not of course live and work in wholly separate worlds—are the two destalinisation party congresses of 1956 and 1961 and the new CPSU programme. In the realm of history this has meant that the party has insisted on the cooperation of the historians in three fields in particular—in the struggle against the personality cult, in the education of the new Soviet man, and, as a practical application, so to speak, of the second task, in the struggle against the 'dogmatists' and 'left adventurists', i.e. the Chinese. This last point illustrates vividly what the party, today as in the past, expects of the historians. According to changing practical needs, they are supposed to participate, or even take the lead, in the ideological struggles against the adversaries of the day.

The historians themselves, however, have a very different view of their task. Judging by what a number of them have said on the subject,

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many of them interpreted the directives of the post-Stalin party congresses primarily as a request to create order in their own house. As a result, historians engaged in the field of party history did not stop short at the de-deification of Stalin. Nor did they restrict themselves to the transformation of the former dictator into an un-person, or to the attempt to replace him by some new myth—the party as a whole, the anonymous central committee, or a stylised kind of ubiquitous Lenin. Instead, they showed marked tendencies, especially in 1962, to deal with the personality cult in a far more radical manner, to combine the devaluation of Stalin's personality with a re-evaluation of his epoch, and to go on exposing the dead tyrant's living henchmen even among the professional ideologists and historians. This avalanche of intensified destalinisation inevitably threatened to involve the party itself, including some of its functionaries. It also threatened to deepen the crisis of confidence which the historians were supposed to help overcome, and to produce increasingly explosive political problems. There were, in addition, parallel problems in historical fields other than party history. The institutional and personal expansion of the social sciences led to an increasing specialisation and differentiation which, instead of producing politically useful agreements, resulted in a surfeit of problems and polemics, and in growing insecurity.

MOST foreign observers watch the struggle of the various Soviet interest groups and factions about the further development of destalinisation and the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims mainly in the arena of politics. Yet politics, as Khrushchev's fall demonstrated, are generally too overladen with global calculations of every description to allow the actors to stage the play in its authentic version. It may be more fruitful therefore to take a look backstage, where the rehearsals take place and where the backroom boys prepare the scenes, the costumes and masks for the future actors—for that misty chorus of historical shadows, un-persons, still-persons, no-longer-persons or not-yet-persons. Up to a point that can be done by following the academic disputes which are being aired in scientific journals and at scientific congresses and which, in many cases, are only apparently concerned with purely academic issues. Academic congresses, academic literature, and academic controversies are invariably influenced by the massive presence of the party. Yet the stand taken by the party is not always the same, nor does it always remain unopposed. In a number of important fields the party point of view has become openly controversial and has remained controversial, contrary to the demands of the party spokesmen. While everyone concerned endeavours to bestow on the social sciences a new aura of respectability, there are nevertheless markedly different attitudes to the desirable manner and degree of destalinisation, which emerge most clearly from the repeated confrontations between the social scientists themselves and the party functionaries delegated to deal

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with their specific problems. Measured by the yardstick of controversies in the non-communist world, or even that of the great inter-communist debates on revisionism, dogmatism, and so forth, these confrontations within the Soviet Union may not appear to go very far, but they amount nevertheless to a very hazardous game.

Not counting the conference of historians of 1928, which, because of the subsequent condemnation of Pokrovsky and his school, has fallen into oblivion, the All-Union Conference of Soviet Historians, which met from 18 to 21 December 1962, was the very first of its kind. 1928–1962: these two dates speak for themselves. Leading party spokesmen at the 1962 conference were Ponomarev and Pospelov. Altogether 135 speakers participated in the debates, outstanding among them Fedoseyev, the Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, Burdzhalov, and seven old-guard party members. The protocol of the conference, which takes up 518 pages, was published only in the summer of 1964 in an edition of 5,000 copies (*Vsesoyuznoe Soveshchanie Istorikov*).

In 1963 and 1964, the wrestling continued at a number of further meetings. The CPSU central committee plenum, meeting from 18 to 21 June 1963, sharpened the tone of the ideological debate. Before that, Fedoseyev had addressed the plenary meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which met on 14 and 15 May 1963. At a subsequent plenary meeting of the Academy of Sciences (1 to 4 July 1963), he gave a lecture on 'Science and Ideological Life'. Debates on methodological questions were supposed to bring about the re-imposition of Marxism-Leninism on the scientific life of the Soviet Union. An example was the lecture on 'Methodological Problems of the Natural and Social Sciences', which the then central committee secretary, Ilyichev, gave to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences on 18 October 1963. On 3 and 6 January 1964, Fedoseyev and Yu. P. Frantsev lectured on 'Methodological Problems of History' at an enlarged meeting of the Academy Presidium's social science section. Twenty-four speakers took part in the discussions which followed. Both the Historical and the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, moreover, organised special working groups on methodological questions. Between November 1963 and May 1964 the two groups held four joint sessions. Even after that the discussions continued, but, so far as the outsider is concerned, they continued from then onwards behind more or less closed doors.

Still, there is the protocol of the conference of December 1962, which throws startling light on the protracted struggle between scholarship and ideology. It allows us to see something of the dramatic confrontation between the ruling party and rebellious scholars, between the defenders of a manipulated Leninism and the champions of the neglected national interests of the non-Russians. It records the many discordant voices of the different groups and factions—the conformist party hacks, the Stalinist diehards, the cautiously operating critics, and the courageous non-conformists who insist on proclaiming the truth.

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THE *istmatchiki*—the professional party champions of historical materialism—claim to have all the answers to the fundamental questions of the past, the present, and the future. The party evidently hoped to reinforce that claim by inducing the Conference of Historians to re-dedicate itself to a moderate kind of post-Stalinism. But the conference produced an unexpected *fronde*, which became the mouthpiece of an explicit, far-reaching criticism, including criticism of the conference itself. Most of the speakers were anything but satisfied. They were, they said, admittedly glad to meet at long last and to have an opportunity to discuss and criticise matters, but the outcome seemed not very encouraging. The outsider's impression of a certain chaos at the conference only confirms what was said in the discussion itself. Certainly, the cacophony of voices and the conflict of interests, which the conference brought into the open, bore no similarity to Stalinist or Chinese ideas of discipline.

The academic rebellion uncovered a wide area of discontent and of shortcomings in the fields of research, teaching, administration, and publishing. Discontent became greater when, at the conference itself, party and government spokesmen answered the critics evasively, while some of the most highly-placed specialists continued to follow the Stalinist ritual. The latter—most of them members of the older generation and, more especially, the 'philosophers' among them who are in any case closest to the party clerics—contented themselves with declarations of faith and with the stereotyped repetition of both the old and the most recent party slogans—as though they wanted to demonstrate that all the directives and all the criticism of the party had already been taken to heart and translated into action. Yet this very attempt to run the conference on the traditional pattern of pre-determined party assemblies was probably an important cause of the steadily growing unrest and of the increasingly open and increasingly courageous attacks on the part of the critics. All Soviet scholars are influenced, if not wholly determined, by the psychology of the authoritarian personality. That applies to the conformists, the appeasers, the opportunist turncoats, as well as to those offering resistance. It is worth noting that some of the keenest rebels were accused of having acted as spokesmen under Stalin. One of them tried to evade this accusation by drawing attention to the Stalinist complicity of others, including some of the prominent party representatives present at the conference, especially Pospelov. The muddy waters of motivation and the moral ambivalences and dilemmas seemed to be inexhaustible. Yet the conference also demonstrated that Byzantinism alone is no longer enough for self-preservation. Neither the party functionaries nor the rebellious specialists are any longer satisfied with vociferous platitudes, though they both pursue different objectives. The party spokesmen are mainly interested in discovering new techniques, more effective than the discredited measures of the past and more suitable to convince, to mollify, and to mobilise the people. The

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more critically-minded historians, on the other hand, who are determined to carry destalinisation further, are by now, it would seem, simply unable to listen any longer to the soothing platitudes and the sickening professions of loyalty made by their venerable colleagues. What is more, at the conference they took the party at its word in interpreting its appeals for a courageous new beginning and for Marxist-Leninist objectivity, not as a mere political ornament, but in its literal meaning.

They understood only too well, and tried to make their audience understand, that a premature capitulation to those anxious to halt destalinisation would have dangerous consequences. Quoting instances of retouching and falsification which occurred after 1956, for instance in 1960 and 1961, they warned their hearers against the perils of promulgating new untruths and quarter-truths or, as they expressed it, *prokultovskie oshibki*—mistakes serving the personality cult. They warned them against the neo-Stalinist attempts to close the debate on the Stalin era and to endorse the suppression of all those as yet undisclosed facts which have remained hidden because they might damage the party image or the patriotic legends of Soviet history. The party spokesmen and the academic yes-men maintained that the liquidation of the personality cult had already been accomplished. The critical historians insisted that it was time to start it in earnest, and they kept on describing their opponents as *kultik, kultist, kultistskaya shkolka,* which are all derived from *kult lichnosti*—the personality cult. In an allusion to the terror and the sycophancy associated with Arakcheyev, the powerful Minister of War under Alexander I, they referred to the 'Arakcheyevist' humiliation of history under Stalin and his henchmen, and they even hinted at an 'Arakcheyevist' resistance to the destalinisation directives of the XX and XXII CPSU congresses. They also endeavoured to oppose those party spokesmen who, following the official line, pretended to have known nothing of the crimes of the Stalin era and to have trusted Stalin completely, so as to demonstrate the alleged resistance of at least some historians to Stalin's arbitrariness.

The opposition at the conference emerged from a sort of alliance between the younger generation of historians and the party veterans from the pre-Stalin period. Speaking with the authority of survivors from Lenin's old guard, the party veterans were remarkably frank and passionate in their criticism. Neither they nor the younger historians were prepared to accept as final the official revision of the Stalinist version of history which had been undertaken since 1956, partly at the instigation and partly with the toleration of the party. They were determined and, in the name of a return to Leninism, declared it to be their aim, to continue the process of revision and to re-admit to the official version of history all the still suppressed facts, events, conflicts, and personalities. Their chief aim, in other words, was that of going on with the task of rehabilitation in the widest sense of the word. They pleaded that all established facts and conclusions should, as a matter of principle, remain subject to a process of permanent revision. There was, for

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instance, the question of the party's, and especially of Stalin's, attitude in March and April 1917 to the Provisional Government, to the continuation of the war, and to the Mensheviks—a subject on which Burdzhalov had written in 1956. Yet when this question was brought up at the conference, the official party spokesmen declared that there was nothing to discuss as the matter had been settled by the central committee resolution of 9 March 1957, which condemned the serious mistakes of Burdzhalov and others in the journal *Voprosy Istorii*.

The critics, including Burdzhalov himself, were not silenced by this declaration, and persisted in pursuing the matter and asking awkward questions. In other ways, too, they stubbornly campaigned against the official practice of suppression and evasion. The apologists of the party legend at the conference, such as Pospelov, characteristically enough tried to refute the rebels with the argument that Burdzhalov's account had been praised in anti-communist journals. Thus, more than five years after the central committee's intervention, the struggle still continued between the propagandistically and educationally minded 'traditionalists', on the one hand, and, on the other, the younger generation of historians and the spokesmen of the persecuted victims who pleaded for truth.

THE academic elite of the Soviet Union, as many statements at the conference indicated, is, on top of all this, in the disagreeable position of a buffer between the students and the regime. The historians themselves spoke of their struggle against both, against administrative 'discrimination' (by which they meant material disadvantages) and against the aggressiveness, the lack of confidence, or even the contempt of the students and young writers. In many cases the professors took the part of the students. Thus they pleaded for fewer general (and highly repetitive) courses in Marxism-Leninism and for the students' right to choose between various lectures and textbooks. Others defended themselves against the young generation. A member of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, for instance, criticised the poem 'History' by Robert Rozhdestvensky as the expression of an exaggerated and quite unacceptable sense of discontent. Nevertheless, he described the poet as talented, and as it were excused his lapse by explaining that Soviet history still laboured under the pressures of the Stalin cult.

A number of other matters aired at the conference threw further light on the practical significance and, indeed, the explosiveness of the controversial destalinisation issue. Particularly important among them was the nationality question and the emphasis put by many speakers on the national interests and the national self-respect of the non-Russian peoples. In the academic field this was shown mainly in the form of an open revolt against the authorities' preferential treatment of a few centres, mainly Moscow and Leningrad, in all spheres of scientific activity. But it also found expression in ideological pleas for the re-evaluation or rehabilitation of the history of the non-Russian peoples in

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the Soviet Union. Some of the non-Russian historians were inclined to interpret the history of their own peoples, including especially their past struggles against Tsarism and Russian colonialism, in terms of the doctrine of the national-democratic liberation movement, which serves as the official theory of contemporary events in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In opposition to 'orthodox critics', practically everything that was suppressed or denounced under Stalin is now being justified and restored to the national consciousness of the non-Russian intelligentsia, which, in the past, had to suffer most from enforced conformism, lying, and hypocrisy. Some of them also put special stress on their own nation's particular contribution to the revolution and to the construction of socialism. They found no time in their speeches to express their loyalty and their thanks to the great Russian brother nation and its illustrious scientific stars. They found time only to air their own anxieties and to register their claims and demands. During the Stalin period, and especially during the war, Soviet patriotism had been sanctified. Although in practice Soviet patriotism served largely as an ideological justification of Greater Russian supremacy, it nevertheless constituted one of the regime's most important ideological pillars and remained sacrosanct even after Stalin's death, and Russia's heroic past continued to play a dominant role in Soviet education.

At the conference, however, a number of speakers rejected the chauvinistic glorification of Russian history in general and of certain Tsars and military leaders in particular. Opinions on this issue remained divided. There were those who feared a 'nihilistic' and thoughtless approach to the educational aspect of Soviet patriotism, and those who launched vehement attacks on the unmarxist defence of the feudal past and on the one-sided idealisation of certain progressive features, deeds, and personalities of Tsarist history. Employing the jargon of official ideology, they said that the past should be studied and presented, not 'objectivistically' but objectively, and they asked historians to pay less attention to the cult of heroes and more to the role of the people and to class questions. Yet they, too, pleaded for the liberation of history from 'the lying pathos which the young are no longer able to tolerate' and sought to lay the foundations for a history free of any kind of mythology. The collection of Tsars, generals, and admirals which Stalin assembled in his gallery of political ancestors has ceased to be an adequate foundation for Soviet patriotism.

Given the trend towards further revisions in the citadels of historical science, the highly articulate self-assertion of the non-Russian historians might well help to put Soviet patriotism on a basis which, geographically, demographically, and ideologically, is both broader and more 'republican' than hitherto. In fact, if Soviet patriotism is to go on functioning as the essential 'motive power of socialism', some such development seems inevitable. The inclusion of the various Republics and nationalities of the Soviet Union in a kind of supra-national, all-union patriotism

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would, admittedly, not do away with the many continuing strains and tensions. But it is at least conceivable that the empty and hypocritical ideology of the present might in this way gradually give place to a form of Soviet patriotism with a different and real content. Destalinisation in this field would depend on the recognition of the actual state of affairs and on the development and, indeed, the deliberate promotion of an autonomous way of life for the various nationalities. This, in turn, would be a step in the direction of a less ideological and more pragmatic way of seeing and handling things and of a general normalisation of social attitudes. International developments—the disintegration of world communism, the conflict with China, and the surfeit of problems and conflicts elsewhere in the world—in any case give a vital impulse to national cohesion. Domestic pressures within the Soviet Union work in the same direction. The trend towards a more rationally conducted economy suggests the possibility of a more tolerable and more profitable cooperation between the centre and the periphery. There is, admittedly, nothing sensational in this perspective, but, compared to the Russified Soviet image and the chauvinistic, militaristic hullabaloo of the past, it does represent an advance in the direction of an enlarged, a more solid and more mature form of self-awareness. In initiating this slow transformation, the pressure of certain Soviet historians for further destalinisation certainly played a not unimportant part. It is perhaps also worth mentioning that their controversies about Soviet patriotism led to a revival of interest in Pokrovsky, whose own approach was repeatedly quoted at the conference as either a positive or, on the contrary, a cautionary example.

ANOTHER topic discussed at the historians' conference of December 1962 was that of methodology. Fedoseyev suggested that methodology was simply a question of the right kind of ideology. Historians, he proclaimed at the end of one of the plenary sessions, are methodologically correct so long as they conduct their research within the framework of the competition between the world systems of socialism and capitalism. The dogmatists, he went on to say, have proved incapable of grasping the changes wrought by the dialectics of history. He did not blame the dogmatists for adhering to ideological premises; he blamed them for adhering to obsolete premises. Soviet scholars, according to Fedoseyev, need do no more than provide an adequate interpretation of the new world conditions from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism. The conference, however, was not inclined to accept his equation of methodology and ideology. It is perfectly possible, the critics said, to have a proletarian point of view and to adhere to Marxist positions without being able to master the methodology of historical research; what mattered was expert knowledge and professionalism. True, they rebuked 'a few young historians' for 'trying to escape into the so-called realm of pure knowledge' and for insisting that 'it was first of all necessary to create the right conditions for

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scientific work', but they were quite adamant in defending the true needs of scholarship, even if their defence was frequently cloaked in the customary Aesopian language. They insisted on research into uncultivated fields and borderline problems. They deplored the fact that there were no longer any 'erudite Marxists' among them who could combine exact scholarship with a bold approach to questions of principle. They reacted sensitively to everything that smacked of provincialism, dilettantism, and technical incompetence. They complained in particular about the conditions prevailing in the realm of publications and archives, and they underlined the need to have access to foreign literature and foreign countries. In airing these many complaints and demands they made their points carefully, in terms which as such were unassailable. Thus they explained, for instance, that the principle of approaching their work from a party point of view required, by its very nature, scientific objectivity and soberness of judgment, just as it precluded all juggling with historical facts.

The tension between the standard-bearers of ideology and the champions of truly scientific methods, which distinguished the initial phase of the discussion, became in the course of its further development increasingly explosive. This emerged especially during the debate in the spring of 1964 on methodological problems of history.[1] The debate made it plain that the very terminology of historical materialism had become questionable and urgently required a form of re-codification. Just as important, according to Fedoseyev and Frantsev, the two rapporteurs, was the need to 'counteract the differentiation of the social sciences with their integration'. But while the two rapporteurs, in their introduction to the debate, suggested that of all the many contemporary tasks none was more important than the ideological crusade against the Chinese, the other participants were once again almost exclusively concerned with their specialist problems. One of them accounted for the positivistic attitude of the 'young specialists' by explaining that they were not afraid of generalisations, but that they had no taste for them, though he hastened to add that this 'of course, does not apply to all of them'. Responsible for their attitude, he suggested, was the older generation of teachers and their Stalinist stereotypes.

A number of speakers discussed basic Marxist historical terms, such as era, epoch, age, phase, period, stage, etc., and thereby revived the awkward problem of periodicity. They underlined the subdivision of history into a steadily growing number of narrowly specialised disciplines, and they insisted that historical materialism and historical methodology no longer fully coincided. Methodology, as a borderline area of science, they suggested, made the co-operation of the greatest possible number of specialists imperative. They also maintained that methodology—especially with regard to its historiographical aspect—was the field which combined the most general problems of history with the specialist problems of the theory of knowledge.

[1] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1964, 3, pp. 3–68.

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EVEN greater tension resulted from the attempts of the *filosofi-ist-matchiki*—the professional philosophers of historical materialism—to halt the move among the historians towards greater objectivity and greater autonomy. The historians were clearly disinclined to leave the task of 'generalisation' to their colleagues from the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences or other bastions of faith. They seemed determined to produce their own kind of synthesis from the discoveries of their expert knowledge and the empirical facts collected in the vast storehouses of world history. In the course of the debate on methodology, the critical relationship between scholarship and ideology thus changed imperceptibly into a conflict about the respective functions of historians and philosophers. This rivalry between two sets of professional apologists of ideology was remarkable enough in itself. But it has since been even further complicated by the inroads which the 'sociologists', now recognised as an established group, and the spokesmen of 'scientific communism' have been trying to make into the preserves of the *istmatchiki*.

So far as the historians are concerned, it seems likely that the search for some form of synthesis will sooner or later infect even the younger anti-ideological generation. To be sure, what they are groping for is not a synthesis to be imposed by even the watered-down present version of historical materialism, but one that is rooted in the historians' own work and is capable of satisfying the pre-scientific human longing for a unified and meaningful view of the world. It would be unrealistic to expect that Soviet historians will altogether desist from attempts to cross the Rubicon which separates science from *weltanschauung*. Agnosticism without *weltanschauung* is no more conceivable in the Soviet Union today than professions of nihilism, whether of the school of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, or Sartre. The intellectually most alert Soviet historians, who have made a genuine start with the cautious development of independent thinking about history, thus look like men who are trying to go ahead in the most admirable way without being as yet aware that all their efforts are in vain.

The 'philosophers' could have defended themselves against the attacks of the historians only by raising the problem of the universal laws of history and the means of discovering such laws. But they did not do so. Chased from the hitherto secure lair of their scholastic formulas, they sought refuge in the elaboration of the categories of moral values. Bourgeois society, they suggested, had misused the science of moral values for its own ends. It was thus necessary to endow the categories of moral values with a Marxist-Leninist content. In view of the impossibility, in other words, of preventing people any longer from thinking, the communist executors of Plato's and Hegel's testament are now endeavouring to forge the fetters, of which man is allegedly in such dire need, out of materialistic ethics. As the metaphysics of history loses its halo and as the old dogmas collapse under the onslaught of the specialised empiricists, the 'philosopher' offers himself

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to the regime as the guardian of morals. The great-grandchildren of the revolution will not believe their ears. A meta-Marxism of morals is hardly the communism to which they will wish to devote their lives.

THE current outlook of Soviet man or, at least, of large sections of the intellectually active younger generation, is being shaped largely by this transformation. It is also the key to the understanding of the continuing confrontation between the party regime, on the one hand, and, on the other, scientific rationality and artistic truth. The arguments about destalinisation have put the party leadership in an awkward position. The decision of the CPSU to describe itself as the party of the whole people is not necessarily a sign of strength. A party of the people has no need to describe itself as such. If, nevertheless, the CPSU does so, it is in order to woo the people. In trying to identify itself with the people and the state, the CPSU seeks to secure a basically non-ideological perpetuation of its rule. It may be tempted, too, by the traditional device of countering ideological fatigue with a form of imperial, power-political pomp designed to fill the threatening ideological vacuum. If, at the same time, atheism loses its attraction as the ideology of the state, the authorities can always leave it safely in the hands of the cranks in the rear, while they themselves appear in the international arena as enlightened, pragmatic, and liberal-minded men of goodwill who would make suitable coalition partners.

In the cultural field the party is now visibly experimenting. Destalinisation is being encouraged up to the limit where the party's own position might be endangered. The party frowns on both extremes, the remaining Stalinists and the over-impetuous anti-Stalinists, and seeks to keep them both under control. Still, destalinisation remains general policy. That emerged, among other things, from Ponomarev's final speech at the historians' conference, in which he told the Stalinist non-conformists that they must stop resisting the directives of the XX, XXI, and XXII CPSU congresses. Ponomarev illustrated the continuing resistance of the Stalinist diehards with a caricature from *Krokodil*, depicting a man kneeling in his home before a picture of Stalin and asking forgiveness for an anti-Stalin speech he had just made in public. Such continuing resistance is worth mentioning if only because, for their different reasons, neither the Chinese nor the Western press seems to take any notice of it. In fact, it has remained just as correct to speak of a continuing Stalinism without Stalin as it is to speak of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.

The opposite extreme, the anti-Stalinist non-conformists, is being tolerated by the party within the limits of its own conservative, middle-of-the-road line, mainly because it needs scientists as well as economic experts who are capable of shouldering responsibility. The party needs men who can make decisions according to their judgment and their conscience. Will this lead to a new variant of the enigmatic link between Calvinism and Capitalism? That the party itself is being driven in the

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direction of effective rationality does something to counter the many pessimistic predictions about the future of historical science in the Soviet Union.

In an essay on 'Politics, Ideology and History in the USSR',[2] for instance, Hans Rogger asserted that it was difficult to 'be confident about the future of history as an academic discipline and intellectual enterprise'. Assessments of this kind seem to rest on the isolated observation of certain limited fields, e.g. history, while failing to take account, or to take sufficient account, of the far-reaching transformation which has affected the whole of Soviet society, including the party itself. Of course, it would be just as wrong to fall into the opposite error and conclude from the changes which have taken place, and from the unmistakable signs of a search for greater freedom, that the spirit of liberalism is about to prevail or that the Soviet Union is developing in the direction of a free society governed by the rule of law. Even so, the country is now undergoing a profound transformation which imposes changes on the party as well and on its ideology. Its outcome—so far—is an increasingly sophisticated conservatism and ideological neo-orthodoxy. The primary aim remains the maintenance of the Holy Soviet Empire of the Russian (language) Nation. That neither excludes the gradual replacement of totalitarian forms of rule by autocratic or oligarchic forms of rule, nor does it prevent the party from promoting developments dangerous to itself. The party cannot help doing so because its very existence depends on the increasing liberation of science from the shackles of ideology and on the success of economic rationality. The Russian writers' congress, which met in March 1965, confirmed once again that, in the cultural field, the party now makes a habit of speaking with the voice of the ultra-conservatives, while in practice it promotes the interests of the progressive forces. Nobody should, however, be so fascinated by this current reformation of communism that he is no longer able to see the simultaneous counter-reformation.

* * * *

The celebrations on the twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Germany provided an opportunity to bring Stalin back once more into the field of vision. The swing of the pendulum back from the grotesque extremes of utter silence and defamation should not be interpreted primarily as a concession to Peking. Paying tribute to Stalin for his services in wartime can indeed be seen as part of 'dekhrushchevisation', and of the general hardening of certain trends in domestic and foreign policy; but it was high time for Stalin to be given a recognisable place as part of the attempt now once again being made to establish some plausible continuity in Soviet history. Since there are obvious limits beyond which the revision of Soviet history will not go, the disputes about destalinising the historical picture, about how 'socialist justice' can be applied to both Stalin and his opponents, are still going on.

[2] *Soviet Studies*, January 1965.

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THE BOARDING SCHOOL

Albert L. Weeks, Jr.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty. But you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of social relations when we replace home education with social. . . . The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed relationship between parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting as all family ties among proletarians become increasingly torn asunder by the action of modern industry. . . .

—Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848).

The first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole of the female sex back into national industry . . . and this, in fact, means the abolition of the monogamous family as the economic unit of society. . . . Private housekeeping will be transformed into a social industry. The care and education of children will become a public affair.

—Engels, *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State* (1884).

In place of the individualistic and egoistic house-groups, there will arise a great universal family.

—Alexandra Kollontai, *Communism and the Family* (1920).

Children's collectives are incomparably better suited to giving the most thorough inculcation of the best social habits in a child than the most loving or attentive mother . . . [with] the egoistic attachment of mothers to their children.

—Stanislav G. Strumilin, 'The Daily Life of the Worker Under Communism', *Novy Mir*, July 1960.

* * *

THESE quotations cover one hundred years of communist teaching on the family. To these one could add many other communist pronouncements of equal vintage and extravagance about future plans for the state (which is to wither away), for the economy (which is to satisfy fully everyone's basic and 'reasonable' needs), for society (whose members will voluntarily obey all the rules of social living without recourse to legal sanctions). But there have been other programmatic goals which, it should never be forgotten, *were* either partially or wholly carried out in practice: the dictatorship of the proletariat, or as the Kronstadt communists complained and Zinoviev boasted, dictatorship of the Party over the proletariat; state economic planning; nationalisation of the land; inroads on bourgeois productive relations in the village; centralisation of the means of communication and transportation; polytechnisation of schools; and many others.

Realism towards communist theory is a commendable attitude on the part of foreign observers of the Soviet scene, so long as the baby is not thrown out with the wash. Even those goals which seem at best only remotely realisable may, in a sense, exert an influence (something like Kant's 'regulative' ideas) on the course of present-day Soviet policy and practice.

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The difficult theory-v.-practice problem is related to the whole question as to what part of Soviet theory is mere window dressing or ritual, and what part is feasible and in earnest. Putting it another way; how can one distinguish those theories which are likely to see the light of practice from those which may only be attractive advertising?

An answer to this question cannot be given within the framework of this modest essay, but with regard to the programme for the *family* and the post-1956 institution of the Soviet boarding school (*shkola-internat*), it seems likely that this goal—the socialisation of the family and public rearing of children—may indeed belong to the first category, a goal whose realisation is already partly under way. Inroads have already been made on the private family through the boarding school reform. Soviet leaders appear to be putting into action what political philosophers of the past (most notably Plato) dared not call more than an ideal laid up in heaven.

The Soviet Communist Party has embarked on the third revolution in Soviet history. The first was, of course, political: the seizure of power in November 1917. The second, the economic revolution, saw the carrying out of Stalin's five-year plans, collectivisation, and laid the foundations of the socialist economy and its corresponding state institutions.

The third revolution, initiated under Stalin but re-dedicated and refined in theory if not in practice by Khrushchev, is social and spiritual and tied directly to the 'concerted building of a fully communist society', the present officially-stated basic aim of the Soviet domestic programme.

This last and crucial revolution was first outlined, although rather sketchily, at the twentieth Party congress in 1956. It was subsequently delineated more fully at the twenty-first congress in 1959. Finally, in the 1961 50,000-word programme of the Communist Party, the third epoch was further elaborated and made the basis for the Party's general line for the next two decades.

In the key year of 1956, notable more for its reappraisal than for any reformation or reaffirmation of basic communism, Khrushchev told the Party and the masses that the USSR was about to enter an entirely new revolutionary epoch, an epoch which would demand maximum effort and sacrifice for the future, 'the concerted transition from socialist to communist society . . . the broad outlines of which are now plainly visible'. At the 1956 congress, the First Secretary introduced what now appears to be one of the most characteristic institutions of the new epoch of spiritual reformation: the *shkola-internat,* or polytechnical boarding school.

KHRUSHCHEV dwelt on the importance and future prospects of this new institution: 'It will rear and educate the new Communist Man.... Its teachers will be the engineers of the souls of the rising generation. . . . No funds or effort will be spared; the boarding

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schools will return the expenditures a hundredfold. . . . It is impossible to over-emphasise the enormous importance of this type of education.'

At the twenty-first congress in 1959, or three years after the new schools were founded, the First Secretary spoke of them in still broader terms: 'The possibility of educating *all children* [my emphasis—ALW] in the boarding schools will be opened up in the future and will solve the problem of giving a communist upbringing to the rising generation. At the same time, millions of women will be released from the household chores of child-rearing and fill productive jobs in the construction of communist society.'

Khrushchev's intention of eventually enrolling all children in these schools has since been cited, although with little additional comment, in the Soviet press and pedagogical journals, especially in the new boarding school monthly journal, *Shkola-Internat*. The speed and determination which the Party and the Government have shown in establishing the boarding schools illustrate the practical importance which the Soviet leaders attach to them. Starting from scratch in 1956, the number of children housed and reared in the polytechnical boarding schools in 1961 was 700,000; in 1962, 1 million; and in 1963, around 1·2 million [1] in some 3,000 schools. The latest figures (*Pravda*, 24 January 1964) show 2·4 million pupils at boarding schools and extended-day schools, or 360,000 above the 1962 school year. According to the current seven-year plan, the number of boarding school pupils is to reach 2·5 million by 1965. This would represent around 10 per cent of the total elementary and secondary school-age population. By the end of 'the second decade of building full communism', or by 1980, roughly one-third of the Soviet youth from the age of seven to eighteen may dwell and be trained through eleven grades in these schools, judging from statements made by Soviet educators. At the present rate of expansion, the bulk of the children of the peasant and industrial working classes may by the 1980s be living and matriculating in these institutions.

The large-scale building of these new communist schools prompts a number of questions. What advantages are the schools supposed to have in the building of pure communism? What kind of curriculum and regimen has already been set up in them to realise their purpose? What means is the regime using to attract hundreds of thousands of Soviet children into the new schools and what is the parents' attitude to the programme? Last, and perhaps most important, what is the social and political rationale of the polytechnical boarding schools?

THE veteran economist, former Gosplan executive and Lenin Prize winner (1958), 87-year-old Stanislav G. Strumilin, is one of the USSR's leading authorities on the institutions to be established in the

[1] In the last two years, Soviet statistics have given the number of boarding school pupils *plus* the extended-day school pupils as one. The extended-day schools, which discharge their pupils at the end of each day and at the end of the week for their return home, represent slightly less than half of the total boarding-school and extended-day student body.

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now not-so-remote communist society. His articles appeared in any number of journals and newspapers, including *Red Star*. In his long and important article in *Novy Mir* (July 1960) entitled 'The Daily Life of the Worker under Communism', Strumilin dwelt at length on the third revolution and the boarding schools.

> Upon emerging from the hospital—he writes—every Soviet citizen will be assigned to a nursery, then to a kindergarten maintained day and night, and then to a boarding school from which he will enter independent life . . . It is our task to extend the public forms of upbringing in the next few years at a tempo that will eventually make them accessible to all, from the cradle to the diploma, within the next fifteen to twenty years.

Strumilin contrasts the 'often egoistic attachment of mothers to their children' with the more rational, altruistic, and genuinely 'comradely' relationship between children in the environment of the boarding school public family: 'Children's collectives [of the boarding school type] are incomparably better suited to giving the most thorough inculcation of the best social habits in a child than the most loving and attentive mother. The advantages of public upbringing are so great that they will justify whatever public expense may be necessary to accommodate all children of the country.'[2]

The communist man of the future must be taught from the cradle on to regard himself merely as an 'organic part' of the great collectivised commune, one voice in the gigantic communal chorus. As Khrushchev has said, individualism must give way to the communist ethos of sacrifice for the group, of the 'good of all as the condition for the good of each'. And at the twenty-first Party congress he said: 'Man is a social animal. His life is unthinkable and indeed impossible outside the collective.'

The boarding schools are also conceived as an institutionalised form of what may be called 'social Pavlovism'. As Strumilin writes:

> Egoistic inclinations in the child will be 'snuffed out in the cradle'. In place of them, all inborn social instincts and sympathies will be emphasised and brought out as the result of *newly-conditioned reflexes* formed in the process of daily comradely interrelationships [my emphasis—ALW].

[2] *Kommunist* (No. 10, 1962) reviewed a book by N. Soloviev entitled *The Family in Soviet Society* (1962). According to the reviewer, Shakhnazarov, Soloviev is correct in criticising 'several authors' who maintain that eventually the family will be completely replaced by public families of the boarding school type. Instead, writes Shakhnazarov, supporting Soloviev, the Party has in mind the 'merging' (*sochetaniye*) of the family with public institutions. While this may be a proper reading of the present Party line on the family, it is interesting that Soloviev speaks not only of 'several' authors who predict the utter destruction of the Soviet family but also of the 'widespread' idea that this is the future of the family. That the Party criticises these authors may only mean that it would be imprudent to do otherwise, for then opposition to the boarding school idea might be generated precisely at the same time when the Party is relying on voluntary admission into the boarding schools.

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Pure communism, he goes on, will be practised in the schools. 'Private ownership of toys, skates, bicycles, etc., is not recognised here. All gifts, edible or not, enter the common pool for all. All children, from the youngest to the oldest, are guided by the rule that all must be comrades, that the older children must help the younger, and that no one is allowed to be greedy . . . Order and discipline must prevail at all times and in all things.'

The Minister of Education of the RSFSR, Afanasenko, an alternate member of the central committee, wrote in *Izvestia* (7 March 1961): 'We are moving towards the day when the doors of all homes will be thrown open wide so that children will know about locks only from reading about them in books. We must throw open the doors of all schoolrooms and lockers. Libraries must have no librarians in them. Only in this way will genuine honesty be implanted.'

THE curriculum and regimen in the boarding schools are intended to serve as the model for the regular elementary and secondary schools, which will continue to exist until they are gradually enveloped by the expanding eleven-year boarding schools.

The principal curricular *motif* of the boarding schools is polytechnism. It was the boarding schools which in 1956 and after pioneered the present programme for installing universal polytechnical education in the USSR. Polytechnism was not begun in the regular schools until 1959 and has not been completed even now. The successful three-year experience with the pilot polytechnical boarding schools, most of which are on an eleven-year curriculum, convinced educational authorities and Party leaders of the feasibility of total polytechnisation of the educational system.

Considerable opposition to this programme was put up by certain educationalists who maintained that the intellectual quality of education would suffer and the continuity of a student's education be interrupted by the intermittent time-consuming training in factories required of polytechnical students during their actual time of study. One of the most eminent opponents of the polytechnisation programme in 1958–59 was Professor Nesmeyanov, then President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who criticised it publicly. He has since resigned as President of the Academy.

The necessity of the polytechnisation programme was spelled out in somewhat strident tones by Mr. Khrushchev in September 1958:

> A number of ten-year secondary school graduates unwillingly go to work in factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, and some of them even consider it beneath their dignity . . . This lordly, scornful, and erroneous attitude towards physical labour can also be found in a number of families. If a boy or girl does not study well, the parents and the people around him frighten the child by saying that if he does not study hard or fails to get a gold of silver medal,

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> he will not be able to get into a university and will therefore have to work in a factory as a common labourer . . . Such views are insulting to the toiling masses of socialist society.

He continued by pointing out that the schools, as then constituted, were 'divorced from life, the chief and basic fault of our schools'. Lenin's famous dictum on education, he said, had been forgotten: 'Education must be combined with socially-useful labour'.

The eleven-year polytechnical boarding schools have led and are leading the way in the expanding polytechnisation programme throughout the whole Soviet educational system. Professor Brickman, former New York University specialist on Soviet education, was among a travelling team of seventy American educators who closely studied Soviet schools, including dozens of boarding schools, in 1958. He told the present writer that in an Alma-Ata boarding school, boys sixteen to eighteen years of age were working during school time in a nearby automobile factory. Boys and girls at the school worked away from school for eight to ten hours a week for several weeks. At the end of the on-the-job training, an examination was held and the results entered in each student's *dnevnik* which, together with the Certificate of Skill, is, of course, a vital component of a boarding school graduate's dossier. At another boarding school a large group of its teen-aged girls were dispatched to a nearby 'patron' factory having close ties with the 'apprentice' boarding school. At the plant the girls were receiving on-the-job training in garment-making.

Productive labour is sometimes performed on the premises of the boarding school itself. For example, Leningrad Boarding School No. 2 recently put both its younger and older pupils to work assembling cardboard boxes for packing the shoes manufactured at a nearby patron shoe factory. The box-assembly brigades, which included children as young as eight or nine years, worked in afternoon shifts before supper, customarily a time reserved for supervised study. Boarding school administrators were pleased when the children joined eagerly in a school-wide 'socialist competition' for high quantity and quality output of assembled boxes.

Students at another boarding school earned 150,000 rubles in a single year of woodworking production on the premises. Money earned in this fashion goes into the communal fund of the school.

BEYOND the purely polytechnical training in the boarding school curriculum, pupils are reared in the expectation that they will become model communist toilers, in the moral and labour-discipline sense.

Discipline in the schools is rigid and intense, which is attested to both by Soviet and by American commentators. There is more than a suspicion that some of the staff in the schools have had police experience; such personnel were in demand particularly in the first year or so of the schools' foundation, when a large part of the student body was made up

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of delinquents. The pupils move everywhere in strict double file—to meals, from class to class, and from activity to activity. The revamped 'Stalin Code' of classroom behaviour is strictly followed, more so in the boarding schools than in the regular schools. As in the regular schools, students snap to attention when the teacher enters the room. Boarding school students stand and recite at attention or march to the head of the class making smart, right-angle turns on the way to and from their two-student desks. The schools enforce a military-like regime consisting of early-morning rise, callisthenics, personal and dormitory cleanup and inspection, and supervised study in the evening. Classes generally meet from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. From 2 to 4 p.m. the pupils have to lunch and, for the younger ones, rest hour. From 4 to 6 p.m. they have supervised study or labour training, as the case may be.

One of the few breaks in the day comes from 6 to 8 p.m. At this time the pupil is free to participate in hobby clubs, watch TV in the Pioneer Room, play chess or checkers, dance (ballroom style only), or take part in other work or study activities in the various *kruzhki.*

Speaking of dancing, the boarding schools are universally co-educational. Boarding school officials often voice the hope that happy marital unions will result from friendships formed between the boys and girls in the boarding schools. In some schools, boys and girls are separated by floors in the dormitories, in other schools they dwell on opposite sides of the hall on the same floors.

Discipline is sometimes carried too far, as Soviet educators and administrators have pointed out. For example, B. Y. Shirvindt, Director of Moscow B.S. No. 15, pointed out in *Sovetskaya Pedagogika* (December 1960) that the discipline enforced in some of the larger boarding schools[3] was 'extremely oppressive and fatiguing for the children'. The RSFSR Minister of Education Afanasenko gave the example of a boarding school in Kemerovo where the children were, he said, literally never allowed outdoors (the cold being no legitimate excuse) and as a consequence looked pale and fatigued from strict regimentation indoors. Educators have also complained of the levelling effect of some types of discipline and group punishment. Gifted boarding school children, they say, are simply being lumped together with the 'problem children', large numbers of whom are among the residents in the schools; they are generally orphans, neglected children of large families, or simply 'children of the streets'.

From an ideological point of view, the boarding school setup offers excellent possibilities for thorough indoctrination of the rising generation on a 12-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week basis.[4] In general, the curriculum is supposed to impart 'love for the motherland and the cause of communism, hate for the enemies of communism'; 'joyful, comradely

[3] *Pravda*, 30 April 1962, reported a 600-pupil boarding school in Tashkent.

[4] Octobrist and Pioneer, not to mention Komsomol organisations, are extremely active in the boarding schools, embracing much larger percentages of the student body than their counterparts in the regular schools.

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communion '; the duty to ' work, study, and live in a communist manner '; elimination of ' egoistic and individualistic private-ownership psychology '; voluntary obedience and adherence to the communist moral code, without recourse to overt punishment beyond ' the force of public opinion of the communards themselves '.

Sovetskaya Pedagogika and *Shkola-Internat* report that many boarding schools are trying out the technique of ' Children's Courts ' in which children who refuse to obey voluntarily are given various sentences by their young peers. (One of the worst forms of punishment is depriving the child of any activity whatsoever, a penalty whose impact is much greater than traditional penalties.) The American educators who visited schools with this type of court felt that the children tended to mete out more severe punishment to fellow offenders than school officials would have done.

As a thoroughly indoctrinated Communist Man, the boarding school graduate is presumably fully equipped to take his place in communist society. He is supposedly willing actively to cooperate in stamping out the remnants of the acquisitive bourgeois spirit and to help bring about the withering away of punitive law and the state in the communist millennium. What is not discussed, however, is the shock the young graduate will experience upon leaving the utopian, communal atmosphere of the boarding school and entering the highly competitive and atomistic Soviet society lying outside its walls.

IN the Party's methods of attracting new pupils into the schools, American educators and other observers have so far reported no violation of the principle of voluntary consent of the parents. No cases of forcible enrolment of children are known to exist, with one major exception. Cases are known of children who have been directed into these schools by the People's Courts (and perhaps also by the other, para-legal courts) because their parents were allegedly unable or unwilling to give them an adequate material or spiritual environment or upbringing.[5] A recent issue of the Soviet legal journal, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, cited examples of the application of this type of court order to juvenile delinquents. Presumably, the Party reserves the right to introduce whatever elasticity it wishes into the law on these matters, if voluntary admission does not support the planned pace of boarding school enrolments.

Instead of outright compulsion, the regime appears to be employing at present economic incentives to induce parents to send their children to the reasonably-priced boarding schools. Under the nearly marginal economic conditions of the average Soviet family, monetary inducements

[5] In this connection, a recent statement by Afanasenko appears somewhat ominous: ' Many families are encountered, unfortunately, in which there are still strong remnants of the old life, private property-minded, and religious and nationalist prejudices. In addition to this, some parents are unsuccessful in the rearing of their children, at times influencing their behaviour negatively ' (*Pravda*, 1 September 1963).

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evidently act strongly on the parents, or at least have done so up to now. Tuition payments are graded, from a low base, so that poorer families pay nothing while moderately well-off families pay from 30 to 40 rubles a month.[6] This also covers the boys' bluish-grey uniforms and the girls' brown dresses and blue aprons. Medical care is also included. Parents with large families, low incomes, and crowded living conditions are particularly attracted by the schools.

By means of the boarding school programme, moreover, the Party plans to include millions of additional women, released from housework and child-rearing, in productive labour at a time when the Soviet Union is feeling the manpower pinch as the result of the low birth rate during the war. The figure of from 5 to 6 million women workers to be added to the labour force is fixed in the goals of the current seven-year plan. Part of this increment is supposed to result from the fact that millions of mothers will no longer be tied down at home by 'unproductive' child-rearing. The connection between public upbringing and the release of women for productive labour was indicated long ago, not only by Marx and Engels and other classical communists, but by Mme. Kollontai, author of *Communism and the Family*, Lenin, and countless others in the Soviet period.

Western visitors to the USSR have noted that home conditions for many of the children now in the boarding schools were so inadequate, the apartments so cramped, that the poorer children seem to relish the neat dormitories (which they clean and maintain themselves), the gay dining rooms (in which they serve as waiters and which, it is reported, are noisy in the extreme), recreation rooms (some have TV), gymnasiums where these are provided, and the other inducements in the boarding schools. Homesickness is a difficult problem and *Shkola-Internat* publishes numerous complaints and much advice on this matter. To foreign observers, it has seemed that the children often miss their parents less than the parents miss them after the children have spent some time in the schools.

Complaints by boarding school officials of 'maternal egoism' crop up now and then, and there are other problems. Parents are known and reported to have complained about the all-too-brief and infrequent encounters with their children which are permitted by the tight boarding

[6] Khrushchev indicated at the twenty-second congress and the Party programme promises that all pupils will eventually be non-paying guests of the state. In explaining the programme's references to the boarding schools, Khrushchev cautiously pointed out in 1961 that 'people who take the position that the family is of dwindling importance in the transition to communism and that in time it will disappear altogether are quite mistaken; the influence of the family in the children's upbringing must be coupled with their public upbringing'. While 'disappearing altogether' may not be the fate of the Soviet family, it is surely destined to increased interference from the side of the state. Communist theoreticians have not, after all, predicted the end of wedlock and family parenthood; they do not envisage the communism of Plato's Guardians in *The Republic*. But they do favour a large encroachment by the state on what Mme. Kollontai called 'egoistic house-groups' after the children are seven years old or so.

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school schedules. Children are generally allowed to go home on holidays and on several weekends throughout the year. Trips home are often difficult, however, because the boarding schools are far away from the pupil's home town or village.

AS to the underlying political purpose served by the boarding schools, a number of answers come to mind. Soviet spokesmen are especially reticent about discussing this aspect of the boarding school programme. Visiting educators have detected a reluctance on their part even to broach the subject. The programme nevertheless does suggest a number of political motivations on the part of the regime.

First, the schools are necessarily intended mainly for the children of the working class and peasantry, at least at the present time. It is estimated that these two groups compose around 90 per cent of the pupils in the schools. When the new schools become nearly universal, only a small minority of children will presumably be able to avoid being institutionalised in the ordinary boarding schools,[7] by virtue of their economic, social, and political influence. The regime is concerned above all with training and disciplining new youthful reserves to work in the factories and farms, and loyally to support the regime in any trials that may lie ahead.

The link between the Party and the masses becomes particularly crucial as the promised 'self-administration' supposedly comes into operation during the transition to communism, and impersonal automation spreads throughout the economy, while at the same time 'bourgeois influence from abroad' and various strains of revisionism may become increasingly dangerous in the eyes of the one-party regime. There has been a 'Worker's Opposition', before.

In 1957, a few months after the revolts of the workers in Poland and Hungary, Mao Tse-tung publicly identified the party-masses relationship as the key, recurring problem of communist polities. Mao's shortlived tactic of 'let-a-hundred-flowers-bloom', a safety valve for releasing and detecting pent-up grievances among the masses, was his alleged solution of the problem of what he called 'the contradictions between ruler and ruled'. Khrushchev and his associates, on the other hand, evidently react quite differently to the problem of worker disaffection, corrupting bourgeois influence, and so on. They seem to be thinking in more institutional terms than Mao (their superior material base is an advantage in this regard). Khrushchev's answer to the contradictions-problem evidently consists of accelerating the move towards what he calls,

[7] There is evidence of an emerging new type of 'special boarding school' which has been referred to openly in the Soviet press and by Western correspondents. One such school, for 'exceptional students', was reported in Novosibirsk (see *The New York Times*, 27 October 1963). These special schools are reported to operate from ninth to eleventh grades and admit students wth unusual abilities, especially in the sciences, on the basis of competitive examinations. In an era of advancing automation, these special schools seem designed to turn out men and women who will enjoy a special status in the technocracy.

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communist society which, he assured his listeners at the twentieth congress, is the most highly organised and disciplined society there is; in this context the polytechnical boarding schools act as a typical institution of the new epoch.

The underlying political intent of this nearly total communisation and collectivisation of child upbringing is designed to cope with one aspect of the problem of political authority, its expression and its maintenance, peculiar to closed communist societies. The legitimacy of their self-perpetuating oligarchies hangs delicately and precariously by the thread of theory and indoctrination. In fact, the Soviet state may be said, in a sense, to have 'no roots . . . to hang in the air', as Tkachev said of the Tsarist state. In pluralist democracies, on the other hand, political authority reaches upwards and downwards, from and to the grass roots, and based on the periodic housecleaning carried out by free voters armed with multiple-list ballot papers.

In *Problems of Leninism*, still a valid manual on communist statecraft, Stalin speaks of 'the links of the Party with the masses by means of transmission belts' as the best answer to the contradictions-problem. The education and organisation of the youth, he pointed out, constitute the most important transmission-belt between the Communist Party and the masses for ensuring that the many future demands made on those masses by the party-state would be met without protest.

The boarding school, which completely swallows up boys and girls from the age of seven without letting them go into 'independent life', as one Soviet authority put it, until they are eighteen or so could forge a solid link between the broad masses and the ruling party.

The boarding schools also raise problems about social status and mobility. The elite status of the Soviet intelligentsia, in contrast to that of the graduates from the ordinary boarding schools, will clearly be enhanced. As more and more Soviet children are brought up in the polytechnical educational system, and the boarding schools in particular, only three tiny minority groups could avoid the schools and the accompanying stigma of being mere non-intellectual polytechnical cogs in the social and economic machine: the well-to-do with sufficient social and political influence to avoid attendance in the boarding schools; those boarding school graduates who will be permitted to go on to college and acquire the considerable status that attaches to a higher education in the USSR; and the graduates of the new 'special boarding schools'. The polytechnisation of the schools, and of the boarding schools in particular, would seem to further entrench the communist new class.

* * * *

A characteristic of the immediate post-Khrushchev period was the criticism of some of the deposed First Secretary's pet projects—among them, the cultivation of maize, five-story building construction, and the boarding schools. However, as the post-K period has ripened, major

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pronouncements in the form of editorials have been appearing in *Pravda*, stating the new regime's line on agriculture, foreign policy, science, the arts, education, *et al.* The authoritative post-K editorial on education appeared in *Pravda* on 12 January 1965. It indicated that the boarding schools (now called *internaty pri shkolakh* or simply *internaty*) had received a strong vote of confidence from the new Soviet leaders. 'The boarding schools', the editorial stated, 'must be given constant attention. . . . Party and Soviet organs must undertake the continued expansion of the network of boarding schools'.

A few days later, on 23 January, *Pravda* provided further evidence that the post-K regime has endorsed the 'schools of a new type', and has even added to their variety by establishing a 'special' boarding school. This 'special physics and mathematics boarding school' is attached to Moscow State University. 'This is an unusual school', the article continues. 'Its students are winners of mathematics "olympiads" held in 56 provinces of the country. Beginning with the ninth grade, these students matriculate in a special programme under the guidance of some of the most outstanding mathematicians'.

Its close association with the university makes it radically different from the majority of boarding schools. The latter, far from being attached to institutions of higher learning, are most often apprenticed to factories or farms. They are intended to function as polytechnical training schools supplying young recruits for the Soviet labour force. The special boarding schools, on the other hand, bear an elitist cast and may be intended to provide a source of talent for the new class of Soviet technocrats and possibly also for the party cadres.

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THE VIRGIN LANDS

J. W. Cleary

WHEN the first announcements were made in September 1963 of large-scale purchases of wheat from Canada and Australia by the USSR, Western observers were taken by surprise. For a brief period their explanations were based largely on the needs of Cuba and the European communist bloc countries, despite reports of unfavourable weather conditions in some of the Soviet Union's grain-growing areas. Subsequent events left no doubt about the reality of the shortage within the USSR itself: the bloc countries themselves imported substantial quantities of grain, thereby invalidating the hypothesis that the USSR was acting as their joint agent in order to secure favourable terms of trade; a campaign against petty speculation and misuse of grain was conducted in republic newspapers; and finally Khrushchev admitted that without the imports it would have been necessary to introduce ' administrative regulation of the use of grain '—in other words, rationing.

The extent to which the harvest fell short of consumption needs has since been set forth by economists in a number of places, and it will suffice to point out that, until the 1964 harvest was gathered, imports constituted about a quarter of the state grain stocks. The situation galvanised the Soviet leader into an abrupt reappraisal of his basic agricultural policy. After a decade of promoting extensive farming methods as the primary source of increased grain supplies, Khrushchev, during his last year of power, set about seeking greater production by more intensive farming. Mineral fertilizers and irrigation were now described as the two keys to the abundance of the future.

Since his fall in October 1964 various elements of Khrushchev's character and policies have been singled out for attack, both oblique and direct, but the cornerstone of his extensive farming programme, the virgin lands scheme, has thus far remained inviolate. Criticism of the scheme is, moreover, unlikely to be heard from Soviet sources, for the telling reason that the new First Secretary, L. I. Brezhnev, was one of its chief executors: from 1954 to 1956 he was second, then first secretary of the Kazakh Republic's party organisation. It is therefore of obvious interest to students of Soviet politics and agriculture to penetrate the layers of propaganda and concealment that have been wrapped around the scheme.

It is now recognised, both in the Soviet Union and the West, that Stalin's handling of agriculture left the country in dire straits in the vital matter of grain supplies; in order to meet current needs his successors had to delve into state reserves, and drastic measures were unavoidable. Differences of opinion within the Presidium of the Central Committee as to how to increase supplies are also well documented. Khrushchev opted for an enormous increase in the area sown to grain, even though this meant exploiting semi-arid regions which had turned

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back the land-hungry peasants in Tsarist times. Further attempts to grow grain in some of the areas had failed in the twenties and again in the thirties. Opposed to further ventures into these marginal lands were Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in particular, and the 'anti-party' group in general, all of whom have been accused of obstructing and sabotaging the scheme. The case for the opposition has never been published, but Malenkov is on record in his report to the nineteenth congress of the CPSU, as having favoured more attention to land already under cultivation. To achieve increased yields he advocated, inter alia, more concentrated use of fertilizers and extension of irrigation networks —i.e. what Khrushchev himself finally came round to adopting.

The dispute was by no means a product of the Soviet era, as readers of Tolstoy and other nineteenth century Russian novelists will be aware. Progressive landlords were painfully conscious of the inefficiency of Russian farming, whereas the peasants looked enviously at the estates of the nobility. Government policy before 1917 tackled the problem from both angles: migration to less densely settled areas to the east was encouraged, while Prime Minister Stolypin fostered the growth of independent peasant farms, where personal incentives would lead to the introduction of agricultural methods in advance of those of the ancient communes. The situation in 1953 remained remarkably similar to that existing before the advent of Bolshevik power: the average grain yield had not quite reached that of 1913, and the area sown to grain was only 2 per cent greater.[1] The difference was that, whereas Tsarist Russia normally had a genuine surplus of grain for export, growth of population and urbanisation now made increased supplies imperative.

KHRUSHCHEV'S solution to the problem was adopted, and after a hesitant beginning in 1954, the rate of expansion was stepped up sharply; within three years the plough had sliced into 36 million hectares (almost 90 million acres) of virgin and unused soil in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals, the Volga area, and the north Caucasus. A nation-wide campaign was launched to find the manpower needed in fields that stretched from horizon to horizon, and by the end of 1956 Kazakhstan alone had absorbed 600,000 'young patriots'.[2] It was reported at the Central Committee plenum of December 1958 that apart from those who migrated, a million students and workers participated in harvesting the crops in the three years to 1958.

The result of this titanic effort, in monetary terms, was a declared profit of 2·4 billion rubles by 1959. There is good reason to suspect that the balance sheet presented by Khrushchev omitted several sizeable debit items, such as the transport of machinery and personnel to the new lands. It almost certainly excludes the expenditure by collective farms,

[1] *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheski Sbornik*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 132–33, 209.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 31 October 1956 (hereafter abbreviated to *K.P.*).

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which, even in Kazakhstan, where the greatest number of *state* farms were formed, ploughed up more than half the new land from 1954 to 1956,[3] before being converted into state farms. In addition to calculations as to what should be added to find the total cost of the scheme, there is the question of losses incurred by the wholesale diversion of resources from other parts of the country. Between 1953 and 1963, for instance, no new grain elevators were constructed in Krasnodar Krai, one of the richest grain producing areas of the USSR, while Kazakhstan's storage capacity was raised beyond its normal needs.[4]

In questioning the returns claimed it is certainly not intended to convey the impression that the project was a fiasco from the outset: No matter what the investment required, the drain on grain reserves had to be stemmed, and this object was achieved. In 1956 and 1958 bumper crops were grown in the new lands, and Kazakhstan, where the greater part of the scheme was centred, became briefly the second largest grain producing republic in the Union, an honour traditionally held by the Ukraine. As a result the Russian diet improved to a standard unknown since before the second world war, and Soviet grain exports soared to seven million tons.

The achievement can safely be ascribed to Khrushchev. He alone publicly and fully committed himself on the issue before 1957, and the policy stood very much as his own. Such support as he did receive within the Presidium before the ' anti-party ' crisis was at best permissive. On the other hand opposition cannot have been as strong as he later claimed, since in 1954 he was still dependent on ad hoc alliances within the Presidium to push his programme through, and a formal vote on an issue of such magnitude must surely have been inescapable. The question is then, why did he choose the course he took. His belated explanation that intensive farming was precluded at the time by lack of investment capital obviously did not hold water with Malenkov and his supporters. And the enormous investment in the virgin lands is in itself a strong refutation of Khrushchev's argument. Perhaps a more likely reason is that Malenkov's plan would have made Khrushchev more dependent on cooperation from Gosplan and the chemical industry for the production of mineral fertilizers, and on the construction ministries for the building of dams and irrigation systems. It was precisely in these spheres that Khrushchev's influence was weakest at the time; indeed a centre of opposition to him was located in Gosplan.[5]

Secondly, the virgin lands had the advantage of giving immediate results. These came just at the time when Khrushchev was fighting for political survival and were undoubtedly a trump card against those who

[3] *Selskoe Khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheski Sbornik* (Moscow, 1960), p. 223.

[4] See Jerzy F. Karcz, *Studies on the Soviet Union*, vol. III, No. 4 (Munich, 1964), pp. 111, 112. For an up-to-date discussion of the profitability of the virgin lands scheme see Keith E. Bush, ibid. pp. 44–50.

[5] *Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 15–19 Dekabrya 1958: Stenograficheski Otchet* (Moscow, 1958), p. 408.

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had opposed his policy. To what precise extent the 1956 harvest was instrumental in winning support for him at the crucial Central Committee meeting in 1957 is a matter of conjecture. It may not have influenced members already committed to one side or the other for direct patronage reasons (and these were presumably the majority), but who knows how many uncommitted or wavering members may have been swayed by the best result Soviet agriculture had yet shown? Khrushchev could well say of his scheme at this stage that ' the virgin lands have served us well '. No other policy could have produced grain in such quantities so quickly, and grain was then, as it is today, the most highly political commodity produced in the Soviet Union.

Success induced in Khrushchev such confidence that he now risked an ambitious degree of regional specialisation, actually cutting by millions of hectares the area sown to cereals in European USSR. Winter wheat gradually gave way to corn for fodder and seed on up to 40 per cent of the ploughland of Southern Ukraine,[6] despite the warnings contained in the poor virgin land harvests of 1955 and 1957. How ill-founded this confidence was is now part of history.

Developments in the virgin lands since 1957 have received more than a little attention from Western economists, and can best be summarised in terms of the performance of Kazakhstan. This republic contains twenty-eight million hectares or nearly two-thirds of all virgin lands, and between 1953 and 1964 the area sown to grain grew by about 350 per cent.

Area sown to grain, gross harvests, state purchases, crop fertility in the Kazakh SSR

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Area sown to grain (million hectares)	23·216	21·956	22·078	22·171	24·885	24·279	—
Total grain harvested (million metric tons)	21·965	19·063	18·813	14·711	16·053	8·74*	—
Grain purchased by state (million metric tons)	14·800	11·470	10·514	7·505	8·215	4·779	15·397
Yield per hectare (quintals)	9·4	8·6	8·5	6·6	6·5	3·6*	9*

* Estimates based on incomplete Soviet data.

Sources—*Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu* (Moscow 1963), pp. 256, 257, 272, 289, 274; *Ezhegodnik bolshoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii 1964*, p. 124; *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 23 December 1964.

Caution is essential when dealing with dry-land farming statistics, severe fluctuations being their common characteristic the world over. If any trends are to be distinguished in the above table, the two extreme years 1963 and 1964 should probably be excluded, the former as being exceptionally unfavourable, the latter as being climatically the most favourable in living memory. This leaves a pattern of declining yields from 1958 to 1962 which cannot be attributed to vagaries of weather,

[6] *Pravda*, 13 December 1964.

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even though most of Kazakhstan's grain areas lie within an area which receives a summer rainfall of between five and ten inches. and where variations are critical. As far as the writer is aware, no detailed weather analyses of the area are published, but the general newspaper descriptions of temperature and precipitation over these five years certainly do not indicate a series of worsening seasons. One is forced, therefore, to seek alternative explanations in terms of soil fertility and tillage methods. And the most dramatic pointer here is the 'black storms' of northern Kazakhstan.

AS early as 1955 a Soviet agronomist voiced his dismay at the extent of the area subject to wind erosion.[7] Some Western observers at the time forecast that large areas would become dustbowls, but the results achieved up to the late fifties, the scant references made to erosion for a number of years, and in particular the complete silence on the subject by Khrushchev, all led to the conclusion that the danger had been overestimated. Nevertheless, the infrequent references that did find their way into print provided some guidance to what was occurring: the occasional warning of a troubled scientist long remained the voice of one crying in a potential wilderness. One agronomist, for instance, asserted categorically in 1962 that 'if we do not cease mercilessly ploughing up all virgin land fields, there will be no escape from erosion. We must stop it immediately'.[8] According to this source 456,000 hectares were subject to wind erosion in Pavlodar oblast by 1961, and in the Virgin Lands Krai as a whole the danger extended to 4·2 million hectares. How rapidly the phenomenon spread after that may be seen from the fact that in mid 1963 three million hectares had been damaged in Pavlodar, including 1,800,000 hectares of ploughland.[9] While this oblast is particularly subject to erosion because of its light sandy loam soils, the inroads made there gave some indication of what was happening in the Virgin Lands Krai as a whole. Even if the deterioration occurred at only half the rate in Pavlodar, the adverse conditions of 1963 must have brought the area affected to well over six million hectares. One observer, in fact, placed the figure as high as nine million.[10] Staggering though these figures are, the full extent of the havoc wrought may be considerably greater. In a rare statement on the subject in 1958 the Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers referred to three million hectares of ploughland being abandoned during the four preceding years.[11] Since these were years of a maximum effort to expand the sown area there can be only one explanation for retiring such an area from use: fertility loss had made it unusable. At the end of 1963 'thousands of hectares' were written off by two northern oblasts as having been 'ruined by incorrect

7 *K.P.*, 20 November 1957.
8 *Ogonyek*, 29 July 1962, p. 10.
9 *K.P.*, 11 June 1963.
10 Karzhaubaev to Kazakh Supreme Soviet, *K.P.*, 19 June 1962.
11 *K.P.*, 21 February 1958.

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tillage practices'.[12] The question is whether these, and other lands presumably abandoned in the intervening years, are included in the 'ploughland' said to be damaged by erosion.

The loss of this huge area to full production can be ill-afforded, not only because of the immediate loss of grain entailed, but also because the USSR is at last faced with the possibility of a shortage of arable land. In the European part of the country fifteen million hectares have been damaged by wind and water erosion, and each year half a million hectares of fertile land are lost to agriculture through the construction of industrial enterprises, living quarters, railroads, hydroelectric power stations and so forth.[13] These figures, while small in comparison with the total sown area, are significant enough to have prompted one agricultural economist to urge the government to exercise more caution when appropriation of collective and state farm fields is suggested.[14] On the other hand there is still much poorly utilised land in European Russia and an estimated twelve million hectares of unused virgin land in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

There are, of course, varying degrees of erosion, and by themselves the figures quoted for Kazakhstan do not tell us a great deal. When they are combined with accounts by farm directors of having to resow thousands of hectares after a windstorm because seed grain was laid bare or disappeared altogether,[15] it becomes clear that it is erosion of the most virulent kind that has bedevilled the settlers in Central Asia. A graphic picture of a 'black storm' during the sowing season of 1960 in Tselinograd has been recorded by one writer, N. Laskovaya; a river bed was filled with topsoil, crops were torn up or smothered with sand drifts, and a village had to be dug out by bulldozers.[16] True, this author was later accused of putting about 'horror stories'[17] but her account tallies with those of others.

Laskovaya enquired what was being done in Kazakhstan to avert catastrophe and was referred to the director of the Institute of Grain Farming near Shortandy in the Tselinograd oblast. He explained to her the general principles of dry-land farming based on the retention of the stubble of the previous year's crop, a minimum of field operations, a high proportion of fallow, etc. To prepare for sowing, while preserving stubble as far as possible, specialised farming implements were needed, but these were not yet being produced. The Institute had only just received its first two factory-made units; all other implements had been improvised. Back in Moscow, Laskovaya endeavoured to stir up the appropriate bureaucrats, but achieved nothing. She had stumbled upon one of the rawest points of the whole scheme—the tillage methods used.

12 *Pravda*, 14 January 1965.
13 *Izvestia*, 17 September 1963.
14 Ibid.
15 *K.P.*, 16 May 1963.
16 L. Laskovaya, 'Zemlya i veter', *Novy Mir*, No. 6, 1960.
17 *K.P.*, 23 October 1963.

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Erosion is relatively easy to prevent, difficult to contain, and still more difficult to eliminate. Where agriculture is state controlled it would seem to be a simple matter to avoid it—lay down a complex of measures for dry-land farming and supervise their execution. Why was this not attempted from the outset? One might seek some devious political explanation—in presenting his plan to the Presidium in early 1954, for instance, Khrushchev would not have improved the chances for its adoption had he emphasised the necessity for employing farming techniques new to the USSR. But this is to assume that he was cognisant of the requirements of dry-land farming. Had this been the case he would surely have hastened to rectify matters after June 1957, for nothing was more vital to his prestige than the success of this scheme. The simple truth is that Khrushchev did not know. More than that, he personally vetoed the introduction of a dry-land farming system.

THE history of technical agricultural policy in Kazakhstan over the past decade is a labyrinth of turns and abandoned paths; of authoritative articles followed by withdrawals; of schemes for crop rotation that were overtaken by others before being even partly tried. Superimposed on local differences of opinion between agronomists were, of course, the corn campaign, the overtake-the-USA campaign, the intertilled crop campaign, the anti-fallow campaign, as well as regular administrative reorganisations which were even more numerous there than in other republics.

Oversimplifying the technical policies followed to the point of caricature, one may distinguish the following phases:

(a) The initial introduction of traditional methods and machinery in 1954, and the assumption that annual deep autumn ploughing was the universal foundation for high crop yields.

(b) The official adoption in early 1956 of T. S. Maltsev's method of cultivation.[18] Essentially, this consisted of boardless deep ploughing of fallow land followed by several years of superficial cultivation in preparation for sowing. The system was developed for Kurgan oblast to the north of Kazakhstan, where soils were generally heavier and summer rainfall slightly higher. Where applied in Kazakhstan it led to difficulties with erosion because of excessive reliance on discing operations, and to problems of weed control. It incorporated some elements of dry farming, but its best feature, boardless ploughing, never achieved ascendancy, largely because the Maltsev plough was not produced in sufficient quantity.

(c) The gradual reversion in principle (in practice they had always been dominant) to traditional European methods by 1960, except in the areas worst affected by erosion. Coupled with this was a growing appreciation of the benefits of fallow in dry conditions, which, however, ran foul of Khrushchev's intertilled-crop and anti-fallow drives in 1961 and 1962.

[18] Maltsev outlined his system in *Voprosy zemledelia* (Moscow, 1955).

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(d) The belated approval in late 1963 of a comprehensive system of dry farming, with some backsliding in the latter half of 1964.

Throughout the decade of what are now termed 'ill-considered schemes and recommendations', one figure stands forth as an unshakable adherent of the methods finally approved. He is A. S. Baraev, a candidate of agricultural science, until late 1956 or early 1957 a deputy minister of agriculture in the Kazakh republic. A supporter of the positive elements of Maltsev's system, he entered the lists in 1955 with a warning of the dangers of excessive discing in light soils and called for the production of a drill plough which would reduce spring operations to a minimum.[19] The success of the 1956 harvest, it seems, was taken as a refutation of his views and he was attacked for 'weak direction of scientific work'. After removal as deputy minister he took charge of the Institute of Grain Farming, already mentioned above, and immediately set about testing his theories despite lack of resources and official indifference. For years to come the institute was the only place in Kazakhstan where a complete anti-erosion system was practised. The work was continued in the face of attacks from fellow agronomists (we shall refrain from naming them) and party officials right up to Khrushchev himself. In fact Baraev's survival as director of the institute remains one of the strangest contradictions of the Khrushchev era. While others were removed from sundry places for failing to follow current campaigns, Baraev quietly ignored what did not suit him, and even found an occasional platform to put his case.[20]

Lest it be thought that Baraev's praises are being oversung, here are two examples of his behaviour. He had no fears about the effects of monoculture in virgin lands, provided his precepts were observed, and in order to overcome the difficulties raised by the imposition of corn plantings he proposed that this crop be confined to an area near the animal husbandry sections of farms—thus excluding it from the regular crop rotation system! At the height of the anti-fallow campaign in 1962, when numerous farm directors were removed for failing to follow directions on sowing intertilled crops on 'fallow' land, Baraev's institute put 9 per cent of its ploughland to clean fallow. This was indeed a retreat from his usual recommendation of up to 20 per cent, but it must be recalled that Khrushchev had come to Kazakhstan at the end of 1961 for the avowed purpose of introducing 'occupied fallow' and had singled out Baraev for ridicule at a public meeting. With his characteristically earthy humour, the First Secretary suggested that someone at the conference should put a flea or two under Baraev's shirt to cut short his daydreaming. Hitherto, Khrushchev had refrained from publicly attacking Baraev, and it could only be surmised on the grounds of his customary close involvement in anything connected with the virgin lands that it was he who stood in the way of Baraev's methods.

[19] *K.P.*, 21 October 1955.
[20] Ibid., 30 October 1956, 11 January, 23 March 1957, 7 January, 8 December 1959.

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Now he declared, 'If we change over to the system recommended by comrade Baraev, then we can say in advance that the task set by the twenty-second Party congress would be difficult to fulfil'.[21]

It is hardly surprising then that, when the denouement came at the end of 1963, it came quietly indeed. On 3 August of that year *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* carried a brief plea by a member of the republic's Academy of Sciences calling for more rational methods of soil exploitation. It contained a blunt declaration that 80–90 per cent of the agricultural machinery in use should be replaced by units which performed all field processes without greatly disturbing the residue of previous crops. No comment on the plea followed, and it appeared to be no more than another grumble from a conscientious scientist with little political acumen. A month later, however, a full page of the same newspaper (3 September 1963) was devoted to the bitter experiences of Canadian wheat farmers in the thirties and the various methods they had evolved to combat wind erosion. This was a clear change of official heart, for one of the charges previously levelled at Baraev was that he had wanted the 'mechanical importation' of the Canadian system of dry-land farming[22]—Baraev had been to Canada to study developments there.

The following day the republic's senior agronomist made it known that erosion in Pavlodar had doubled in extent since 1961 and that in 1962 12 per cent of the sown area had been affected. There was a muted but rancorous 'I told you so' from one scientist, who complained of having been accused of all the deadly sins in the past, but after a few more articles the only political interest remaining in the issue was the question of who would be the scapegoat.

Perhaps to the silent regret of members of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences, who now claimed credit for having advanced concrete anti-erosion proposals in 1959,[23] there was none. The 1963 crop failure, although the worst in the history of the virgin land scheme, was also the most peaceful, and contrasted sharply with events twelve months earlier when there had been a wholesale turnover of the republic's leadership. At the November 1963 plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP, Yusupov, the first secretary, declared briefly that measures were planned to combat wind erosion, and then devoted the remainder of his speech to the nation-wide campaign to stimulate interest in fertilizers and irrigation. A month later Khrushchev referred shortly to recommendations on new methods of soil cultivation and the use of fallow in dry areas. He allowed that these measures *seemed* to be correct for the virgin lands.[24] In this off-hand fashion was inaugurated a veritable revolution in the methods used for ten years over a large proportion of the country's grain area.

[21] Ibid. 7 January 1959, 25 November 1961, 18 May, 18 September 1962.
[22] *K.P.*, 3 September 1960.
[23] *K.P.*, 4 September 1963.
[24] *Pravda*, 15 December 1963.

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The *volte face* passed less smoothly at the conferences of local party organisations held in Kazakhstan at the close of the year; in one oblast, where an obvious attempt was made to stifle discussion, the conference degenerated into an uproar. Elsewhere there was fairly frank local recognition that the failure of the 1963 harvest was not due simply to drought. To illustrate this it is sufficient to refer to one comparison made between the results of the old and new methods. Baraev's institute had these results to show on a 25,000 hectare area.[25]

	1961	1962	1963
Institute's yield (quintals/hectares)	11·5	11·85	8·0
Average Virgin Land Krai yield ..	6·7	6·0	3·6

This and several other less extensive experiments quoted at local party meetings surely show that Khrushchev and other leaders had told only a small part of the story when they attributed the 1963 crop failure to drought. This silence at Presidium level, the absence of further dismissals in Kazakhstan, and the timing of the introduction of the new system of soil cultivation so that it went unheeded outside the virgin lands because of the fanfare of trumpets to herald in the fertilizer era, all add up to a tacit recognition of what must be one of the most costly blunders of the Khrushchev era.

ONE might almost call the episode a study in fatuity. There are areas in Canada whose natural environment is almost identical with that of northern Kazakhstan, and which have now been farmed continuously for over fifty years. Yields there during the past decade (when the Soviet areas held the advantage of their original fertility) have been 79 per cent better than in the Virgin Lands Krai. Comparisons of mineral fertilizer dosages, which can be made in regard to other areas, do not hold good here. Dry-land farming is not suited to heavy applications of fertilizers and the Canadian achievement can be attributed almost entirely to soil tillage practices which restore depleted organic matter and build up soil structure.[26] As we have seen, this was known in the Soviet Union, but expert advice was ignored. One can only surmise that success came too easily for Khrushchev in the initial phase of the scheme, and despite the prophets of doom at home and abroad. This perhaps made it impossible for him to realise that he had been even partly wrong. After his inconspicuous capitulation in 1963 he still remained only half convinced. During his last visit to Kazakhstan in August 1964 he again attacked Baraev for insisting on the need for 15–20 per cent clean fallow,[27] despite practical demonstration of its soundness over seven years. And even 20 per cent is a low proportion according to Canadian

[25] *K.P.*, 20 November 1963.

[26] For a comparison of methods and results in Saskatchewan province and the Virgin Land Krai, see Carl Zoerb, 'The Virgin Lands Territory: Plans, Performance, Prospects', *Studies on the Soviet Union*, vol. III, No. 4, 1964.

[27] *K.P.*, 16 August 1964.

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experience. Had Khrushchev remained in power there is little doubt that the remarkable recovery made by the virgin land last year would have confirmed him in his view that he knew better than the experts.

It remains to comment briefly on the relevance of the policies and events looked at here to a much-emphasised aspect of change in the USSR over the last decade. It is commonly agreed that the heavy-handed methods of Stalin and the area of purely politically motivated decision-making have receded before the encroachment of wider consultation with lower formations, a better upward flow of specialist advice, and consequently more rational policies. Much of what has happened in recent years can undoubtedly be described in terms such as these. The history of the virgin lands scheme, therefore, merits special attention, because it contains several elements that run counter to this general trend—rejection of professional advice, the following of the arbitrary preferences of one man, and evaluation of the performance of hundreds of party and state officials on results which were a reflection of misguided direction from above rather than professional competence. (Kazakhstan holds the record for turnover of first secretaries during the period.) It can certainly be argued that the scheme is exceptional in the degree to which these features have been characteristic, and that elsewhere the picture is brighter. Nonetheless, they are very obtrusive features and must be given some weight in any discussion of political change in the Soviet Union.

The new leaders have an unenviable heritage in the virgin lands; at the latest central committee plenum it was announced that an unspecified part of the greatly increased investment in agriculture would be devoted to measures to combat erosion (*Pravda*, 27 March 1965). Assuming that Baraev's system will be followed, there still remains much to be done before the 1964 harvest can be repeated regularly. Kazakhstan has requested delivery of 182,000 units of the new machinery by the end of 1965, but plants are heavily committed to production of units to handle the increasing flow of fertilizer to the areas of good rainfall. Also it will be two years before the supply of herbicides, an essential part of the new system, can be brought to the required level.

As this is being written there are some promising signs of awareness on the part of the new regime of the harm done to agriculture by planning from above, and a determination ' to support the creative initiative of the workers of the countryside '.[28] Some scepticism, however, is warranted in view of the profusion of such declarations in the past. The Kazakhstan press has inveighed against ' shablon ' (a stereotyped approach by officials) over and over again, but each time this catchword merely heralded the imposition of another form of the malady. Until words are translated into deeds the future of the virgin lands will remain in doubt. Meanwhile the Soviet consumer's best hopes lie in the new emphasis on intensive farming in the established areas.

[28] *Pravda*, 5 January 1965.

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AGRICULTURE UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

Roy D. Laird

PARADOXICALLY, although no previous period in Soviet history (with the possible exception of the NEP) has shown so much advance in food output, Khrushchev's failure in agriculture must have been a vital factor, indeed, may well have been the primary factor, in his deposition.

In virtually every respect, 1962 agricultural output reflected an all-time high. Yet there was not enough grain in reserve to provide the bread necessary to carry the USSR through the 1963 drought. Moreover, even with the purchase of huge quantities of grain from abroad, animal feed was still in such short supply that more than forty per cent of the pig herd had to be slaughtered.

Although Khrushchev did not achieve full power before 1955, and perhaps not until 1957, his leadership in agriculture was firmly established in 1953, signalled by his September report which included a public admission that in crucial livestock realms Soviet agriculture was below the level of 1913.[1] The report clearly advertised the Khrushchev promise to bring about much needed reforms. As a result, not since Stalin's forced collectivisation was so much change to occur in the Soviet countryside, both in production and administration, as did occur between 1953 and 1962.

The primary object of the post-1953 production changes was that of increasing food output for a growing population. Inseparable from the overall goal, however, was the nearly equal aim of increasing the protein content of the Soviet diet. The leadership's conception of agricultural needs was presented in the plan goals for key food items for 1965 and 1980.

TABLE 1

PLAN GOALS: 1965 AND 1980

(millions of tons)

	1965	1980
Grain	191·7 (or 156–172)*	295·0–311·3
Meat	16·1	30·0– 32·0
Milk	105·0	170·0–180·0

* The grain alternative for 1965 is the original seven-year plan goal.

Although potato production did decline, a seemingly impressive growth in the total output of most food items was achieved between 1953 and the 1962–63 period. In field crop production, vegetables,

[1] N. S. Khrushchev, *Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954).

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sugar beet, and especially grain, increases were sought after and achieved. (Table 2 shows the increases during the decade.) Grain was vital not only because bread is so important to the Soviet diet, but also because an increase in the production of grain for animal feed is the key to accomplishing the desired increases in livestock products.

TABLE 2

OUTPUT OF KEY FOOD ITEMS: 1953 AND 1958–63 *

(millions of tons)

	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Grain							
Official	82·5	141·2	125·9	134·4	138·0	148·2	107·5
Adjusted† ...	82·5	127·1	113·3	121·0	117·3	125·4	91·4
Potatoes	72·6	86·5	86·6	84·4	84·3	69·7	71·8
Vegetables ...	11·4	14·9	14·8	16·6	16·2	15·9	15·2
Meat	5·8	7·7	8·9	8·7	8·7	9·5	10·2
Milk	36·5	58·7	61·7	61·7	62·6	63·9	61·2
Eggs (milliards) ...	16·1	23·0	25·6	27·4	29·3	30·1	28·8

* With the exception of the adjusted figure for grain, all output is official. See *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 234–35 and 310–11; *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu* (Moscow, 1964), p. 100. *Nar. Khoz. SSSR v 1963g.* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 225, 284, 287.

† The percentage reductions used by Professor Arcadius Kahan in his estimate of the gross output of grain for 1956–60 have been employed here. However, whereas Kahan employs a 10 per cent reduction below official claims for the years 1958–60, reflecting the 1960 revelation of false reporting of output by the farms, a 15 per cent reduction has been employed for the years 1961–1963. Moreover, while Kahan has excluded maize lactic-wax stage that is counted as grain, this has been included in the present calculations. See Arcadius Kahan, 'Soviet Statistics of Agricultural Output', *Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs* (R. D. Laird, ed., University of Kansas Press, 1963), pp. 134–60. The 1963 handbook excludes maize in the milky wax stage from the total grain figure.

By far the most important source of increased grain production came about as a result of his campaign to plough up and seed vast areas of 'formerly idle and virgin lands'. As a result, some 40 million new hectares—largely in Kazakhstan and the southern RSFSR—were brought into cultivation. In addition the Williams' grass rotation scheme was attacked, and the area devoted to fallow was drastically reduced. In contrast with 29·6 million hectares in 1953, only 6·3 million hectares were left fallow in 1963. In sum, therefore, more than one-fourth of the area sown to crops in 1963 had not been sown in 1953.

Important as new grain sowings for the livestock programme were, they were not the only major measures introduced by Khrushchev. In search of more animal feeds, he also called for and received greater fertiliser output (although virtually all the increase went into technical crops), increased electrification and mechanisation (which may or may not have had an impact on yields), and a change-over of the crop area to such protein-rich fodders as alfalfa, clover, and lupine, and, especially, an enormous expansion of the area sown to Khrushchev's 'queen of the fields', maize.

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The revolution effected in the cropping pattern involved much more than just increased sowings. Indeed, if changes from one crop to another in the long-established cultivated areas could all be accounted for, the total change in the cropping pattern would surely involve about one-half of the whole sown area. Khrushchev's over-ambitious maize growing campaign alone involved an increase from 3·6 million hectares in 1953 to 34·2 million hectares in 1963, the great bulk of which was a matter of substituting maize for some other crop in an established area.[2]

An indication of the dubious value of much of this campaign is given by the fact that so much of the new plantings was in northern areas of insufficient heat for full ripening that, of the total area seeded in the later years, nearly half of the crop was in green mass for silage purposes. Even of the 17·8 million hectares officially counted as mature grain in 1963, only 7·0 million hectares was harvested as fully ripe grain. In spite of all the errors, however, on balance, the impact of the maize programme on feed production must surely be counted as positive. True, yields have fallen off since the 1958 peak, and the 13·9 centners per hectare yield (adjusted) achieved in 1962 was disturbingly less than the average yield of some 40·0 centners per hectare in the United States.[3] Nevertheless, 13·9 centners is far above the yield of 9·2 centners per hectare (adjusted) for all grains in the USSR.[4] Finally, on the side of accomplishment, when production is measured in terms of calories per capita of the population, the Soviet diet was quite sufficient at the end of the decade.[5]

TABLE 3

MAIZE COUNTED AS GRAIN *: HECTARES, TONS, AND YIELDS

	(millions)						
	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Hectares	3·5	8·1	8·7	11·2	13·1	14·2	17·8
Tons (official)	3·7	16·7	12·0	18·7	24·3	23·3	n.a.
Yields (centners/hectare, official)	10·6	20·6	13·8	16·7	18·5	16·4	n.a.
Tons (adjusted)	3·7	15·0	10·8	16·8	20·6	19·8	n.a.
Yields (centners/hectare, adjusted)	10·6	18·5	12·4	15·0	15·7	13·9	n.a.

* As reported in the statistical handbooks, maize here includes not only that harvested as mature grain but also that harvested in the milky wax stage but counted as dry grain. The percentage reductions used for all grains (see Table 2) is applied here to maize in the adjusted figures.

[2] *SSSR v Tsifrakh v 1963 godu*, pp. 96–98.

[3] The 1962 official yield claim for that small portion of maize actually harvested as mature grain was 22·1 centners/hectare (*Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu*, pp. 236–37). For an enlightening examination of crop yields in the USSR see Dr Jasny's paper and Jeremy Anderson's commentary in *Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs*, op. cit.

[4] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo . . . 1962*, op. cit., pp. 236–37. The officially claimed yield for 1962 was 10·9 centners/hectare.

[5] In their division of the world into diet-adequate and diet-deficit areas, the United States Department of Agriculture places the USSR in the diet-adequate category. *The World Food Budget 1970* (US Department of Agriculture), October 1964.

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As to the shift from a starch heavy diet to a greater amount of protein, meat and eggs were much more plentiful during the early 1960s than had been the case ten years previously, although Western consumption standards were far from achieved. In face of this, why do Western students continue to speak of a deepening crisis in Soviet agriculture?

The evidence for gloomy Western forecasts lies in the recognition that the base for much, perhaps most, of the post-1953 production advances is unsound for sustained long-run purposes. Vegetables and livestock products alike, indeed, all food output, is ultimately dependent upon yields per unit of land, and the unreliability of much of the new production base has been demonstrated by the decline in yields in recent years.

Although most of the new lands hectares were added between 1953 and 1958, ploughing up of new lands continued on beyond the 1958–59 production peak (by 1958 some one-fifth of the total sown area was new). Furthermore, the pace of reducing the area in fallow was greatly stepped up after 1958–59. Yet the 196 million hectares sown to crops by 1958–59 surely represented an over-extension when measured in terms of the system's capabilities at that time. The consequence of increased dependence upon sub-marginal lands was a precipitous decline in yields after the 1958–59 peak in the huge New Lands Krai in Kazakhstan. This decline is probably representative of what has been happening in virtually all the 37 million hectares of new land sown to grain.[6] In the whole of the USSR, as elsewhere in the world, there are good years and bad years, but what has been happening in the new lands areas cannot be explained in terms of normal year to year fluctuations in natural conditions (see Table 4).

Between 1953 and 1958–59 the increased output of food reflected substantial increases both in the sown area and in yields per hectare. After that, however, virtually all the further production advances depended upon the continued expansion of the sown area. Even in the long-established cultivated areas, yields per hectare of some key crops declined. True, in the whole of the USSR yields of vegetables per hectare did increase by some ten per cent during the latter period, but the output of potatoes per unit of land and that of the crucial crop grain at least stagnated and probably declined (see Table 5).

[6] The area sown to grain in Kazakhstan in 1962 was 28·6 million hectares. In the new lands regions of the RSFSR the area sown to grain in 1961 was 39·3 million hectares. Therefore, assuming that virtually all the increase in the area sown to grain in the RSFSR from 1961 to 1962 was in the new lands regions (from 77·3 to 82·0 million hectares) the implication is that in 1962 the total sown to grain in the new lands areas was 69·9 million hectares. According to initial reports, at least (*Pravda*, 19 July 1963), the total area sown to grain in 1963 was 138·7 million hectares, or an increase of 2·8 million hectares over 1962. Again, assuming that virtually all these new sowings were in the new lands areas, a basis for estimating the total 1963 new lands sowings of 71·7m. hectares for 1963 is available. Since some of the new grain sowings in recent years most probably came from a reduction in the area in planted grasses, however, 71·7m. hectares may well be a somewhat high estimate of the new lands sowings from which to calculate the actual new sowings.

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TABLE 4

NEW LANDS GRAIN: HECTARES, TONS, AND YIELDS
(millions)

	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
RSFSR hectares (new lands only) ...	28·1	37·4	36·9	38·9	39·3	45·0	—
Kazakhstan hectares (all rayons)	7·0	23·2	21·9	22·2	24·9	—	—
Total hectares	35·1	60·6	58·8	61·0	61·5	69·9	71·7
New sowings only, hectares	—	25·5	23·7	25·9	26·4	34·8	36·6
Tseliny krai yields (centners/hectare, official)	—	9·0	9·2	8·5	6·4	5·9	3·1
Tseliny krai yields (centners/hectare, adjusted)	—	7·5	7·6	6·9	5·4	5·1	2·8
Tons, new sowings only (implied official) ...	—	22·9	21·8	22·0	16·9	20·5	11·3
Tons, new sowings only (adjusted)	—	19·1	18·0	17·9	14·3	17·7	10·3

TABLE 5

YIELDS OF KEY CROPS: 1953 AND 1958–59 TO 1962
(centners/hectare)

	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Grain (official)	7·8	11·3	10·5	11·0	10·8	10·9
(adjusted)	7·8	10·2	9·3	9·9	9·1	9·2
Potatoes	87	91	91	92	95	80
Vegetables	87	101	100	111	113	109
Sugar beets (industrial)	148	218	159	191	164	152
(feed)	n.a.	n.a.	77	121	105	86
Maize for silage	n.a.	151	128	143	126	93

TABLE 6

LIVESTOCK OUTPUT/100 HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND:
1953 AND 1958–1962

	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Meat (centners)	12	15	18	17	17	18
Milk (centners)	75	118	123	123	121	123
Eggs (thousands)	15	18	20	23	24	23

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Khrushchev's campaign to increase the output of livestock products, particularly by producing more feed by ploughing up former grazing lands in the vast new lands regions, significantly reduced the grassland area. This, plus his stress upon shifting to more protein-rich feed crops, has meant an enormous increase in the dependence upon the sown area for sources of animal feed. As Khrushchev repeated time and again during his tenure of office, successful agricultural advance could be measured only in terms of the output of milk, meat, and eggs. Unfortunately, perhaps the most sobering sets of statistics of production trends in recent years are those for the output of key livestock products per unit of land since the 1958–59 peak. Before that time, considerable improvement was registered, but from 1959 through 1962, although the number of eggs produced per hectare continued to rise, even official statistics reveal that there was virtually no increase in meat or milk per hectare.

What then is Khrushchev's agricultural legacy to his successors? In the light of the Soviet admission that there are no more new lands available for expanding the cultivated area (and the conviction of Western observers that the sown area has in fact been over-extended), the level of output of livestock products reached in 1962–63 (and possibly 1964) will hardly be equalled again for several years unless that proportion of cereals and vegetables going directly to human or industrial uses at the end of the Khrushchev period is to be drastically cut back (or animal feed is to be imported in large quantities). Successful fulfilment of the new fertiliser and irrigation programme and/or significant changes in the system could result in important increases in crop yields. Whatever is done, however, grain production will probably be down for several years, since to make such improvements for a whole nation is a mammoth undertaking, and major benefits from these programmes cannot be realised for several years.

Given a population increase of some three to four million people a year and the Khrushchev agricultural legacy, in the short run the new leadership is surely faced with a most painful choice of policy alternatives. Either extensive purchases of food must be made abroad, or the Soviet consumer must be asked to accept a decline in the food available and particularly livestock products.

The crop production record since 1958–59 is the explanation both for Khrushchev's admission in March 1962 that 'we simply do not have enough meat'[7] and the contrasting observation of a colleague that there seemed to be ample supplies of meat during the fall and winter of 1963–64, when he was living in the Soviet Union. Meat production actually reached an all-time high in 1963 and may well prove to have been even higher in 1964. The explanation was given by *Pravda*: because of the shortage of feed, the collective and state farms slaughtered a greater

[7] *Pravda*, 6 March 1962.

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proportion of their animals than usual. The overall livestock count is seriously down; hogs alone were reduced by more than 40 per cent, and that will take time to make up.

ALMOST all the failures of agriculture under Stalin can be traced to the lack of adequate economic incentives for the peasants and to the extremely inefficient kolkhoz-sovkhoz system that he imposed upon the countryside. Reflecting at least a limited recognition of both these factors as serious faults in the system, Khrushchev's policies included serious attempts to increase farm incomes and to achieve the advantages of administrative decentralisation.

On the more purely economic side, his programme surely had some success. Total investment in agriculture is said to have increased from 2·2 billion rubles in 1953 to 8·0 billion rubles by 1962.[8] Part of this investment went into the new lands scheme and much of it into increased production of machinery. In the important area of mineral fertiliser production, the claimed deliveries to agriculture advanced from 6·5 million tons in 1953 to some 13·6 million tons in 1962.[9] However, the most crucial economic need was for increased peasant incentives.

Since peasant wages are determined by kolkhoz profits, inadequate incentives stem largely from the low prices paid for farm produce. Indeed, as the joint party-state statement admitted at the time of the increase in livestock prices in 1962, even at that late date prices were still so low that many (perhaps most?) farms were forced to produce meat at a loss (*Pravda*, 1 June 1962). Nevertheless, prices of virtually all agricultural products were substantially increased during the period and, largely as a result, real incomes advanced. Taking 1953 as 100, peasant real wages are said to have advanced to 173 by 1960.[10]

Output per man hour was also said to have risen to 173 by 1960. Although figures for incomes are not cited after 1960, output per man hour is said to have further advanced to 189 by 1962.[11] The increase in incentives must have had an impact on the output per man hour, but much of the peasant income increase surely must be credited to such short-term benefits as the relatively easily attained harvests from the new lands. Perhaps output per man hour actually did continue to rise after 1960, reflecting the resumption of ploughing up still more new lands and the significant reduction in the fallow area in the long-established areas of cultivation. Nevertheless, serious doubt is raised about both sets of official statistics because of the evidence that peasant incomes fell after a 1957 peak.

It has been argued that post-1957 policy changes, particularly those connected with the cost to the kolkhozy of the elimination of the MTS, undoubtedly resulted in the state's recovery of a considerable portion

[8] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1962 godu*, p. 249.
[9] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo . . . 1962*, p. 298.
[10] Ibid. p. 160.
[11] Ibid. p. 68.

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of the increased investment in agriculture between 1953 and 1957. Indeed, an official Soviet source reveals that kolkhoz peasant incomes in kind dropped by nearly one-third between 1958 and 1960, while the increase of their cash income (a little more than half the total) went up only from 174 to 188 (1953 = 100). Perhaps the increase of some 35 per cent in meat prices in 1962 resulted in a temporary restoration of peasant incomes to the 1957 high. Nevertheless, the indicators that are available imply that, as in the case of crops, advances in peasant incentives also came to a halt during the latter half of Khrushchev's rule. Indeed, although a system of pensions for the kolkhoz peasants was long overdue (and one was announced in 1964), a new decline in the average peasant's in-the-pocket income from his collective labours must surely have been the result, since the farms must pay the cost under the new scheme.

KHRUSHCHEV'S repeated calls for decentralisation to allow the officials at the production level the freedom to make crucial on-the-farm decisions without outside bureaucratic interference were surely genuine. Such actions as the adoption of the 1955 decentralised planning decree, and the emphasis given to implementing the 'production principle' (i.e., output per 100 hectares of land), rather than plan, as the prime measure of successful performance, support this conclusion. Unfortunately, however, the total record of the numerous Khrushchev administrative reforms and adjustments will also support the conclusion that for every inch of latitude given in the name of greater local autonomy, more than one inch was taken away in the name of the need for greater party control over agriculture.

Most Western students of Soviet agriculture were convinced that in Stalin's time the kolkhozy (averaging some 600 hectares and 100 workers in 1945) were too large and unwieldy. Yet it was Khrushchev who inaugurated the amalgamation campaign in 1950, and the campaign continued throughout his tenure of office. Thus, although he often deplored 'megalomania', after 1953, when the number of kolkhozy had already been reduced from some 235 thousand in 1945 to only 93 thousand in 1953, the joining together of the farms into ever larger kolkhozy continued, so that by 1963 only 39·6 thousand kolkhozy remained. Some, of course, were transformed into sovkhozy, which increased in number from 4·9 thousand in 1953 to 9·2 thousand by 1963, but mostly the process was that of enlarging the old kolkhozy. In terms of size, the average kolkhoz by 1962 had some 7,000 hectares (3,000 of which were sown to crops) and engaged nearly 400 workers. In comparison, the average 1962 sovkhoz had 31,500 hectares (11,500 sown) and some 900 workers.[12]

Under Stalin, the state monopoly of major agricultural machinery exercised through the machine-tractor stations, combined with the

[12] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu*, p. 95.

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leadership role of the MTS party group, had made the stations a serious rival to the rayon party and state agencies as the focal point of local control and direction in agriculture. Khrushchev's early post-1953 reform went even further, and by 1957 the zone ruled by the MTS party secretary and his staff of inspector-organisers, each responsible for two or three collective farms, had become the undisputed centre of administrative control over the kolkhozy. Moreover, the 1955 decentralised planning decree had not been implemented.

Khrushchev's abrupt dismantling of the MTS in 1958, along with such other changes as the gradual withdrawal of administrative power from the Ministry of Agriculture, did seem to give some promise of decentralisation. Whatever might have been, however, was destroyed with the establishment of the Territorial-Production Administrations in 1962.

Although the TPA received no monopoly in agricultural machinery, and the territory of each administrative unit (comprising some 180,000 hectares and forty-five collective and state farms) was much larger than the old MTS zone, the TPA obviously were intended to bring back the old scheme of close external controls. Indeed, in announcing the scheme, Khrushchev noted that some desirable control advantages had been lost with the dismantling of the MTS. More than this, the important rayon party and state administrative bodies (revived with the 1958 destruction of the MTS) were abandoned in rural areas. The party inspector-organisers were moved from rayon offices to the TPA, and if anyone had any doubt as to the TPA's ultimate power over the farms, there were Khrushchev's words of March 1962. In a disagreement between an inspector and a farm leader, the farms were to have the last word, but 'if the inspector sees that a kolkhoz chairman or sovkhoz director has the wrong attitude, he reports to the production administration' (*Pravda*, 6 March 1962).

Khrushchev's reforms did bring about a significant increase in the number of trained specialists working in agriculture. He said that, whereas there had been only 114,000 specialists working on the farms in 1953, by 1963 some 414,000 specialists were engaged in local agricultural activities (*Pravda*, 14 February 1964). Their expertise allowed for informed local decision-making. This, and the fact that all farms had party units (and virtually all chairmen were party members), should have created the confidence to allow greater autonomy in directing the farms. That this was not the case, however, was shown by the need to promulgate a party-state decree in March 1964 clearly stating (in contrast to Khrushchev's March 1962 statement) that in case of disagreement between the kolkhoz (or sovkhoz) leadership and the production administrations 'the last word goes to the kolkhoz administration or the sovkhoz director' (*Pravda*, 24 March 1964). Seen in retrospect, the 1964 decree may well have been one of the first moves of defiance by the group working for Khrushchev's downfall.

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TO sum up: under Khrushchev's leadership 'gigantomania' achieved a new high in agriculture. More specialised talent was introduced into production. At long last the party presence was firmly established on the farms. On balance, instead of decentralisation, greater centralisation, certainly more effective outside control, was imposed upon the farms. Peasant incomes advanced significantly, but they remained discouragingly low, and both incomes and incentives probably fell from the peak of 1957. Although the increases in total food output seem impressive at first glance, the advances achieved were not as great as desired. Most important of all, after 1958–59, stagnation and decline in yields per hectare were the rule, and considering the questionable land base of most of the new output levels, total production is probably destined to decline.

Khrushchev obviously recognised that the 1963 troubles were not just a result of the drought, and thus his final act was to call for yet another campaign, this to result in a mammoth increase in the production of mineral fertilisers and a significant increase in the irrigated area. His colleagues, however, seem to have realised that, no matter what their nature, new crash campaigns are not enough. Khrushchev's failure to see the serious limitations of the virgin lands, his increasing tendency to push Lysenko and his ideas, and his inability to refrain from giving detailed orders and advice to local areas and individual farms (while at the same time condemning such actions by others), could be tolerated no longer. He also failed in his efforts to discourage private food production by persuading the peasants to reduce the size of their plots and turn their major interest to the collective fields. Private output of livestock products (with help in the way of feed from the collective fields) continued to be far out of proportion to the size of the peasants' operations. Similarly, the efficiency of private peasant production of vegetables and potatoes remained much greater than on the collectivised fields. It was one of the first measures of the new leaders to allow a modest increase in the size of the plots and to encourage the peasants to increase their private output.

COMING after the decision to relax controls on peasant private production, Brezhnev's report on 'Urgent Measures for the Further Development of Soviet Agriculture' at the March 1965 plenary meeting of the CPSU central committee seems to provide the key to understanding most of the new leadership's hopes for the future of agriculture.[13] Admitting that the plan target figures for the seven-year plan (1959–65) called for a 70 per cent increase, 'whereas the increase over the six years that have already passed amounted to 10 per cent', Brezhnev called for numerous changes. Among the more important are the following:

1. The system of procurements is to be improved, largely by reducing planned state purchases of grain for 1965 and by keeping these

[13] *Selskaya Zhizn*, 27 March 1965.

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purchases at a stable level until 1970. Livestock purchases also are to be reduced somewhat.

2. Prices paid by the state for planned purchases are to be significantly increased—in some cases grain prices will increase as much as 100 per cent. Even higher prices will be paid for over-plan purchases by the state.

3. Urgent measures are to be taken to improve meadows and grasslands as a crucial source of animal feed.

4. Stable (unchanging) plans are to be drawn up and the farms are to be given a greater say in their making.

5. State investments in agriculture are to be considerably increased.

6. The authority of local agricultural specialists is to be strengthened.

7. New rules of the Agricultural Artel (the Kolkhoz Model Charter) will probably be drafted.

8. The enormous debts of many of the economically weak kolkhozy are to be cancelled.

Will the urgent measures called for by Brezhnev remove agriculture from the position of being the major Soviet domestic problem area? If the implied price increases and new investments are in fact carried out and sustained over a long period, many of the strictly economic flaws in the system should be removed. Relatively attractive economic incentives for the peasants would induce them to work harder. However, the magnitude of the cost of the programme suggests the substitution of 'first priority to agriculture' for the old slogan 'first priority to industry'. Is the Soviet leadership prepared to pay the price in sagging industrial growth, or will second thoughts result in much less ambitious investment increases in agriculture?

The economic aspects of the programme should result in important increases in food production. But beyond the need for revolutionary advances in monetary incentives, the Soviet problem also demands a revolution in the administrative-organisational system; probably the most important change at the time of writing (one that preceded Brezhnev's 'Urgent Measures') was the earlier decision to abolish the TPA as Khrushchev had conceived of them.[14] Newly created rayon (district) units are being established as the local administrative entity in agriculture.

Eliminating the MTS in 1958 hardly resulted in increased yields. Increased output cannot be expected to result directly from destroying the power of the TPA. Nevertheless, such a move could reflect a genuine resolve to allow greater on-the-farm autonomy in decision-making (stressed in Brezhnev's report), and is thus a move in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, more than three decades of experimentation

[14] At the time of writing, the production administrations seem destined to remain for the foreseeable future. However, their party committees are being removed and new district party committees are being created as the focal points of local party control and direction.

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with various administrative reforms of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system is surely evidence that such reforms are not enough. The rayon, and decrees calling for more on-the-farm control, have been tried before; dismantling the collectives has not been tried. In short, Stalin's 'revolution from above' (forcible collectivisation) needs to be reversed.

Soviet needs probably do not call for the individual farming system known in the West; but the requirements of efficient agricultural production demand a turn, at least, to some genuinely cooperative form. Efficient farming requires a system in which the man who works the soil and tends the animals has a genuine sense of participating in the decision-making process. In his report Brezhnev went as far as to admit that 'some of the present collective farms have become so big as to be unmanageable'. Perhaps this is a first step towards a future tacit admission that the kolkhozy and sovkhozy themselves are untenable production forms.

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BREAKTHROUGH TO ECONOMICS

Alfred Zauberman

A WESTERN student who, at the turn of the 1950s, thought he could detect certain signs of a radical change in Soviet economics is being proved right sooner than he could have expected. Few could foretell a few years ago that by the mid-sixties important works in Soviet economics would be published, as they actually are now, without even so much as mentioning the name of Marx. The expectations of change were built up on the supposition that, once rigorous modes of thinking—through the use of mathematical apparatus—are assimilated, rationalist tendencies must penetrate the ossified economic doctrine and gain momentum, much as they were bound to be resisted by the forces of the old intellectual establishment.

The rise and the rapid career of the mathematical school in Soviet economics have been validly related to the metamorphosis of the Soviet economic milieu: to its growing maturity, complexity, diversification; to the consequent obsolescence of Gosplan's crude instruments and techniques; and the quest for more modern ones able to cope with it. There again, hardly anybody could have predicted the acuteness and speed with which this problem would confront the leaders, accentuated as it is by a disturbing deceleration-trend in the economy's growth and by the failure of Khrushchevian tinkering with its organisation.

When thinking in terms of decisive individual contributions to the intellectual revolution, one will identify it with the creative and courageous work and untiring efforts of persuasion by Novozhilov and the late Nemchinov, and first and foremost with the conceptual discoveries of Kantorovich (of whom the other, Western, inventor of programming, Dantzig, says: 'If Kantorovich's earlier efforts had been appreciated at the time they were first presented, it is possible that linear programming would be more advanced today').

It is logical that what may be broadly described as the mathematical approach they adopt should be sooner or later recognised as the proper one for the construction of the economic plan. A mathematical programme is concerned to find the optimal solution of a given task, within limits drawn by resource scarcities and employable technologies, and this is precisely what a macro-plan is about. So it was logical that Soviet planning theory and practice, which had been laboriously developing some *partial* efficiency approaches (the search for ways of measuring the efficiency of investment projects is the most important case in point) should be made conscious at the next stage, by the new school, of global efficiency problems. This is precisely what is now happening.

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Inevitably, in the first years of the new school, a great deal of effort had to be spent on inculcating the unfamiliar fundamentals and on mitigating their clash with orthodoxy. True, still in 1965, *Voprosy Ekonomiki* feels it worth while lending its pages to a polemic (Kolganov versus Novozhilov) on conformity or otherwise of the mathematicians' price concept with Marxian theory. But essentially the new school has this period behind it—the period of making the teaching palatable to the traditionalist. Rather it is symptomatic of the present climate that in his new, 1964, book Lurie can and does openly criticise Kantorovich for unnecessarily trying to prove, in his classical opus, the agreement of his solving multipliers with the labour-theory price (as Lurie argues—validly, I think—Kantorovich secures this pseudocompatibility by creating an optical illusion: by bringing into his reasoning an artificial *numéraire* of 'averaged' labour). More, it is safe to say that by now the new school has moved well beyond the monumental but rudimentary works of its founders. Broadly speaking it centres more and more on application. It becomes more and more technical. To be sure, it has some impact, if only indirect, on policy and strategic thinking, and one aspect of it may be indicated here. It is the mathematical inter-industry (input-output) analysis that has revealed the very limited meaningfulness of what was, during a third of a century, a sacrosanct principle: the 'law' of the faster growth of department I as against II (in Marx's dichotomy) or A as against B, heavy as against light industries (though the present writer is inclined to think that it is primarily the change in the economic milieu that has made the 'law' anachronistic and undermined its status). Generally, while focussed on techniques, the work of the new school has, in the usual course of things, a strong and growing impact on theory; it also brings into focus certain theoretical issues which transcend the boundaries of economics proper.

It is not proposed to engage here in any exposition in depth of the increasingly intricate technical issues which clearly dominate Soviet thinking at this stage. But at least one or two hints may be given. The mathematically framed inter-industry analysis is far superior as a tool for checking the coherence of a plan (and to this extent for choice-making) to the crude 'material balance', Gosplan's main traditional instrument. But the few years of experiment with the Leontief-type input-output matrix have brought into relief its inherent rigidities. The more generalised device, Kantorovich's linear programming construct, has proved to be still more restrictive in empirical work, although it is the achievements rather than the failings that deserve note and appreciation. The work of the Gosplan Institute of Economic Research, culminating in the elaboration of a large-scale inter-industry balance for 1970, is remarkable, and so is the achievement of the Academy's Economics-Mathematics Institute in constructing a dynamic model of such a balance for the calculation of the 1965–70 plan extended into

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a linear programme. While the limitations encountered in such ambitious work must have bred a good deal of frustration, they have also provided a stimulant to more and more sophisticated inquiries. It is gratifying to see that it is this kind of work—in which requirements of practice push into theoretically important areas of exploration—that absorbs the minds of a pleiad of first-class students. The change from the arid exegetical exercises of the past is indeed striking.

TO mention a few of their problems. A good deal of effort is concerned with breaking out of the shackles of linearity, which does not correspond with most of the technical and behavioural relationships with which the planner has to deal in the real world. Hence the effort devoted to non-linear programming. Many of the phenomena with which the planner is daily concerned are quantifiable only as integers: hence the active interest in integer-programming. The assumed constancy of parameters—in particular the constancy of fixed technological coefficients—is one of those rigidities of classical inter-industry and mathematical-programming constructs which depart from reality. Hence the attempt to develop what is known as parametric programming. All these are still very young fields of scientific effort; in hardly any of them has a definitive break-through been achieved.

Further, the original classical constructs are static *par excellence*. Obviously, in trying to shape economic life, the planner must be dynamic. Hence the quest for ways of making these constructs dynamic. In this quest, dynamic multi-stage modelling is winning the day. Fortunately, the work of Pontriagin and his team has been made accessible to Western students in English translation—one of the very few among Russian works of this class—and it instantly won their admiration. The story of this work—which relies on the inductive principle, and has a family kinship with, but is independent of, Bellman's dynamic programming—is in many respects symptomatic of what is happening these days in Soviet economics. It has its roots in the pioneering work of Soviet scholars not sufficiently known in the West, especially Feldbaum and Lerner. It was originally conceived as an exercise in pure mathematics, perhaps with an eye to technological application. Only *ex post* was its relevance for controlling economic processes (proceeding stage-wise from a given status towards desired objectives) discerned. It is relevant in particular as a possible means of giving formal shape to continuous—'rolling' or 'sliding'—planning, which has been favoured for some time by the Gosplan and Soviet leaders as a way of coping with the growing intricacy of the country's economic life. To give yet another example: only a few years ago Pugachev was known just as an authority on probabilistic functions. Until the 1960s he did not make any direct contribution to Soviet economics: today he is—and deservedly—one of its leading lights. (Once the implied assumption of the omniscient, all-foreseeing

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planner is dropped, it becomes essential—in one technical way or another—to tackle probabilistic elements.) This is the kind of penetration by pure mathematics that is fertilising Soviet economics.

THESE changes were bound to pose the question of rationality—the question, that is, how rationally to relate means to ends in Soviet economic policies. For, if one tries to state the policy-tasks in mathematical form, one has to put down in rigorous terms what it is that one wants to maximise (or minimise). Vague platitudes à la Stalin's fundamental law of socialism would no longer do; nor could the economists accept, when it was spelt out, what had been the *de facto* Soviet strategic aim for decades—growth seemingly for growth's sake. When at last it was forced into a rigorous frame, the inquiry came up against extremely tricky matters of social-political philosophy as well as techniques, which landed it in the hitherto ideologically banned area of welfare economics, complete with the Soviet-Marxian *bête noire*, the concept of marginal utility: more precisely, it is tending to move towards a Bergson-type social utility function. When consumption is explicitly set as the ultimate end, a number of questions unfamiliar to Soviet thinking habits are raised, questions as to how to integrate collective (or planner's) and consumer's preferences: how to schedule the optimised consumption-accumulation processes through time, within a given time-horizon; and how to deal with economic processes generating results beyond this horizon. And, to the extent that the planner is the guardian of the unbounded future, how technically to cope with infinity. Important exploratory work in this field is being done by several economists; here Pugachev, Volkonsky, Dudkin, and Girsanov are particularly worthy of mention. In relating questions of techniques at present in focus to changes in the fabric of the economy, the connection between these problems and the change in the Soviet environment have to be noted—the change that favours the shift from the traditional Soviet resource-type to the demand-type of planning.

Further, in trying to give a formal frame to procedures for shaping an efficient path for the country's economy, the planometric school came up against what Bellman calls the 'curse of dimensions'; in the economist's jargon the problem of aggregation. The gist of the aggregation dilemma is how to reconcile the exacting degree of detail required of a plan (to make it realistic) with the limits imposed by manageability at the prevailing level of techniques. For example, how to use a formalised inter-industry system designed for about 130 branches and several hundred commodities (this corresponds to the present state of Soviet matrix construction) in running an economy whose commodity nomenclature has something like 15,000,000 items. This is yet another field in which work, interesting both theoretically and technically, is being done, especially by Gavrilets, though the best one can hope is to find some tolerable way out of what is an insoluble dilemma. (I would

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take issue with those, in both the West and the East, who argue that this and other weaknesses of formalised planning make it intrinsically less viable than the traditional crude Soviet methods. Surely the troubles of aggregation, of assumed linearities, or of uncertainties, and so on, have been with the Soviet planner for nearly forty years; they only remained unarticulated. Like Molière's Monsieur Jourdain, he has been dealing with them without being conscious of it. More articulation can only give better insight.)

The curse of astronomic dimensions, and a few more troublesome matters mentioned here, immensely complicate the key task of providing the economy with parameters of calculation, prices and rates of interest. It is precisely Kantorovich's merit to have given Soviet economists the concept of a price which corresponds to an efficient allocation of scarce resources (with given policy postulates and objectives), alien to traditional Soviet doctrine. The system of such prices—Kantorovich's multipliers, or, in his terminology, 'objectively conditioned valuations'—would then form the 'dual' of the original efficiency problem, the 'primal'. The two are almost symmetric: as it were, two faces of the same thing; they are indeed, algebraically, a check on each other. Hence the theoretician's precept to the planner: use as convenient one of the two to solve the other. The mathematical duality concept is beautiful in its simplicity, but its application in planning—on the scale of the national economy—perplexes the Soviet practician. He knows now that he can get an efficient physical plan if he has a system of efficient prices, and that he can get a system of efficient prices if he has an efficient plan. But what if he has neither? The Soviet mathematical-economics school has not found a satisfying answer to what is empirically the crucial question; and in trying to do so it is divided against itself.

OUT of this quandary the idea has emerged and gained ground in recent years in Soviet economics that a practicable solution can be found only in some systematic step-by-step (iterative) procedure of handling information flows and counter-flows, supported by powerful computational methodology and machines. Thus Soviet planometrics has now broadly oriented itself towards cybernetics (ironically, Norbert Wiener thought that one of the fields where his brain-child was unlikely to be helpful was economics), towards the theory of information and control systems and all the other novel disciplines in their neighbourhood. The ultimate stage of development of the economic mechanism is seen as one of a self-regulated, self-teaching system. This is the formative background of the scheme for planning and running the economy officially adopted last year by the *Mezhduvedomstvenny nauchny sovet*, worked out principally, it seems, by Pugachev and Fedorenko. The whole country would be spanned by a giant communication network with some fifty nodal computer-stations, each with a capacity of around 1½ million operations a second, linking up the enterprises and the

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planning centre horizontally and vertically; a system gathering and processing information and issuing parameters of calculation. The conception is inspired by yet another of Dantzig's famous theoretical discoveries (the 'decomposition principle'), but it is an original and elegant variant (technically formulated as 'aggregation by constraints'). The guiding idea in this variant is to reduce by feedback-planning the load of repetitive rounds (iterations), a load that may in practice be just as heavy as the burden of dimensions from which it was meant to offer deliverance. The approach is one of pragmatically regulating the measure of optimality. That is, it aims at some sufficient approximation, at some second-best *sub*-optimum rather than optimum-optimorum (the theorising planometrician's will-o'-the-wisp, which in any case is beyond reach owing to the imperfections of data, chance disturbance, and so on). This is to recognise the fact that planning is only an art of the possible. Even then it would be extremely risky for a student to commit himself as to when, and indeed whether, the scheme will prove operational: it is certainly not so at present. Its prospects would be brighter if it proved to be true, as some authorities of Dantzig's calibre believe, that mankind is just now on the threshold of an era of 'computational explosion'.

As the theoretical gropings have crystallised in empirical schemes of the Pugachev-Fedorenko kind, Soviet economics has found itself at a significant cross-roads in its thinking about the feasible and desirable economic mechanism for socialism. The old doctrinaire attitudes have been dropped. In his last published paper Nemchinov warned his readers that in real life differences in economic mechanisms represent only degrees of compromise between the two extremes of a centralised purpose-directed mechanism of management, and a decentralised self-regulating mechanism. The context, incidentally, was French 'indicative' planning as against the Soviet 'normative' type of planning. How far Soviet thought has travelled from the dogma that the Soviet mechanism based on Marxian-Leninist doctrine is a category in itself and has not and cannot have any points of tangency with one peculiar to capitalism!

The implication of Nemchinov's ideas for the moderniser of the Soviet mechanism would seem to be broadly this. You may get efficiency in a socialist economy either by relying on prices provided by a competitive market installed under some kind of indicative planning; or, alternatively, by efficiency-computation; or by some mixture of the two. In his last articles addressed to a wider public, Nemchinov in fact discreetly tried to pave the psychological way to such a marriage. He also gave qualified support to the celebrated Liberman proposals, as did other members of the mathematical school. For to order the manager of a firm to try to get his profits as high as possible does fit perfectly into the mathematician's model of an efficiency-oriented system. There is, however, a serious snag. It stands to reason that maximising profit can lead to efficient choices only if the profit itself is calculated within the frame of efficiency-prices, and it is the weakness of the

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Liberman proposals, possibly a fatal weakness, that they fail to secure a mechanism (market or computation) which would supply the manager with such prices.

At some stage, as it now appears, some planometricians moved away from Nemchinov in their view of the desired or required mechanism. In its cradle, Soviet planometrics was more or less explicitly wedded to decentralism, but it is not necessarily so today. Indeed, there is a wing in it inclined to draw the full consequences from the logic of a highly automated control regime. This could perhaps be put very roughly in these terms: What is the point in simulating perfect computation by means of inevitably imperfect markets, if this is precisely the job of the computer (assuming you have dependable information and the right mathematical algorithm)? So this wing has turned into one of ultra-centralisers. However, to do them justice, there is a dialectic in the final consummation of their solution. In his latest work, the architect of the famous original model of market socialism, Oskar Lange, discusses the minimax principle in relation to collective decision-making, and concludes with these words:

> Here we have a mathematical solution to the problem of finding the minimax of elements of some matrix: it can therefore be carried out by a mathematical machine. This opens up to a socialist society the possibility of automation of administrative processes. In agreement with the postulates of socialist democracy, all members of the society would register their preferences (this too could be mechanised), and the decision would be computed by 'electronic brains' on the minimax principle. Such decisions would be the objective logical outcome of valuations by individuals, free from arbitrariness and subjectivism, and from possible distortions by bureaucratic decision-making agencies (*Optymalne Decyzje*, 1964, p. 294).

Lange also hints broadly at the possible significance of automating collective decision-making processes for the issue of the withering away of the state under communism. For Lenin, electricity plus soviets equalled socialism; in the planometrician's ultimate vision electronics minus soviets could equal communism.

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ON PHYSICAL IMMORTALITY

Materialism and Transcendence

Peter Wiles

If a man won't believe in God he will believe in anything.
—G. K. Chesterton

In every way there is something gigantic about this people: ordinary dimensions have no application whatever to it. . . . With them everything is colossal rather than well proportioned, audacious rather than well considered, and if they do not attain their goals, it is because they exceed them.—Madame de Staël

'To live a long time, even if living for ever is denied to us, that is a goal that all people are striving for,' wrote Reveis-Paris already in 1885.—Sovetskoye Zdravookhranenie, 12/1961, p. 88

Introduction, Wherein the Subject is Shown to Exist

When a talk of this title was once proposed, the organiser of the meeting advertised it merely as a talk by the author, without any title. The reason he gave was that no one could have seriously meant to speak about such a subject before an academic gathering. In other words, it can't be true because it's amusing. This is a *non sequitur*, however. Much of what we shall have to say is indeed amusing but that does not make it in any way false or unimportant. The 'First International Conference on the Scientific Prospects for Physical Immortality (indefinitely extended longevity)' was held in Washington in December 1963.

Our general thesis is as follows: A man of atheistic persuasion but religious temperament faces two psychological problems among others. First, he fears death, as do all men. Second, he wishes to deify man, since with his particular temperament he must have a god, but an ideologically respectable one. These two problems can be solved at one stroke thus: No proper god is mortal, so we must make men materially immortal and then they will themselves constitute the desired materialist god-substitute. It follows that a religiously-minded atheist is a natural victim for all medical quacks promising the prolongation of life, and tends when talking of death to mystical turns of phrase not strictly compatible with his materialism.

Now a communist is a religiously-minded atheist *par excellence*, and the tendency we have described is to be seen everywhere in modern communism. It is especially strong in Russia, where the religious tradition was already very materialistic, and laid much stress on physical immortality. When communist atheism is superimposed upon Russian Orthodoxy, a quite remarkable mysticism results. Communist atheism by itself may result only in a very stoic acceptance of death. Thus Engels the German simply said 'To live means to die'. The three examples from Russia that follow not only define the subject of this essay but explain how the writer's attention was drawn to it.

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A Russian party member known to me, very well educated, visited me twice at an interval of a year. During the interval a common British acquaintance had died. The Russian talked at great length, first quite naturally of his sorrow, but secondly in a most unexpected manner of his extreme desire to see the friend again, and of his inordinate regret that the world was so constituted that this could not be. He then expressed a similar wish about his wife, also dead. The hardest thing about materialism, he said, was non-existence after death—the rest he found easy to accept.

Second, in the memoirs of a Soviet airman who later defected[1]:

> . . . At last three cars drew up and the general, surrounded by his staff, came in. He smiled at everyone and said: 'Congratulations, my glorious falcons'. Our answer was a delirious, sustained hurrah. The band played . . . We sat down to a feast, complete with wine and speeches.
>
> Our honoured guests occupied a centre table together with the commanding officers of the regiment. The rest of us sat at small tables, each spread for four people. But only two persons at most occupied these. The glasses in front of the empty seats were full. And, before we drank ourselves, we clinked with these filled, unused glasses. We had invited our dead comrades to share with us the feast of victory. We chose whomever we remembered best. We wanted to assure them, on this day of days, that they had not sacrificed their lives in vain. They too were victors and entitled to be present today.
>
> 'Let's drink, Comrade Captain', I said before each new toast. And I kept remembering one or another incident from our short time together. I remembered his love of life and contempt for death. I remembered how he had cried that night in Zhitomir even while he was teaching me that the dead were not worth crying for. I really felt that he was sitting there across from me, and my eyes watered.
>
> 'Who's with you, Comrade Pirogov?' the Commissar asked as he passed by my table . . .
>
> 'Captain Zakharov, Comrade Commissar.'
>
> 'Zhora Zakharov . . . he fell in Poland last year . . . he was a good pilot and a wonderful comrade.'

The third instance is the propaganda about Lenin, especially on the anniversary of his birth. Thus, a visitor to the Soviet Union noted the following placards on 22 April in 1960: 'Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live'. 'Lenin is more living than all who are alive' (zhivee vsekh zhivikh).[2] It might be objected that this is much like the praise other great men have received in all countries; and certainly it would not be significant in another context. But in the Russian context here described, and having regard to the extraordinary volume and persistence of propaganda connecting Lenin with immortality, we may properly give it weight.

[1] Peter Pirogov, *Why I Escaped* (London, 1950), pp. 150, 197.

[2] This is an application to Lenin of a line of Mayakovsky, who undoubtedly meant it in a mystical manner when he first wrote it.

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The very way in which Lenin is buried is of significance: embalmed, and open to everyone's view. So profoundly anti-religious a man would have been very shocked, as his contemporaries protested. But Stalin, the pupil of the seminary, the self-constituted repository of Great Russian traditions, insisted on burying him like an Orthodox saint. And how rightly, the interminable daily queue of ordinary people outside the tomb demonstrates. In this context we may suggest that the length of the queue does not demonstrate communist loyalty but rather Orthodox superstition and the desire for physical immortality.

Until 1954 Lenin was annually celebrated on his death-day (21 January), with considerable fanfare in every newspaper. But in 1955 the switch was made to his birthday (22 April). Now it is a fairly general practice to celebrate the birth and not the death-days of the great: witness George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Indeed if the celebration begins during the great man's life, the preference for the birthday is technically determined: witness the reigning British monarch. But significance may properly be accorded to a switch. It was natural for Stalin to celebrate Lenin's death, and he certainly wanted to emphasise the fact. He wanted an orthodox saint's body, not an immortal. His more modest successors prefer an immortal, that is, a continuing presence whose guidance they may claim.

Or take Mrs Dora Lazurkina, telling the 22nd Party congress of her sufferings under Stalin as a political prisoner: even in prison she had still worshipped him, but since the 20th congress (when Khrushchev made his secret speech) she has re-appraised Stalin:

> . . . not only because of the purges without trials and not only because many innocent people had been jailed; not only because of all these things but because the whole atmosphere created contradicted the spirit of Lenin . . . . and I think that our great Vladimir Ilyich, the most human of all men, cannot remain near Stalin, who despite his merits in the past, before 1934, cannot remain next to Lenin. . . . I always carry Ilyich in my heart, and always, comrades, in the most difficult moments I only lived on because Ilyich was in my heart and I took counsel with him what to do. Yesterday I took counsel with him again, as though he stood before me alive. And he said: 'It is unpleasant to me to lie beside Stalin, who has done such great harm to the Party.' [3]

Clearly Mrs Lazurkina is speaking out of a very special background and set of pre-occupations, worth extended investigation.

So much, then, to establish *bona fides*. I deal below with further examples of the modern Soviet desire to conquer death in a more logical sequence. The plan of this essay is now to establish the origins of this interest in Orthodox Christianity, and to show it peeping out in the way Russian Marxist philosophy has developed from the parent stock, in the directions taken by pre- and post-revolutionary medical research, and in certain great intellectual figures—Federov, Tolstoy, Pasternak.

[3] *Stenograficheski Otchet, XXII S'ezda KPSS*, vol. 3, p. 120.

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Russian Christianity and Russian Marxism

How, then, does this combination of phenomena come about? Is it sufficiently explained by the thesis with which we began, namely, that physical immortality on earth was a goal only to be expected of any religiously minded atheist? The behaviour of non-Russian communists might persuade us of this, but in the case of Russians we can point with confidence to a long non-communist tradition of interest in physical immortality on earth, stretching far back before the revolution and firmly rooted in Orthodox Christianity.

Now Orthodoxy is itself but a genus of the species Christianity, and that religion is remarkable for its special attitude to death. Christians and Moslems alone—not even Jews and Bahais, who are also branches from the same stock—have a singularly concrete vision of individual survival, whether in Heaven or in Hell, for ever (or at least for a very long time indeed). This survival is very materialistic, very similar in its attributes to life on earth. There is memory, continuity with earthly experience, pain, pleasure, even eating and drinking, singing and dancing, sex and marriage.

Orthodoxy—whether Greek or Russian—carries this materialist individualism still further. The body of an Orthodox saint is never dismembered, in strong contrast to the Catholic practice which is that a part only of a saint's body serves well enough as a holy relic. The detached pieces of a dead saint are not distributed here and there in reliquaries. The Orthodox theory is that although the saint's body is not a prerequisite for the cult, it must be kept whole, because the whole body has a peculiar affinity to the soul of the saint in Heaven, and the tomb containing it is thus a link between man and God. The saint's corpse must not smell after his death, because decomposition is the proof that he was not after all a saint.[4] A graphic description of this is given by Dostoevsky in his account of the death of Father Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov* (Book 7, Chap. 1).

Orthodox Christianity also emphasises the Resurrection of Our Lord more than other branches of the faith. Easter rather than Christmas is far and away the principal feast of the year, and the standard greeting between ordinary people on Easter morning is not 'good morning', but 'Christ has risen'.

All this implies a somewhat different attitude to the theological status of matter. Matter in Orthodox Christianity is holy, or more accurately 'spirit-bearing' (*dukhonosny*). Spirit is but an improved sort of matter, and the history of the cosmos is but an evolution under God of matter into spirit. Thus Orthodoxy long anticipated Teilhard de Chardin, and indeed harks forward to the most recent biological speculation.

[4] I take this information from Dr Nicholas Zernov, of Keble College, Oxford, and Dr Ivan Basilevich, of State Hospital, Howard, Rhode Island (personal communications).

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There were, of course, Russian atheists before communism. I have no evidence connecting them with physical immortality, but they were certainly noted beyond atheists of other nations for their boundless faith in science. In the 1860s the attitude called 'nihilism' was not, by the ordinary meaning of the word, nihilistic at all. On the contrary, it connoted an extremely positivistic belief in science, particularly Darwinism; the nihilism consisted merely in the rejection of all things orthodoxly Russian, and indeed Western.

From about 1900 Marxism was the primary form of Russian atheism, but alongside it there had grown up in intellectual circles the child of nihilism: scientism or sciolism. It is one of my main arguments that the state of mind of the Russian people about 1900 held within it all the seeds of the subsequent development sketched here. So let us examine the young student Boris Sokoloff, who figures as a principal later in these pages.

> When, at the age of sixteen, I entered the University of St. Petersburg, I was in a state of inner conflict. I grew up in a family which accepted the Church without any reservation or wavering. . . . But the world of blind faith was not acceptable to me even when I was still a boy. Natural science already exerted a strong influence upon me. The books of Darwin and Spencer and other writers of natural science made a deep imprint on my mind, and caused irreparable damage to my faith. And yet faith, although shaken, still remained a part of me, within my subconscious, alive and vital, but demanding again and again some proof and confirmation. . . . For me at that time it was a burning and all-consuming problem which created in me a truly grave inner conflict.
>
> I enrolled at the University for one simple reason: to find the answer to the multitude of questions which troubled me. It seemed to me that science, and science alone, could answer these questions. For at that time I believed, as do many young men today, in the omnipotence of the human intellect, in the supremacy of science. Without knowing or even suspecting it, I was already impregnated with blind faith, not in God or Providence, not even in human destiny, but in science. I was a victim of sciolism, that common affliction of modern man, which is the first step towards modern materialism. For, at bottom, what is materialism if not pride of intellect? 'When God is destroyed', Dostoevsky said, 'when faith in Him is lost, then man proclaims himself a god.' That is the psychological premise to sciolism, to a belief in the omnipotency of the intellect and, consequently, in the supremacy of science.[5]

It is not, I think, fanciful to see in dialectical materialism the continuation of this attitude to matter. Before the Russians took over Marxism it was known as historical materialism, and was a materialistic theory of human history alone. Moreover, the 'matter' which underlay all history was not itself very materialistic; it was derived from so comparatively spiritual a science as economics, not physics; the

[5] Boris Sokoloff, *Science and the Purpose of Life* (New York, 1950), pp. 1–2.

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'relations of production' are a social, not a physical, phenomenon, and this is practically all that Marx's materialism means. Marx was, of course, an atheist and a pupil of Feuerbach, but he certainly indulged in no such mystical exaltation of matter as his Russian successors. In the 1920s two events changed the emphasis. A very low-brow anti-philosophical school of Marxists had arisen, who really were materialists, and were able to claim some support for their 'mechanist' doctrine in no less a person than Bukharin.[6] And ready to hand for the destruction of this unorthodoxy appeared the newly discovered manuscript of Engels' *Dialectics of Nature*,[7] which extended the dialectical analysis to the non-human universe as well. That is, Engels wished to show that natural scientists ought to reason in the same way as social scientists, namely, in accordance with the new dialectical logic developed by Hegel and Marx. Now in Marxism generally the dialectic, or logic of motion, plays the part of spirit. This type of logic, that is to say, is not merely analytical or concerned with the correct usage of words. It is also in some sense causative; history, or whatever it is, possesses in itself an essence which is not static like previous philosophers' essences, but dynamic. The law of motion of this essence is thesis, antithesis, synthesis, i.e. the dialectic. The development of the thing is determined by the development of its essence, but the relations of essences to each other are of course, as they have always been, logical. The dialectic is thus *both* a law of motion *and* a logic. It at once describes and compels development. The key word here is 'contradiction'. To non-Marxists a merely analytical or logical word, describing the clash of sentences or meanings, it means not only that to Marxists but much more: the necessary opposition of hostile, empirically occurring, tendencies, which meet in the course of 'dialectical' development to cause the 'internal unity of opposites'. From this contradiction, which is at the same time both causal and analytical, new motion empirically results.

It would take us too far afield to discuss the concept of a logic that governs cause and effect as well as verbal entailment; nor could we in any way accept it. Enough that Marxists generally believe in the notion, but Bukharin and the Mechanists questioned it:

> A further difference between dialectical materialism and mechanism lies in the mechanists' conception of dialectic. They attribute all motion to impulses arriving from without, and thereby abandon that attribute of matter which the dialectical materialists regard as most essential, namely its inner liveliness, that spontaneity which they describe, in their Hegelian terminology, as the 'self-movement' of matter (*samodvizhnost*). As we know already, dialectical materialism explains the origin of motion by means of the 'law of the unity of opposites', the chief law of the dialectic. Owing to

[6] *Teoriya Istoricheskogo Materializma* (Moscow, 1921).

[7] First published in 1925, the document was little regarded by Western Marxists. On the vicissitudes of the text cf. G. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism* (English edition, 1958), p. 44.

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> the presence of internal contradictions—contradictions whose tendency is to break apart from one another—a thing, a phenomenon, a process is set in motion from within. According to the mechanist view, on the other hand, the origin of motion is ascribed to external impulses outside the thing. Lest they should be compelled, therefore, to acknowledge a First Mover, the mechanists, like the old French materialists of the 18th century, conceive of Nature as eternal and unchangeable.
>
> As already indicated above, the mechanists see something mystical, teleological, in the notion of dialectic. Bukharin accused Marx and Engels of having bequeathed to the proletariat a world-outlook by no means free from ' a certain teleological flavour which inevitably clings to the Hegelian formula which speaks of a self-development on the part of " Spirit ".' [8]

The orthodox view triumphed in 1929 and the victors further imposed Engels' extension of the dialectic from human to natural history. Now Engels himself had merely been concerned to make large claims for his type of logic: the *Dialectics of Nature* was originally only an act of intellectual imperialism. Not so in Russian hands. For now, precisely as Bukharin said, the element of ' spirit ', in however desiccated a form, lived on. Not chance nor God but an immanent teleology ruled, and matter again became *dukhonosny* among Russian theologians. The leader of the victorious party phrased it thus:

> Being, Life and Consciousness represent three fundamental levels or stages in the development of matter. It is one and the same matter, as the substantial element in the process of development, which transforms itself into living matter, and this in turn into thinking matter.[9]

To repeat, in the light of what we now know about genes, DNA and RNA, this claim is very reasonable. It also anticipates Teilhard.

Age and Immortality

So much for the traditions of Russian materialism, both Christian and post-Christian. We may next mention the very general *respect of Russians for old men*. There is in Russian folklore the common figure of the Bad Old Immortal, the *Koshchei*: ' in Russian folklore a bony, emaciated old man, rich and wicked, who knows the secret of eternal life '.[10] Opera-goers will recognise this character in Stravinsky's Firebird.

But non-Russian folklore is also full of immortals, so this must count for little. There is, however, the quite specially Orthodox grade of holiness below that of saint: the *starets*, which can only be translated as ' Old Man '. Now in all countries age earns respect, but that it should contribute to holiness is something specifically Orthodox. These semi-holy old men are a regular phenomenon in all Orthodox countries.

[8] Wetter, op. cit., p. 140.
[9] Wetter, op. cit., p. 164, quoting A. M. Deborin.
[10] A. I. Smirnitski, *Russian-English dictionary*, p. 315.

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The most famous in the West is the somewhat off-beat example of Rasputin, who was classified as a *starets*. What made these people holy was in part their age.

Then, too, Russians have always shown an inordinate interest in centenarians, saintly or otherwise, and a quite unusual credulity before the claims these gentlemen make. It has often been observed what a heavy proportion of centenarians were born in times and places where births were not properly registered, such as the Caucasian highlands in the 1850s; but this consideration is seldom urged upon the Russian public.[11] If, as indeed appears to be the case, these highlands do harbour an exceptional number of centenarians, the exceptional public and scientific interest remains a fact in itself. The Hunzas in Pakistan are said to be equally long-lived, but have not been studied.

The longevity of Caucasian mountaineers, especially Abkhazians, is generally accepted as a scientific fact, and alleged to be well documented in church records.[12] Dr Basilevich,[13] then a medical worker in Kiev, visited Abkhazia in 1937–38, but was not able to produce complete statistics of the number of centenarians. He returned with the impression that it was unusually high, but by no means as high as claimed. From his figures it looks as if Abkhazia were in fact no more remarkable for centenarians than Norway, the European champion. That is, the Norwegian rate is about half the Abkhazian rate, while the country is far more literate and far better administered. Nor have its centenarians become a tourist attraction.[14] Nevertheless, in view of the generally high mortality and low living standards of Abkhazia, it is indeed remarkable that it should have as many centenarians as Norway, and no scepticism can shrug this off. Moreover, some of these centenarians are exceptionally old: there are well attested cases of healthy men aged 120 and over. There are incidentally scarcely any female centenarians, in Abkhazia or elsewhere.

Federov, The Religious Innovator

Respect for old men brings us to the *locus classicus* for the Russian passion for immortality: the works of Nikolai Federovich Federov (1823–1903).[15] His doctrine went as follows: Man's purpose it to achieve

11 A charming illustration of the unreliability of undocumented centenarians is the fact that in the 1950 census in USA ten times as high a proportion of coloured as of white people claimed to be 100 or more. In the 1960 census, however, after the expectation of life had risen all round, though that of the coloured people remained significantly below the average, the white rate of centenarians rose, while the coloured rate fell!

12 Cf. *Vestnik Statistiki*, 4/1961.

13 Ivan Basilevich, *The Medical Aspects of Natural Old Age* (Munich, privately published, 1959), ch. 4; I. V. Bazilevich in *Medichny Zhurnal Akademii Nauk Ukr. SSR*, 7/1938, 19/1938.

14 One of the most remarkable—and confidence-destroying—tourists to Abkhazia was Richard Halliburton, in his *Seven League Boots* (Indianapolis, 1935).

15 G. Florovski, *Puti Russkago Bogoslovia* (Paris, 1937), pp. 322–31; N. Berdyaev, *Russkaya Mysl*, 1915; P. Bartenev, *Russkii Arkhiv*, 1909, vol. 1, pp. 119–22; N. F. Federov, *Filosofia Obshchago Dela* (Moscow, 1913), ed. V. A. Kozhevnikov and N. P. Peterson.

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universal collective material salvation on earth (equal stress should be laid on each word). God, who created Nature, gave it no special purpose. God works exclusively through man, who must give Nature its purpose, and this is the physical resuscitation of the dead. Why? Because individualism is bad and humanity ought to be one family; the ideal society is a patriarchal family, and God has given us a paradigm thereof in the Trinity. The perfect relation of individuals in the Holy Trinity must be reproduced in the one great human family. The Trinity shows us that the highest relation between beings is that between father and son, not that between husband and wife. The supreme act of filial piety is the resuscitation of one's father and ancestors. This done, salvation will be achieved on earth without further resort to childbirth, in a patriarchal society. The Malthusian pressure resulting from so many human beings will be relieved by colonising other planets.

This extraordinary farrago had great influence in its day. Warm, high, and sincere tributes to the doctrines of the modest and obscure librarian of the Rumyantsev Museum were paid by none less than Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Soloviev. The latter called him the most original Christian thinker since Christ—which in a way is literally true. Everything that every historian of ideas has ever meant by the 'Russian soul' is exemplified by Federov; Slavophilism (he believed in the patriarchal principle and hated Roman Catholics),[16] *sobornost* (he hated individualism and his model of society was the family), unlimited boldness of thought (the preceding paragraph speaks for itself), ascetic radical utilitarian Philistinism (his Spartan personal life and his neglect of the arts and graces rivalled Belinsky's own)—the whole syndrome is gloriously present, including the two things most interesting to us here, religiosity and materialism. That he was a fervent Christian, not an atheist, is hardly relevant: the thinnest line divides such Christianity from, say, the atheism of Mayakovsky. By every account, incidentally, he was a man of singular learning, purity, and charity towards all. But since he was known to many only through his writings his personal saintliness cannot explain his influence.

Federov always concealed his personal origins from his distinguished and admiring contemporaries. Had they known them their verdict might have been different. But again it might not, and it is significant that they paid attention to this fantastic mythopoeia whatever quirk of psychology had caused it. In fact Federov was the natural son of a nobleman of the very distinguished Gagarin family, by a woman of low degree. He lost his father and then his grandfather at a very early age, and was then apparently turned out of the house, with his mother and brothers and sisters, by an aunt. Nevertheless he received a nobleman's education. Not surprisingly, women occupy a low place in his scheme of things. Resuscitation renders further childbirth unnecessary, and motherhood

[16] In particular, of course, the Popes, but also, significantly, Dante. They were not only exponents of division rather than unity, but also prophets of inevitable damnation and hell, which of course contradicted the very basis of his theology.

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is thoroughly devalued. There is, luckily for him, no mother in the Trinity, so he was able to provide for the incontestable fact that women exist by equating them with daughters, and daughters in turn with the Holy Ghost.

The writer must add for his own part that he does not regard the resuscitation of the very long dead and decomposed as a *logical* impossibility: that condemnation applies only to one aspect of Federov's theory, the re-use of the original molecules (which is evidently impossible since many generations of living bodies have used and re-used the same molecules).

To counter the reader's incredulity we let Federov speak for himself [17]:

Ancestors and Resurrectors

> The day eternally longed for, the object of our desire since the first bereavement, will only come when the now prodigal sons, gifted with reason, understand that the force that in its blindness killed their fathers, not at the command of God but only by His permission, needs only rational direction to become a life-giving force. A principal obstacle to the arrival of the longed-for day is the extreme moral stupidity of the book-learned and the whole mob of the 'intelligentsia', a stupidity such that only a terrible plague or famine, arising from the exhaustion of the earth, will force them to give up the slave-like underground work of miners and turn themselves to the heavenly force that comes from the sun and other worlds. Only when they have unified themselves with the direction of the meteoric process, in which the sun's force manifests itself, will the sons of men become able to recover the dust of their forefathers from the deep strata and not turn it into food for their descendants but reassemble it into the bodies to which it belonged. The agitation and movement, of which the molecules and dust of the dead are never free, and which can never be heard by any microphone—example of a very crude organ of hearing—find a harmonious echo in the movement of the particles in living bodies, related by birth to the dead to whom the particles belonged. Such individual vibrations, hidden in the secret depths of matter, are no more than a suggestion to explain the process of resuscitation, which does not exclude other hypotheses. Up to now we have explained the construction, building, or development of the world by hypotheses which could be produced only by the narrow experience of the separate scholar's study, but the theory of the creation of the world demands general experience, covering the earth's whole globe at all its levels.
>
> According to this hypothesis a force, recovered from the currents of the air and communicated to the various layers of the earth, will produce in them the correct vibrations, taking the place of the present destructive movements of the earth, which however open paths to the waters that collect the particles of the dust of the dead. Without doubt the science of small molecular movements, perceived

[17] Federov, op. cit., vol. 2, III/7 (his italics). Cf. also II/101.

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only by the sensitive hearing of sons, equipped with the most accurate organs of perception and hearing, will search out not precious stones or particles of valuable metals, for the searchers will not be humanists to whom all filial and paternal spirit is foreign, but full-grown sons; they will search for the molecules that went to form the matter that gave them life. The waters that brought out from the womb of the earth the dust of the dead, will make themselves obedient to the universal will of the sons and daughters of men, and will act under the influence of rays of light, which will no longer be blind, as are hot rays, nor yet cold and feelingless; chemical rays will be capable of this selection, that is, under their influence related things will unite themselves and unrelated things split apart. This means that the rays will be a weapon of the good, combined will of the sons of men.

The way and method whereby various rays become tools of the will can be imagined as follows: the vibrations or agitations, to which the particles are subject which are in organisms, remain when the particles leave the organism and when the body is destroyed. The thick stout layers which cover the particles will not be impermeable by all vibrations. The rays from these agitations, coming through to the surface, meet reflected and other rays, putting together not only an external image of the earth and the living things on it, but also an internal one with the dead decomposing in it. By directing or regulating the movements of other heavenly bodies outside the earth the picture made by the rays can be reflected back to earth, where as we have seen the particles hidden in the depths have been carried up to the surface. There begins the constructive activity of the rays. Returning *to* the earth, coming *out of* the earth and *off* the earth, and at that in a consistent order, the rays bring with them images of living things and then of dead things, images of their bodies now decomposed into particles; these rays, meeting the particles, unite the gaseous molecules of the atmosphere with the heavy ones on earth. The process, whereby *unconsciously* a mould or vegetable forms were produced, *with conscious direction* will unify particles into the living bodies to which the particles belonged.

But the business of resurrection concerns not external forces only, directed by the universal wisdom of all; it is also the personal business of each man, as a son and descendant.

If we compare our present small family affairs with the collaboration of all and each with the meteoric and cosmic process in the family and personal business of resuscitating fathers and ancestors, then it is clear that all the spiritual forces, all the intellectual capacities now asleep for lack of occupation, will find outlet and application in this great enterprise. The internal regulation, in the intellectual, emotional-artistic, and psycho-physiological senses, that governs the process of nourishment and internal growth, turns the latter into the process of resuscitation, in place of giving birth to weak matter that scarcely feels or is conscious.

On the longed-for day the Triune God will become the model for imitation by all earthly generations as a whole, and not an unattainable ideal. All material worlds of the Oekumene, known

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> to the sons of men, will become means whereby their souls can express likeness to the Immortal Trinity. The whole Oekumene, animated by all the resuscitated generations, will become a temple to the Immortal Trinity; and the longed-for day will be the day of the Trinity, the culmination of the Sabbath of universal resuscitation; the whole Oekumene will be a union of countless worlds of immeasurable heavenly extent (with) those multitudes of resuscitated generations swallowed up for countless ages by the earth.

If this is obvious madness, let the reader also consider this [18]:

> *Bartenev*: Yes, but if it's desirable that doesn't mean it's possible. It is possible to believe that in time man will master nature; there are already signs of that, for even now he is mastering her more and more; but to think that he will attain to such knowledge of her mysteries and such fullness of power over her forces that he will be in a position to put together again a body fallen apart into dust, and bring back life to a dead man—that means to recognise no limits to human intelligence and strength, that is pride, for man is weak and limited.
>
> *Federov* (*interrupting*): How do you know where the limits of his intelligence are? Who told you? That's rather pride on your side, to decide what man in future shall achieve and what he shall not.

Turning to more rational thinkers in the same strain, S. Bulgakov was far more moderate and typical of Russian Orthodoxy, yet he too goes very far, albeit in imprecise language [19]:

> That division [between the Wisdom of God and the Wisdom of Creation—P. W.] is not irremediable. Its healing, in God's plan, includes in itself the healing even of the division of God's Wisdom into kinds, the eternal and the creaturely, i.e., the deification of creation, assimilating it with the divine life and raising it from creaturely Wisdom to creaturely-divine Wisdom. For God so loves creation that, calling it into being, He gives it *His aspect*, Divine Wisdom, as the basis of its being, so that later he may also give it *Himself*, uniting it with His Divine life. And that is the basis of the theanthropic [20] process. Humanity, which is the focus of the world, its cryptogram, is the image of Divine Humanity, or God-manhood, destined by that fact to the greatest possible approximation, even to living identification, with the Arch-image. This is the task and goal of creation. God forms future 'gods by grace' in order to include them in the many-personed multi-unity of the Holy Trinity and in the unity of Divine life. This is the ultimate basis of the creative act. Creaturely Wisdom must unite itself in a single life with Divine Wisdom on the basis of the unity of the person that lives in both kinds: the idea of the dogma of Chalcedon, of the single-personed double unity of both kinds, the Divine and the

[18] S. Bartenev in *Russki Arkhiv*, 1909, vol. 1, p. 121.

[19] *The Comforter: On God-manhood* (Uteshitel: O Bogochelovechestve) (YMCA Press, 1936), p. 402.

[20] This is my own coinage for *bogochelovechenski.*

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> human, of Divine and creaturely Wisdom, must receive a significance not only christological but also anthropological and cosmological.

Plainly Bulgakov has been influenced by Federov, yet this is the most Federovian passage that his writings yield. The title of the book (*On God-manhood*), that seems so relevant to our thesis, is not so. The reference is to God's coming among men, through the historical visit upon earth of the Trinity's second person, and the permanent dwelling among us of the third. Nevertheless in this single passage we see again the singular concreteness of the Russian theological vision, its refusal to deal in concepts alone, its rejection of matter-spirit duality.

The American Parallel

If I am not mistaken, physical immortality only fits naturally into one other social and ideological environment than the Russian, and remains everywhere else the quirk of off-beat doctors. This place is of course the United States. The important instance here is curiously enough the Mormons, who had at one time [21] their own version of the self-deification of man, the holiness and infinite potentiality of matter, etc. It is difficult to believe that Federov was unacquainted with Mormon theology, so many parallels are there. Thus Federov resuscitates ancestors, the Mormons baptise dead ancestors into immortality, and for this purpose have set up an enormous genealogical service. Federov's resuscitees migrate to other worlds, while for the Mormons the world itself dies and is resurrected, joining other worlds. That matter is *dukhonosny*, indeed that spirit and matter are the same thing, is an absolutely cardinal Mormon tenet. Federov is a patriarchalist, and the Mormons, with their insistence on polygamy and progeny, carry this further. Federov's God is still a transcendent God the Father, who, however, is now only the benevolent supervisor of man's own attempts here below to achieve his own salvation. The Mormon's God is hardly even transcendent, but Himself a man who deified himself.

It will be seen in the second part of this essay that while most of the doctors interested in our subject were Russian, many were American (Brown-Séquard, Stephens, and now the deep-freezers McDonald and Ettinger). In a work so nearly one of imagination as the present, it is permissible to speculate more at large on the Russo-American parallel. Dr Paul I. Yakovlev [22] suggests that

> . . . The preoccupation with the idea of Life, Death, and Immortality is, I submit, no greater among Russians, or in Russia in general, than elsewhere. There is, however, a difference in the statement of these 'universals', and I venture to say (and this

[21] I describe here the classical Mormonism of the heroic period, not its Christianised descendant.

[22] Of the Harvard Medical School, and of Russian origin. I owe very many suggestions and corrections to Dr Yakovlev, and quote here from his letter.

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> appears rather clearly from your discussion) that in Russian language (which is the clearest definition of what is 'Russian mind'), these 'universals' are generally more often stated in *empirical pragmatic*, rather than abstract philosophic or theosophic terms, as they are often stated in other European languages, particularly German and English. . . . However, this pragmatism is not unique or specific for Russians. You have yourself noted, and it is, indeed, notorious, that it is curiously characteristic also of the 'American mind'. Here, as in Russia, the universals Life, Death, and Indeterminate Survival are discussed, generally, as a scientifically 'respectable' subject. . . . The American and Russian civilisations, as they evolved in the past three centuries from their radically different root-cultures, have this in common, that both are *translatory* civilisations.

Is there really nothing similar in other non-Russian traditions? It is difficult to demonstrate a negative, and the research required for this one would be wide indeed. We can, however, at least point to one non-Russian document where we should expect to find references, but do not.

Corliss Lamont published his Columbia doctoral dissertation, *Issues of Immortality*, in 1932. He had at that time on file a bibliography of more than 2,200 books and articles, most of them in English and most of them written since the bibliography of 5,300 titles by Ezra Abbot was compiled in 1862.[23] Not even an American Phil. D. student will have read 7,500 titles, but Dr Lamont's excellent dissertation shows great general familiarity with his subject. He mentions many kinds of immortality, but physical immortality is not on his list. His own, shorter bibliography, includes Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, but curiously only as 'Material throwing an indirect light on the idea of immortality' (p. 195). It omits Godwin (see below). All this fits well with the theory that physical immortality is a Russian monopoly, since Dr Lamont quotes no Russian source.

In his second book, *The Illusion of Immortality* (1934), Dr Lamont continues to exclude the immortality that is the subject of this essay. Mechnikov's *Prolongation of Life* now enters the bibliography, but appears to have affected the text no more than Shaw. As is entirely his right, the author has treated the survival of the soul, immortality through fame, and even physical resurrection, but not resuscitation or eternal physical life—omissions of which a Russian would have been quite incapable.

5. Tolstoy's obsession

After Federov the most staggering instance of the Russian preoccupation with death is Lev Tolstoy.[24] In Tolstoy's novels the deaths of the heroes

[23] As an appendix to W. R. Alger's *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life* (Philadelphia, 1844).

[24] I am almost exclusively indebted to Daniel Gillès: 'Tolstoi Interroga a la Muerte', *Cuadernos* (Paris), March–April 1961.

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are an essential part. Moreover, they die slowly and consciously; they die, not as retribution for their sins nor in order to advance the story, nor for edification, nor to show the cruelty or the mercy of God, but *in order to explicate death*. Some of the short stories—'Three Deaths', 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich'—have no other aim and no other subject.

We may fairly point out that no other novelist has done this, and that Tolstoy was Russian. Instructive, too, was his own attitude to death, which we must of course take from his life and correspondence, not his works of imagination. He was haunted by death his whole life long, as his diaries reveal, and saw it as nothingness, vacuity. He underwent several sharp crises of struggle with this 'vacuity', as infant, as adolescent, and as grown man. Of these, his 'Night at Arzamas' is the most famous, since he described it in great detail (in *Notes of a Madman*). His final encounter with the angel of death is of course even better known: his flight from home and his solitary passing at a small railway station.

His views on the subject are absolutely central to this essay, since they explain the whole 'Russo-Marxist death syndrome'. Early in life he suffered many untimely deaths of parents and relatives, which gives us, incidentally, a rational explanation for much of his obsession. Twenty-seven days after the death from tuberculosis of his elder brother Nicholas, he wrote to the poet Fet:

> [Nikolai] was right to repeat that nothing is worse than death. And when we understand that this really is the end, then there is nothing worse than life either. Why trouble yourself, why work, if nothing remains of that which was Nikolai Nikolaevich? He did not say that he felt death coming, but I know that he noted its every step forward and measured exactly the little time that he had left to live. A few minutes before dying he lost grip of reality, but he suddenly woke and whispered, aghast, 'But what is this?' For he had seen it, this disappearance of the self in death. And if he found nothing to hold on to, what shall I find? Certainly less. . . . Be useful, virtuous, happy during life, some say; but self, happiness, virtue, utility—all that leads to only one truth, which I have understood after 32 years of life: that the situation in which we are placed is terrible.[25]

In 1876 Tolstoy went through yet another crisis, and emerged, after a very brief period of Orthodoxy, a Tolstoyan. One of his objects now was so to live as to prepare himself for death, to strip himself so thoroughly of passions and possessions that he could cheat the angel by leaving him with nothing to take away. He noted every night in his diary tomorrow's date followed by: 'If I am alive'. Even so he found no solution, noting once: 'The terrible reality of death should order our whole life, and everyone should, of his own will, obtain that total

[25] Letter of 17 October 1860: in A. Fet, *Moï Vospominania* (Moscow, 1890), Bk. I, Ch. 11.

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life, the only true life, which is God'. And on the other hand saying to Gorki: 'What truth can there be, if death exists?'[26]

The essence of Tolstoy's agony, then, is 'Why live, if we must die?' It is to speak too broadly to call this an existential agony, as does M. Gillès. The proper existential agony of, say, Sartre or Camus goes deeper; it is simply, 'Why live?' The possibility of physical immortality would not cure this agony, and indeed might increase it.[27] What Russians suffer from may be called the non-existential agony. Life, matter, this world, constructive activity here below, seem to be perfectly justifiable and to raise no metaphysical doubt in themselves. What is intolerable, what casts doubt on everything, is that each individual in turn must cease to enjoy these things. That the race will survive—the Nazi's consolation—is irrelevant. Even the prospect of direct descendants—the consolation of the Chinese—is not enough. There has to be life after death—or no death.

I do not mean to imply that men of no other nation ask themselves, 'Why live, if we must die?' On the contrary, very many irreligious people do so from time to time; and the Christian and Moslem religions derive much of their strength from their unique doctrine of a physical life after death. The sentiment is common enough, the obsession less so.

We cannot leave pre-revolutionary literature without a brief notice of one of its latest and greatest monuments: Boris Pasternak's *Doktor Zhivago*. Pasternak's own views on physical immortality are unknown to me, but here is the speech he puts into the mouth of Vedeniapin, the unfrocked priest, in the year 1903:

> As I was saying, one must be true to Christ. I'll explain. What you don't understand is that it is possible to be an atheist, it is possible not to know whether God exists, or why, and yet believe that man does not live in a state of nature but in history, and that history as we know it now began with Christ, and that Christ's Gospel is its foundation. Now what is history? It is the centuries of systematic explorations of the riddle of death, with a view to overcoming death. That's why people discover mathematical infinity and electromagnetic waves, that's why they write symphonies. Now, you can't advance in this direction without a certain faith. You can't make such discoveries without spiritual equipment. And the basic elements of this equipment are in the Gospels . . . It was not until after the coming of Christ that time and man could breathe freely. It was not until after Him that men began to live toward the future. Man does not die in a ditch like a dog — but at home in history, while the work toward the conquest of death is in full swing; he dies sharing in this work.[28]

[26] Gillès, loc. cit.

[27] In a sense this is how Sartre feels. Compare his *Huis Clos*, in which the evil is precisely immortality, albeit in Hell, after death.

[28] In the Hayward-Harari translation (London, 1958), Ch. 1, sect. 5.

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And here, perhaps less striking, is what the young doctor Zhivago says in 1911, to a woman who supposes herself to be dying:

> Resurrection. In the crude form in which it is preached to console the weak, it is alien to me. I have always understood Christ's words about the living and the dead in a different sense. Where could you find room for all these hordes of people accumulated over thousands of years? The universe isn't big enough for them; God, the good, and meaningful purpose would be crowded out. They'd be crushed by these throngs greedy merely for the animal life.
>
> But all the time, life, one, immense, identical throughout its innumerable combinations and transformations, fills the universe and is continually reborn. You are anxious about whether you will rise from the dead or not, but you rose from the dead when you were born and you didn't notice it. . .
>
> So what will happen to your consciousness? *Your* consciousness, yours, not anyone else's. Well, what are *you*? There's the point. Let's try to find out. What is it about you that you have always known as yourself? What are you conscious of in yourself? Your kidneys? Your liver? Your blood vessels? No. However far back you go in your memory, it is always in some external, active manifestation of yourself that you come across your identity—in the work of your hands, in your family, in other people. And now listen carefully. You in others — this is your soul. This is what you are. This is what your consciousness has breathed and lived on and enjoyed throughout your life — your soul, your immortality, your life in others. And what now? You have always been in others and you will remain in others. And what does it matter to you if later on that is called your memory? This will be you — the you that enters the future and becomes a part of it.
>
> And now one last point. There is nothing to fear. There is no such thing as death. Death has nothing to do with us . . .
>
> There will be no death, says St. John. His reasoning is quite simple. There will be no death because the past is over; that's almost like saying there will be no death because it is already done with, it's old and we are bored with it. What we need is something new, and that new thing is life eternal.

Note the reference to the Malthusian consequences of resurrection—a hark-back, doubtless to Federov.

Appendix: William Godwin, 1756–1836

This very individual thinker seems not to have hated death or struggled specially hard against it. The animus of Tolstoy and Mechnikov, even of Shaw, is missing. But he did predict that men would be physically immortal, almost as an *obiter dictum*.

In the one place where we should expect it there is no such thought. This is the essay 'Of the Duration of Human Life'.[29] However, the *Essay on Sepulchres* (London, 1809) does show a more 'immortalist'

[29] In the book of essays *Thoughts on Man* (London, 1831).

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turn of mind. This booklet works out a grand international proposal that the graves of famous men be always marked, and the markers perpetually renewed:

> Let us mark the spot, whenever it can be ascertained, hallowed by the reception of all that was mortal of these glorious beings; let us erect a shrine to their memory; let us visit their tombs, let us indulge all the reality we can now have, of a sort of conference with these men, by repairing to the scene which, as far as they are at all on earth, *they still inhabit*! [30]

The *locus classicus*, however, comes in *Political Justice* (1793), Book 8, ch. 7. It is a reply to Robert Wallace, who had urged community of property but despaired of the increased population that would ensue—a very complete anticipation of Malthus. As it is rather diffuse I pick out its essentials only.

> Let us return here to the sublime conjecture of Franklin, that 'mind will one day become omnipotent over matter'. If over all other matter, why not over the matter of our own bodies? . . . In a word, why may not man be one day immortal? . . . If it could have been told to the savage inhabitants of Europe in the times of Theseus and Achilles, that man was capable of predicting eclipses and weighing the air . . . this would not have appeared to them less wonderful, than if we had told them of the possible discovery of the means of maintaining the human body in perpetual youth and vigour . . . We have called the principle of immortality in man cheerfulness, clearness of conception and benevolence. Perhaps we shall in some respects have a more accurate view of its potency, if we consider it as of the nature of attention. It is a very old maxim of practical conduct, that whatever is done with attention, is done well . . . How common is the remark, that those accidents, which are to the indolent a source of disease, are forgotten and extirpated in the busy and active? . . . We are sick and we die, generally speaking, because we consent to suffer these accidents. This consent in the present state of mankind is in some degree unavoidable. We must have stronger motives and clearer views, before we can uniformly refuse it . . .
>
> The men therefore who exist when the earth shall refuse itself to a more extended population, will cease to propagate, for they will no longer have any motive, either of error or of duty, to induce them. In addition to this they will perhaps be immortal. The whole will be a people of men, and not of children. Generation will not succeed generation, nor truth have in a certain degree to recommence her career at the end of every thirty years. There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice as it is called, no government. . .

Thus was Shaw's *Back to Methuselah* totally anticipated. It is not medicine but will ('attention') that beats death, and cerebration replaces copulation. In addition to this rampant Lamarckianism the population problem is recognised and solved. Where Federov would have us migrate

[30] Op. cit., ch. II, his italics.

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to other stars, Godwin is more futuristic: sex must cease—a view that would indeed have appealed to Federov, who very nearly arrived at it.

Physical immortality played a very small part in Godwin's subsequent controversy with Malthus, so we may content ourselves with the latter's opening blast, and omit the rest of their exchanges as irrelevant to our theme:

> I cannot quit this subject without taking note of these conjectures of Mr. Godwin and Mr. Condorcet, concerning the indefinite prolongation of human life, as a very curious instance of the longing of the soul after immortality. Both these gentlemen have rejected the light of revelation which absolutely promises eternal life in another state. They have also rejected the light of natural religion, which to the ablest intellects of all ages, has indicated the future existence of the soul. Yet so congenial is the idea of immortality to the mind of man, that they cannot consent entirely to throw it out of their systems. After all their fastidious scepticisms concerning the only probable mode of immortality, they introduce a species of immortality of their own, not only completely contradictory to every law of philosophical probability, but in itself in the highest degree narrow, partial and unjust. They suppose that all the great, virtuous and exalted minds, that have ever existed, or that may exist for some thousands, perhaps millions of years, will be sunk in annihilation: and that only a few beings, not greater in number than can exist at once upon the earth, will be ultimately crowned with immortality. Had such a tenet been advanced as a tenet of revelation, I am very sure that all the enemies of religion, and probably Mr. Godwin and Mr. Condorcet among the rest, would have exhausted the whole force of their ridicule upon it, as the most puerile, the most absurd, the poorest, the most pitiful, the most iniquitously unjust, and, consequently, the most unworthy of the Deity, that the superstitious folly of man could invent.[31]

(The second part of Professor Wiles' article will appear in our next issue.)

[31] T. R. Malthus, *First Essay on Population* (1798), Ch. 12.

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RUSSIAN TRAVELOGUES 1964-1965

JOTTINGS FROM A DIARY

Marshall Goldman

BACK IN LENINGRAD after four years. There are new apartment houses, some not too bad, and more goods in the stores. There are more stores, and some of the old ones have been well remodelled. The Europa Hotel has a new and attractive lobby, but half the buildings in the city are still in disrepair.

I was tired, after walking miles looking at the stores, so I went to a movie. It was a remarkable film, and the photography, while over-artistic at times, was interesting. The hero was a playboy of a sort, and the villains were three hard-working peasants; there was a good deal of ' romance ', the theme itself was a very romantic one, and—this made me gasp—they actually showed nude women! The picture would give the Chinese a fit.

I met a young foreigner who had tried to sell some stuff on the black market. Unfortunately, he drove down a one-way street the wrong way, and a policeman stopped him and took him and the prospective buyer to jail. The police, he said, were most polite. They told him he could continue his trip, but they would send his confession on ahead.

There seems to be plenty of food around; there's supposed to be a shortage of meat, but I can't say I noticed it. There are plenty of oranges and lemons, for which they must be using foreign exchange.

An odd thing happened today. I had been told that one of the characters in *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was serving as the chief guide in the Aurora Museum, the cruiser that took part in the revolution. Anyway I decided to go to see the Aurora in hope of seeing the naval officer who was in the story. The day I picked to go it was raining cats and dogs, but we went anyway. After a tour by his assistant, I asked to see the boss. He came out in the rain and we said a few nothings. I asked him if he were in the story. He said yes and tried to be very polite. Then I asked if I could take a picture of him. He said no but eventually agreed to have a picture taken of the whole group. I said I would take a Polaroid picture. So I took the picture, only to discover I had no film! Of all the stupid things! I could have taken a picture with the other camera of course, but by then I was too embarrassed to horse around any more in the rain. What a shame.

BY PLANE TO MOSCOW. They have put me in the Ukraine Hotel, which I don't like.

My work began in earnest today. I was told my guide would be at the Ukraine in an hour, later than scheduled, which naturally made me say I wouldn't wait that long but would go pick her up. There followed fifty minutes of confusion during which the car I had disappeared, and finally my guide came. She apologised and was surprised to hear that I had arrived on Saturday; she had thought I would be in late this afternoon. Obviously she had been assigned to me in advance and

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appeared to be quite experienced. (She has seen colour Polaroid. That's a mark of experience.) She is extremely capable and helpful. Immediately she placed the call to Professor Liberman for me and took over in an efficient manner. The call went through but Liberman was out; he's expected in tomorrow. She also got another Intourist girl to answer the phone for me while she made appointments for me. Frankly, I didn't expect much, but she got immediate results. Later she told me I would have an appointment tomorrow with the man I wrote to in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Anyway, I seem to be making some headway as normally you have to wait several days before anything gets done, so now I am very pleased.

Then we took a ride to the area round the University and the new housing. There is no doubt about it, Moscow has grown and is growing. I saw the Moskva, a new department store built in the area, and it is fairly close to Western standards. It is modern and clean and neat. Unfortunately, this store, too, is poorly located and there have been several complaints about its inability to make money. It has a service where a girl on television answers your questions, which of course didn't work. But the goods were of good quality and some—especially imported items from Poland and Czechoslovakia—were very reasonable in price. The Russian-made stuff was high in price and not very stylish. Then we drove out to the new kolkhoz market, which was to some extent based on one of the Star Supermarket stores in Boston, and it wasn't bad. Also, the prices were considerably lower. The tomatoes that yesterday sold for $7.75 were today about $4.50 a kilogram. Also, they were selling strawberries and cherries. The store still shows sloppy workmanship but better than most Soviet buildings. We saw piles of new housing construction all over the south-west region. Really immense and new. This extended out from the areas I had visited in 1960. They have been busy and there does seem to be a little improvement in the workmanship. My guide said they were building a new hotel near the Kremlin. Naturally, it will be the largest in the world. It will have 4,000 rooms. If the Ukraine is impossible with about 600 or so, that will just be murder.

Today I kept an appointment with one of the men to whom I had written in the Foreign Trade Ministry. I had found the Indians and Egyptians, as well as others, had foreign trade statistics that differed considerably from the Russian. He confirmed what I had suspected and what had been explained to me in the other countries I had visited. But while he was not too sure about whether or not the other countries all include imports paid for by loans in their regular statistics, he told me something else I never knew before and which was almost worth the trip alone. He said that some of their foreign trade statistics include the cost of specialists as well as the cost of the goods exported. In fact he implied that it might be possible to determine the drawings on foreign aid. I haven't seen this mentioned anywhere else. I can't use this information without caution, however, because the statistical qualifications are rather tricky. Anyway, this will allow me to keep rough track of aid drawings which so far I have been unable to do. Also, he said they normally don't give technical services alone (although I know of a few examples), so these figures should be quite complete. I called

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back later because I forgot to ask him if the goods are counted in the export totals the year they are sent out or the year the project is completed—he said the year the goods are sent out. This also means that the total figure of what heretofore I had thought of as trade is actually larger than the goods export figure since it has the technical services included in it. These technical services are also included in the Soviet import figure when they buy a complete plant. They think the figure is about 6 to 7 per cent of the value of such projects. They also implied that the technical services are included in the figure as they are incurred rather than when the project is completed. They suggested I ask more about this when I go to another of the offices I hope to see which is like our AID. Also, they said that services and goods given to the UN are not included in their totals. They therefore have to keep a separate bookkeeping system, which they do—a set of figures for the balance of trade (the present figures which appear in their statistical reports are higher) and the balance of payments (the present figures are lower).

They told me that in 1958, after the trouble in East European countries, they decided to freeze prices for five years with all the bloc countries. Now that the freeze is at an end, he implied that there would be many changes in the prices and that the price of Soviet oil to Eastern Europe would fall sharply. This would be due in part to the opening of the new pipe-line which would make the whole thing cheaper to send. So this may have been partial acknowledgment that existing prices are too high. I mentioned that some of the Poles I had seen told me they were investigating the idea of buying iron ore from Sweden instead of Russia. They immediately said, however, that of course I should know that it is not just that the Swedish price would be cheaper but that they must be able to sell something to the Swedes, and the Poles have nothing. I replied that I knew this and the Swedish bankers to whom I mentioned this also knew it, but I didn't mention that the Swedes also thought that there was some possibility of credit. I mentioned that for the Rumanians the situation was a lot easier. They had oil to export and the Swedes were also about to make a deal with them to sell electrical machinery—or the deal was already made—I forgot which. This the Rusians acknowledged as being a possibility, but they said the Rumanians didn't have that much oil and in fact had a law that only oil products (refined oil of one sort or another) could be exported, while the Russians had no such law and in fact sell crude oil as well. They also said that the Russians sell at the world price and don't want to take a lower price or pay a higher one. In any case it was quite an interview and whether all this information was available or not elsewhere, for me it was most interesting and valuable.

After that, I had a quick lunch and then went to call Liberman. My guide suggested that we just walk into the hotel where he was staying in Moscow and call, which I must say I thought was rather foolish. But it worked and we had a talk for about forty-five minutes. First a word about the man. He is quite a character. Very dynamic, persuasive, and attractive. Also he is very quick. In fact that was my problem. He was too quick. Since he had an appointment after our talk, he felt himself rushed and I had a difficult time getting everything

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down on paper. I asked him first of all if he had had a chance to read my article. He said he thought he had and that the Institute of World Economics had translated it. He said that many of the Western interpretations of what he said had been bad and in fact propaganda. I agreed with him but replied that I hadn't thought my article had been that way. He kindly said he excluded me. This was especially about the reference to profits being a new thing in the Soviet Union. So we discussed the implications of his proposals and what he thought they would mean and if in fact they would bring micro-economic efficiency and maintain macro-economic control. Unfortunately, we weren't able to spend as much time together as I would have liked.

I WENT TO THE BALLET in the new Kremlin Palace of Congresses. There really is no building like it. It is a poor place for the ballet, but the building is most impressive. It actually has good workmanship—something Russian buildings seem to lack. I was also surprised by the system they have for feeding people during the intermission. The top floor is covered with chairs and tables at which early season fruits and a wide assortment of beverages and sweets are placed. The salesgirls pass out the food in exchange for money at a pace I have never seen before in the Soviet Union. They freely take food from one another's counter and the lines move fast. Apparently they do not use a system of individual material responsibility. The girls must be responsible for what they sell jointly, but there is none of the cautiousness that such a system usually creates. As a result of the smoothness of the system, they were able to serve all the several thousand people who flocked upstairs in the short time allowed for intermission. They also have some very rare foods up there, like apples. I had the feeling from the way some of the patrons were buying big bags of the fruit that some people came to the ballet not so much to see the performances as to buy the goods which couldn't be found anywhere else in town.

The attitude of the people here is a strange one. There are several that I have known for a long time plus the four or five who have been in Cambridge (Massachusetts) and with whom I have spent a good deal of time. They have almost all been very cool or even unavailable. This kind of reaction in the Soviet Union is not new to me, but it is disappointing. Every place else in the world I have been so far on this trip, from Africa to Poland, not to mention Stockholm and Cairo, people have invited me to their homes or at least they have introduced me to their wives. This has been especially true of the people that have been to my home in Wellesley.

Today I went to see and hear an open defence of a thesis on concentration in American industry. It was by a woman about 55 years old. She was very nervous (as I would have been). It was possible to ask questions from the floor, but none was asked. Still, she was criticised by members of the faculty. However, one member of the panel did say he was happy to see that she had examined the American industrial scene in order to find ways to improve Soviet industry and had not indulged in cold war polemics. The other notable characteristic was that while all this was going on people walked in and out and talked and signed papers their secretaries brought in.

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This morning turned out to be quite interesting and a case where my newspaper reading came in quite handy. I had noted some time ago that the Russians had opened a showroom to display advertising equipment. Finally we got to it this morning. It had a nice sign out in front which I took a picture of, but inside it was rather meagre. It had one or two displays that had some interest, for example two monkeys who moved their hands and mouths and eventually ended up taking a picture. It was a display intended to sell cameras but it cost about 300 rubles. After some talk, the girl in charge suggested we go to Sokolniki Park where the American exhibition had been held and see a bigger advertising exhibition there. It was taking place in the long rectangular building which they still have in use but without the tile on the floor which has disintegrated. Anyway, the advertising display was quite spectacular. The whole building, including the second floor, was filled with materials and displays from Russia, the bloc countries, and the West. I took some pictures of the displays and slogans although they were all inside. I also managed to walk in on a conference that was being held. I guess it was the Second All-Socialist Advertising Conference, the first having been held in Prague several years ago. The speaker turned out to be one of my old friends, now the head of the advertising agency. All I did was say hello and he was quite friendly. I wanted to ask him just one question—how much was being spent on advertising—but I didn't. Instead I went about taking pictures and I think on one of the walls I took a picture which says how much was spent—17 million rubles in 1963 with sales of 81 billion. Anyway I have something to work with and compare with what I have in my book.

But there is no doubt in my mind that things are better. Yesterday we went by chance past our driver's home. He lives in a fairly new, clean, quiet apartment house far from the city and traffic but near the subway. There were good schools nearby and lots of little parks for the kids to play in. He had three rooms for five people and for a driver that isn't bad. The Soviet Union has a long way to go, but there is no doubt in my mind that they are at last on the road to better living conditions. The fact that oranges are abundant and there are other imported foods, like strawberries and cherries, shows that someone feels it necessary to import food (and non-basic type foods) at a time when foreign exchange is scarce.

Earlier that afternoon I went to the race track. It was like racing any place in the world. Admission ranged from 20 kopeks to 1 ruble 20. Bets could be placed for one ruble or two. There were rich and poor at the track. In the centre of the field, they were practising with jumping horses, some of them very impressive. In one race, the payoff was about 3,400 rubles for one ruble.

I saw a crowd lined up at the Manège between the Hotel National and the Kremlin; the posters said Glazunov. I thought it was for the composer. It turns out that Glazunov is a 35-year-old modern and apparently fairly good artist who has been unable to have a public showing before. I got the story of Glazunov from Mrs L., who had one of his paintings hanging in her apartment. (It wasn't a bad painting. I wouldn't say it was great, but certainly it was not socialist realism.) She said the showing had finally been scheduled for last Saturday. When

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it opened and all the diplomatic corps had assembled, a large number of pickets appeared (200–300) from the Artists Union complaining that Glazunov had been unfair to the Union's principles. Apparently the opening was then held up until the Assistant Minister of Culture could be summoned. He arrived in his Chaika and while everybody waited, he ordered the removal of two or three pictures and then allowed the show to open. Mrs L. thought the exhibit had been closed down after a week; when I drove by Friday evening at about 7.30 there were no people waiting to go in, and there seemed an undue number of police around. Until Friday night, I had seen no hint of any trouble in the papers or from anyone whom I had seen. The news simply doesn't exist officially.

One thing happened my last night in Moscow which helped to put everything back in perspective. I had begun to wonder what some of our friends had been talking about when they spoke of the discontent in Russia. On the way home from A's apartment, I got in a cab for about a ten-block ride to L's apartment. After the cab driver found I was neither English nor German but American, he said good. Then he asked me how I liked Moscow. I said there were some things I liked and some I didn't. That set him off. First, he asked me if I was a communist. When I said no, he started in with a flood of complaints that actually embarrassed me. Things were terrible—the pay was low, prices were high, the women did dirty heavy work on the roads and railroads (as before). He cited the production norms the women had to meet to earn their wages and he appeared to be very upset by them. It was really spontaneous and bitter. Unfortunately, it was a short ride. As I started to get out, I said ' Well, things will get better '. No, he said, they would get worse.

TASHKENT. I'VE NEVER BEEN here before, so I have no basis for comparison. But, unlike Moscow and Leningrad, there are no oranges or strawberries or fancy goods. There is new housing and prefabricated housing (built with French equipment, I understand), but the progress is not spectacular. Since there is so much of the old city to deal with, conditions do not seem that much better than they were in Africa, in Accra for instance. In fact they seem worse here, since Accra at least has some colour.

There are lots of Africans here. One of the largest groups is from Somalia. They are training about eighty Army officers. We had a long discussion about how silly it was for Ethiopia and Somalia to fight and spend money on defence and non-economic projects. I also met a hydroelectric engineering student from Ghana. He is preparing to work on the dam the Russians will build in Boui. I also met a meteorological student from Somalia who is here on a UN scholarship. They are all very friendly and since they speak English, we can talk to each other. Some of them, especially the meteorologist, even though they may be married and have kids at home, have a wild time with the women here.

This seems to me to be real exile. It's true that Tashkent has opera, ballet, and is the capital of the republic and all. Still, I have the feeling of isolation I haven't had since Wadi Halfa. It is strange, therefore, that the Russian young men here (not necessarily Uzbek) are so stylishly dressed. They all have narrow trousers and fancy shirts and sporty

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haircuts. The women don't seem to compare although I saw a few quite stylishly dressed. I really hadn't expected it. It may be like a kind of colonialism, i.e. to show the natives (Uzbeks) and yourself that you are not out of touch.

Some Somalis will be here for two years, and they are learning academic as well as military subjects. Foreign students are *not* indoctrinated here unless they want to be. They are not compelled to take the history course. The Cuban students, of whom there are almost sixty, are compelled to take this course, however. Apparently the Cubans are not too happy here. I think all the African students want to go to the United States. This is not because of ideology but because it is richer, has a better reputation, and they don't have to waste a year or two learning Russian.

This afternoon my guide took me to an old mosque in the old city. We got there in time for afternoon prayers. It was quite interesting. The building is used as headquarters for the Moslems of Central Asia. It also has a fantastic library of books (many sitting on open tables), dating back 700 or more years. There are old copies of the Koran written in gold. The mosque was in bad shape but since I am not going to Samarkand where the best mosques are, this was interesting for me. Also, it was set in the old part of town and that was also revealing as to just how poor the area is. Living conditions are no better than what I saw in the Sudan.

I have discovered there is air conditioning in my room which works two or three hours a day and makes it a little cooler.

Today I was invited, quite casually, by a man I had met on the plane, to visit a collective farm. We got so mixed up in hospitality that we never saw the fields or the equipment. I lost my chance but the hospitality was an experience in itself. Also, fortunately, we went down the wrong road so I saw another kolkhoz which was not so fancy and where the houses appeared to be much as they must have been fifty years ago. Some had electricity—many didn't.

Anyway, when we arrived at our farm, we were most warmly received by the party secretary until the chairman came. The people were quite obviously very well off. After I took some Polaroid pictures of my hosts, we went to visit two homes. The first belonged to one of the brigade leaders who obviously wasn't typical but who had a nice house. They had a refrigerator, a TV set, and a large radio and tape recording machine. To entertain us, they played the tape and the girls danced native dances like real professionals. I gave them a Polaroid picture and they were thrilled with it. They were learning English. Then we went next door to the home of the local doctor. He was quite young. Again a TV set and a refrigerator and quite comfortable surroundings. Of course they all had gardens and grapes. There I broke the first of my dietary laws. They offered us some tomatoes, the first fresh vegetable I have had on the trip except in Sweden, and an egg dish something like an omelette that was quite good. More was to come later.

We next visited a kindergarten where little children are little children. It wasn't the Page School in Wellesley and I wouldn't be too happy to see Karla there (maybe I might be. I'm sure she would shake them up a little). But it was very nice by Russian standards. Our next

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visit was back to more food. In the chairman's office was a sumptuous spread of early apples, tomatoes, little plums, and fish. We started out with a big dish of soup. It was the best soup I have had in the USSR. I had one of the plums and then the fish. I told them they should open a restaurant here on Sundays for the people from Tashkent. The chairman replied that their job was not to make money but to produce more food to help the workers. I said I thought a restaurant like this would help the workers just as much.

After the first two courses, we headed for the main course at the chairman's house. As an intermission, his three boys entertained on their piano and two accordions—one from Germany. They also had a TV, a car, an ice box, very comfortable rooms, two modern easy chairs. But, as I discovered, an open pit for a toilet which embarrassed them. The boys were about seventeen to fourteen. The father was Uzbek and the mother Ukrainian, a mixed mariage, and the boys were three of the handsomest fellows I have seen in one family. The elder son had a beard and I expect they can be a little wild, but they were very nice today and played for about forty-five minutes. Later their mother sang and was quite good. The father had been to the United States and Europe and was going to Brazil in January—hardly a typical Soviet traveller. But I liked him very much. He was completing correspondence school lessons for a bachelor's degree. The law is now that all farm chairmen must be college graduates.

Then came more food, including rice pilaff, a traditional Uzbek dish. The mother apologised that she didn't know that I was coming. Otherwise she would have prepared other native dishes. I told her I was glad she didn't know because I had already had too much. They gave me a present of some beautiful silk for my wife.

In between the food (thank heaven I don't drink), we did discuss the operation of the farm, its capital stock, its income (obviously very high), what my host had learned in the USA, and how the farm disposed of its produce. I found it interesting that commission sales to the cooperative store procurement agents are now paid up in full. When I wrote about this in 1958, only about 50 per cent was paid down—the remainder came only after the goods were finally sold. It was natural that this discouraged the farmers from selling goods on a commission basis. In response to my question about whether his kolkhoz would be turned into a sovkhoz, he said no. That was only done when a farm was unprofitable. His was going well.

HOUSING ESTATE

Henry W. Morton

SPRING had not yet come to Yaroslavl when I had my first of a series of interviews with Soviet officials. This historic Volga town of half a million residents lies north of Moscow, five train hours away. I had spent the day before, a Sunday, tramping along the snow covered walk which hugs the shoreline and then crossing the frozen river, which divides the city, and is three-quarters of a mile wide at this point. Its

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icy surface provides the only bridge for pedestrians and horse-drawn sleds. A new bridge is now being built, planned for completion in 1965.

Now it was Monday, and I walked the few blocks from my hotel to the City Soviet, a four-storey building, where I was to interview G., a former chairman of a state farm and now chairman of a housing committee of twenty-five members.

Since the 21st Party Congress in February 1959 these voluntary citizen organisations have been assigned an important role in running various official and semi-official jobs; they have multiplied rapidly. The idea is that as Soviet society moves closer to communism, more and more citizens need to become directly involved in the administration of government, until finally the professional civil servant becomes unnecessary. There is also the practical consideration that they can save large sums by enlisting the unpaid labour of the masses. In 1963 twelve million 'activists' were working in a variety of such organisations, many only recently formed, such as the People's Militia, Comrades' Courts, unpaid sections of local Soviets, Juvenile Commissions and Parent Committees, to name a few.

G. was the first chairman of a housing committee whom I interviewed. He was a robust looking man in his late sixties. Several steel teeth gleamed in his smiling mouth, and a rather large medal of red and gold, 'Hero of Socialist Labour', adorned his left lapel.

A housing committee functions for a small neighbourhood or a housing project and works closely with the local office of the city's housing administration and its party organisation. G. told me that his committee, which services forty apartment houses containing 8,000 residents in a newly constructed development, was formed at the suggestion of the housing administration. A meeting of residents was called at which the members of the committee were elected. (The usual practice is for a responsible party member to nominate previously designated public-spirited members who have time to spare.) The committee then elected their president (G.), his vice-president, and a secretary. His election was confirmed by the Executive Committee of the District Soviet, one of five into which the city of Yaroslavl is divided. Eighteen members of his committee (himself included) are pensioners, the rest are housewives. This preponderance of pensioners is found in most housing committees, since working residents lack the time necessary for regular participation.

Broadly defined, the committee's functions are to enlist citizen support in the upkeep of apartments, buildings, and grounds; to combat juvenile and other delinquent behaviour, in cooperation with the comrades' court; to enforce hygienic standards and conduct periodic inspections of apartments, halls, and stairways; to ensure that only those residents legally assigned to flats reside in them. It is also responsible for political education, and organises lectures, sponsors community dances, presents films, and supports other cultural and sports activities.

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The committee cooperates closely, often through overlapping membership, with other citizen groups, such as the parent committee which works with children after school and during the summer (this is particularly beneficial to children whose parents are both working), and with the women's council which organises sewing circles and other activities.

The party members of G.'s committee have policy meetings once a month, followed a week later by a meeting of the full committee. Presidents of the local comrades' court, parent committee, and women's council, if not elected, serve as *ex officio* members on the committee.

After chatting for almost an hour, during which time G. deferred politely to the Secretary of the City Soviet, I asked if I might see the neighbourhood where his committee functions. With the city's car at our disposal, we were driven to the outskirts of the town where, as in other Soviet cities, most of the new construction has taken place. In this section I saw some very attractive four-, five-, and even nine-storey structures, some with multi-coloured balconies reflecting Scandinavian influence, and all with flat roofs. G.'s section consisted of a series of quadrangles composed of four-storey buildings. Their entrances faced the play areas and benches within the rectangular confines, still covered with snow and away from the street, providing safety for children.

WE soon spotted six smiling elderly men and women, obviously members of the housing committee, standing in front of an entrance covered by shiny coloured signs proclaiming: Housing Administration Office No. 12, Housing Committee, People's Militia, Parent Committee, Comrades' Court, Polyclinic, and Juridical Consultation (lawyers giving legal advice for nominal fees). To the right hung a green bulletin board with the community's wall newspaper announcing news and activities concerning the housing project. After friendly greetings were exchanged, the manager of the office, a dominating, energetic man in his early forties, apparently highly respected by the committee members, joined the group, and I was given a Cook's tour of the premises by these enthusiastic people.

The first stop was the library. It was housed on the ground floor in a small apartment (two rooms plus kitchen). The space was provided free of charge by the housing administration and is paid for out of its cultural fund. The volunteer librarian, an elderly woman, clucked proudly over her neat display of 3,000 books and current periodicals. One of the rooms was reserved for children's books. Although there is the customary network of district libraries in Yaroslavl, having one on the grounds was of great convenience to residents.

Our next stop was a polyclinic housed in a four-room ground floor apartment. The equipment included a dentist's chair and drill, but no X-ray or fluoroscopic equipment. Outside a bulletin board posted the schedules of specialists in attendance (among others a hypnotist-therapist). The housing manager told me that most of the doctors live

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in the neighbourhood. The polyclinic is a great boon to patients who otherwise would have to visit the district medical centre quite a distance away. This was the only polyclinic I observed or read about sponsored by a housing committee—one reason why G.'s group has received public recognition.

I asked the housing manager about his experiences with volunteer repair brigades which have received much publicity in the press. They undertake minor repairs free of charge, and in some cities claim to have saved as much as 15 per cent of the maintenance budget. I gathered that G. was not very impressed by their performance. ' Yes, it is true ', he said, ' they make minor repairs and receive all materials free of charge.' But, he emphasised, he had 77 full-time workers on his staff who carried the brunt of the maintenance work in this and other developments under his care.

Rents are much lower than in the United States, usually accounting for less than 10 per cent. of a family's budget. The major problem for a Russian family is getting a good apartment of decent size. Despite a great deal of new building in the last ten years, many families still live crowded in one room, with several families sharing an apartment. In this development apartments ranged from one- to three-room flats; the largest had 41 square metres (approximately 17 ft. by 27 ft.) of living space.

In the middle of one of the quadrangles stood the Red Corner. It was a converted five-car garage turned into a recreation and meeting hall. (Since so few citizens own automobiles parking space is not a problem.) As we walked in two children were playing a game of table tennis. The two long sides of the walls were decorated with bold red banners and with photographs. One side featured the exploits of Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman astronaut and a native of Yaroslavl, of whom the local citizenry is extremely proud. At the other end of the entrance was a raised stage. A rather thin, elderly lady, chairman of the parents' committee, greeted us. She told me that they were building a two-storey structure for the Red Corner which would permit an expanded programme for children after school hours.

WHEN we returned to the office I asked about the function of the local comrades' court. This court, like the housing committee, is elected for two years. Its chief function is to settle family disputes and altercations between neighbours which result in disturbances of the peace. Much of the trouble is caused by the high incidence of drunkenness. The court's punitive powers are limited but effective. Among others it can hold a guilty party up to ridicule in the wall newspaper, fine an offender up to ten rubles, and in extreme cases suggest his expulsion from the community. The very act of being tried by and in the presence of one's peers is an exercise in social pressure not only on the accused but on the entire membership.

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A member of the court told me, 'Since it has been functioning we have had relatively few cases, only seventy in three years, and only a few came to trial. A member of the court lives in each building and works with offenders. Our main task is a preventive one. We try to get them to apologise and to mend their ways. So far we have not resorted to the wall newspaper even in cases where drunken husbands beat their wives. And so far no one has been expelled. The heaviest penalty the court administered was a sentence of fifteen days' manual labour in the project, seven hours daily at low pay.'

Upon leaving I asked G. whether I could come back in the evening to attend a housing committee session. He had mentioned in passing that his committee was holding its monthly meeting. He shot a questioning glance at the Secretary who answered, 'Why not? It's a public meeting.'

I arrived promptly at seven o'clock. In the Red Corner the table-tennis board had been replaced by rows of chairs. I was led to a seat up front. The hall was three quarters full. I had hardly been seated when G. strode to the centre of the stage and announced that, because the member who was to have given the main report had fallen ill, the meeting was postponed until the following week. I could not help suspecting that this was done on my account. Perhaps in this part of the provinces they were not sure how much a visiting American should be permitted to see and hear. I should emphasise that this was *not* a typical incident. In other parts of the Soviet Union I was permitted to attend organisational meetings.

Committee members are not dragooned. The duties they perform are not burdensome and they find their work useful and pleasant. It provides a useful and satisfying occupation for pensioners and housewives with time on their hands, and if they work with exceptional diligence they will be rescued from anonymity by having awards conferred upon them. Perhaps the press, ever eager to present worthwhile examples for others to emulate, will bring their achievements before a large public. No doubt, too, the pleasure of serving the community is spiced with a sprinkling of power. While the committees are no threat to housing administrators, they are considered nuisances by some, but their very existence stimulates better administrative performance. The work done by the various citizen groups saves the state large sums of money; more important, 'being involved' brings to many citizens a new awareness of the problems of local government and the impossibility of simple solutions. Certainly they are *not* a pressure group in the American sense. (When pensioners councils organised themselves in several cities and asked for special privileges they were quickly disbanded.) Citizen groups are intended to carry party policy to the grass roots and to serve as sounding boards of local public opinion for party and state officials. They are not expected to act independently.

Most housing committees do not provide as many services as the one described here, nor do they all function smoothly. On that same

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Monday in Yaroslavl the local paper carried a searing criticism of housing committees and ordered them to get down to work. The chief obstacle facing the citizens' groups is public apathy and the difficulty of attracting more members and stimulating public interest in collective improvement.

Most citizens I asked at random knew little about their housing committees except that they existed. They were too immersed in living their own lives and working out their own problems. As one taxi driver in Kiev put it, 'I'm not interested in what my housing committee does. I leave that to my wife's cousin. He's interested in such things. Me .... I like to take it easy when I get home, and on my day off I go to the stadium to watch my team play soccer.'

(*I should like to thank the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, which made my visit to the USSR possible.*)

AT THE THEATRE

Mark G. Field

IN between visits to hospitals and interviews with a variety of people in the medical profession, we found we had a free evening, and that the play *Palata* (The Ward), recommended to us by a Soviet acquaintance, was being given at the Maly Theatre. I asked Intourist whether we could get tickets and they said it was much too late to send someone over to get them, but that they would give us a special form-letter addressed to the theatre manager (the administrator, as he is called in these parts), and we might well be able to obtain seats. So we went to the theatre, fought our way through the throngs chanting 'Have you got an extra ticket?' and once in the lobby handed our slip of paper to the woman behind the box office window. After the briefest delay, we were handed two tickets, for which we paid two rubles apiece. The play was incredibly tedious, more suited to day-time serial television of the type that sells soap to bored American housewives than to the stage of the capital of a major country. I suppose the nearest equivalent would be one of the early Dr Kildare movies, with the hospital, illness, operations, and death serving as the major props for the drama, but so full of stock situations and the usual sentimental clichés that I had trouble keeping awake. What I found more interesting were the sets used for the play: they were quite modernistic, representing a type of hospital often seen nowadays in the West but which, in my many visits to Soviet medical institutions, I had never seen. I will be mercifully short about the play and note only a few items: one of the characters is a writer, who is not on good terms with his wife and who has entered the hospital for a very serious operation. The drama revolves partly on

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whether he will or will not survive the operation. And indeed the last scene of the play takes place when the surgeon announces to his wife and to his boy that 'Father remains father', i.e. he will live. Another character which, of course, is not stock in the West, is the ever-complaining communist bureaucrat who has come in for an appendectomy and who makes a nuisance of himself all the time, disturbs the other patients, insults everybody, in other words, plays the 'negative' character so indispensable to the Soviet didactic stage. The only political reference was when another protagonist, this time a school teacher, accuses the bureaucrat of being like a little Stalin, to which the bureaucrat arrogantly replied that under Stalin that kind of talk would not have been allowed. There is a gasp in the audience when this dramatic confrontation takes place. The unpleasant character says that as soon as he gets out of hospital he will use his influence to see that the teacher gets fired from his job. In other words he plays to the hilt the role of the entrenched villain who from the safety of his powerful position exploits and lords it over everybody else. He also taunts the (good) schoolteacher as well as a (good) worker by saying that he earns much more money than they do. It is half implied that some of this money is dishonestly acquired. The blistering answer he gets is that you cannot judge people only by the money they earn. The arrogant bureaucrat is also asked whether he knows how much the doctors who are treating him earn, particularly the young resident physician who has made the tests to determine what the different patients in the play are suffering from. When he is told the absurdly low salaries medical personnel receive, our bureaucrat can only snort in disdain. (It may be noted that approximately six months later salaries of Soviet medical personnel were increased by about 25 per cent.)

The inconsistency of the negative person showed through when he referred to his own operation as one of major magnitude because of the dangers and the sufferings it had exposed him to, but when the conversation veered to the physician who had performed the operation, he said that it did not require much skill, that there was really nothing to it. In addition, the negative character is described as a mollycoddle, who cannot stand any pain, and who behaves atrociously in the ward, in other words, the scared, despicable bully. The worker, on the other hand, is a strong, positive character: he has to have his arm amputated, and he takes it bravely, like a man, informing the audience along the way that during the war he was a soldier at the front. A minor character, mostly for comic relief, is a sleepy nurse who is studying to become a physician, a process which is encouraged nowadays in the Soviet Union. Nurses and feldshers are encouraged to go back to medical school, after they have worked for some time in medical institutions.

I also found it quite interesting that the two doctors in the play (the resident physician and the old, fatherly, experienced surgeon) were both men—indeed, I do not remember a single woman physician in the

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entire play, and this in a country where 75 per cent of doctors are female. But I suppose the play was as realistic as the furnishings!

Of greater interest, to me at least, than the play was the audience. It sat completely (almost religiously) engrossed in it, identifying it seemed, and vicariously participating in the action on the stage. This may well have been because the play, however trite it may have appeared to a Westerner, dealt with intensely human and personal problems, not with political or ideological themes ('boy loves girl who loves tractor'), of which the Soviet public has had a surfeit. Even destalinisation was brought down to earth in human rather than cardboard terms.

KIEV—MOSCOW—LENINGRAD

Elizabeth Pond

THE TRAIN REACHED KIEV after midnight. An Intourist guide met me, of course, and even at that late hour and in pitch darkness he prattled on about the city: 'On your left is a statue of Nicholas Shchors. Do you know who he was? He formed the Red Army in the Ukraine. To your right is the botanical garden with 110 varieties of . . .'

My guide attended the Institute of Physical Culture for two years after secondary school and then began attending the university at night while working. (The evening programme takes six years to complete.) He has curly brown hair and is fully automated with all possible data. He reads Konstantin Simonov (though he did say that some people like Rozhdestvensky). His favourite phrase is 'Science tells us . . .' His English is quite good most of the time, with slightly off-beat vocabulary, but a question such as 'little theatre' is apt to draw an answer about puppets. It was with some relief that I heard him say at noon of the first day, 'Well, I'll see you at 10 tomorrow.'

The Kiev railway station has been modernised since Babel's time, but it is still full of Ukrainian peasants, and women still carry 150-pound sacks over their shoulder without staggering. It's still true that if a train doesn't originate in Kiev, say, and a person wants to board it in Kiev, he can do so only by arriving at the station an hour before the train is due, when any remaining tickets go on sale.

Hotel dining rooms in Kiev are patronised largely by amply built women in cardigans and men who look as if they would be the pillars of the Rotary Club in the American Middle West. Many of them wear little lapel pins indicating their profession or their enterprise. You get the feeling when a strange lapel pin is seated across the table from you that the obligatory response, even if it came direct from a *New Yorker* cartoon, is 'You like to ski?' or 'I gather you're from Irkutsk.'

Nagibin's movie 'The Chairman' packs in the crowds. It has some nice touches—there was no sound when the women covered their ears as the collective farm chairman was swearing at them—but the movie is hardly in the ranks of 'Ballad of a Soldier.'

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It is even more difficult, if that's possible, to talk with people here than it was on the train. It is certainly much more difficult than it was four years ago when I was here in the summer. Of course there are fewer opportunities for mixing in the winter than in the summer, especially in Kiev. The cafés are impossible and close at 10 in any case. There is no music anywhere except in the rather forbidding Intourist hotels. The one time I did start to talk with some people—and that not on politics or other sensitive subjects—we all became guests of the police for three hours. The Kievans involved were three sculptors and we were hauled off on a charge of drinking cognac and lemonade in an atelier without possessing a licence for a restaurant. One of the more amusing moments at the police station occurred when one of my interrogators greeted with indignation the information that Intourist had fined me for my late arrival in Kiev. Russian argot is rich in names for a Black Maria. The two most expressive are 'little lobster neck' and 'garbage collector (musorskaya)'. The latter is apparently not used in polite company.

I have run into the red armbands only in the subways. The druzhinniki, or Decembrists, as they are not too flatteringly known (the law establishing this institution was passed in December), have a particular reputation, however, as the terrors of the public toilets. They take quite seriously their task of rigid enforcement of cleanliness. I did see one example of 'social control' exercised on behalf of a customer today and was rather cheered. The woman in question was buying a lemon at a kiosk, and there were several impatient women queued behind her. The vendor gave the customer a lemon of a lemon, as it were, and the customer rejected it. This was repeated with three successive lemons, but instead of grumbling that the first customer ought to accept one and be done with it, the women in line scolded the vendor and insisted that she come up with a good lemon.

Kiev has the first-in-the-world mile-long bridge of arc-welded steel. The significance of this escapes me, but my guide told me about it once, and a collegium of Soviet citizens on various *kommandirovki* on the Moscow train confirmed the fact. If one may judge from the dress on overnight trains, Russian men go for blue pyjamas, either striped and loose-fitting or solid-colour and Bugs-Bunny style. The difference between hard and soft cars seems to consist of a mattress, free sugar for your tea, and wooden hangers for your coats.

The approach to Moscow is unmistakably heralded by birches and cranes. I received a real Moscow welcome of 22 degrees of frost.

Moscow: Despite *Novosti's* best breathless writing, the fashions in the USSR are no threat to Paris. One of the most modish shops for women's wear in Moscow is Svetlana, and there are quite a few bridal shops in the city where one can buy lingerie that is nicer than the GUM-type tricot line of rather startling purples and pinks. Stockings come in every shade. Some shoes are imported from Italy. (Not, one Intourist guide explained to me, because Soviet shoes are in any way inferior, but because Soviet women, like women the world over, like to look a little different from their neighbours.) High-heeled boots are available in Moscow, but worn in Leningrad, and not vice versa. Stretch pants have not yet hit the Soviet Union.

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Some attractive women's suits and dresses may be ordered (though there are intervals of days and weeks when shops will take no more orders, presumably because they are working to capacity). The small shops with ready-made wear are a shopper's nightmare. Dresses are hung in a cascade behind the counter with nothing visible except the shoulders and necklines of the dresses. There may be one, or at most two, curtained-off circles to one side of the counter for trying on dresses. One or two clerks handle the requests of whoever is in the 'dressing room' and those of maybe ten women crowded at the front of the counter pointing to particular shoulders that they hope will turn into attractive dresses.

The department stores are better, with dresses and coats out on racks, but the choice of clothing there is not too satisfactory. Department stores here seem to be a cross between Victoria Station and the village fairs of Gogol's Russia, with separate stalls for each item. In some department stores there is a counter where customers may take material, explain to a cutter what they want to do with it and have her cut up the material—freehand and with no pattern, but apparently successfully. In materials a dreadful matted velvet sells anywhere from 5 to 10 rubles per meter. Buttons are strictly utilitarian, with maybe one or two timid designs. Clothes in general are extremely expensive. A striped silk blouse costs 30 rubles. Women's red shoes run from 10 to 37 rubles. Finnish raincoats of a synthetic material cost 75 rubles. Limp-hanging men's suits run from 30–70 rubles; English suits are available at higher prices.

The young men about town, however, prefer to buy suits off Western tourists. These they then save for evening wear. They seem to have worked out to a fine art the complexities of locating tourists who are approximately their size and willing to sell. Muscovites who are casting about for clothes for themselves quickly shade over into 'speculators' who are interested in making a fast buck or a fast ruble, depending on which way the trade is going. Whatever overtones of free enterprise these operators may have in the abstract, they tend to be less than desirable characters personally. Half of one's chance acquaintances in Moscow are the kind that sidle up and instead of whispering 'I've got some pictures', whisper 'I can get gold ikons for you'. The question 'How much did it cost?' is not so much a conversational gambit as an opening of negotiations.

There are quite a few young people with money floating around Moscow. They can be found in the hotel restaurants any night of the week. The women seem to be somewhat more sophisticated than their escorts and come complete with stylish boredom. (The men are bored too, but not stylishly.) The women wear eye shadow and bouffant hairdos. It would be nice if men's hairstyles caught up with women's —or at least advanced sufficiently to get rid of the straight-across-the-back-of-the-neck chop. Sedate ballroom dancing is about par for the hotel-circuit course. Of an evening one or two girls may swing into more hippy dances, leaving their partners more or less to improvise for themselves, but those who do so are very conspicuous.

I tipped a waitress heavily today because she brought me a menu after a wait of only five minutes, my tea along with the meal as I

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requested, and my check after a wait of only ten minutes. In the time I have spent waiting in restaurants in a week I have read *Pravda* every morning, half of *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, and half a novella in *Yunost*.

If I hear *Moscow Nights* one more time I think I will rip the offending radio out by its roots!

The American movies that are best known here seem to be *War and Peace*, *Rhapsodie*, and *Tarzan*. Fellini and some of the Polish directors are popular with the young intelligentsia. The new wave of Czech movies hasn't hit the Soviet Union yet.

In order for me to visit American friends at Moscow University I had to get the authorisation of two signatures and a Foreign Department stamp. Or, more accurately, my friends had to spend a morning getting the signatures and the stamp before I could enter the portals. I poked my head into one meeting on Vietnam at the university. A girl with beautiful long braids was reading from a paper. Many in the Vietnamese audience were talking or joking among themselves and not paying much attention to the speaker. There always seems to be a good turnout, however, for such extracurricular activities as a gathering at the Smolenskaya subway stop for a march on the American Embassy. The bulletin board on Vietnam at the university sports what must be among the most raw propaganda put out in the Soviet Union today.

Reactions to my mention of being held by the Kiev police include: (1) 'that happens', (2) attribution of the arrest to trouble with speculators, and (3) (my favourite) continuation of the prior conversation without the flicker of an eyelash just as if I had never spoken.

Leningrad: The hot water in the Hotel Astoria smells like permanent wave lotion, and there is one elevator here that is operated by a smiling grey-haired lady and is a real home-away-from-home, with a sort of couch, magazines, and foreign (communist) newspapers. Audiences dress up more for the theatre here than in Moscow. The women in Leningrad in general have more chic than in Moscow, as might be expected. Their coats have more of a cut to them, and there are Finnish mittens and scarves around.

I have now had pointed out to me by every coat check man in every hotel and theatre in Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad that my coat lacks a loop to hang it from. Depending on my tip, some supplement this information with various bits of extraneous news such as 'The premier of Iran died from an assassin's bullet'. The most popular time-consumer for garderobe employees in theatres is dominoes. The myth that renting opera glasses enables you to get your coat faster after a performance is without foundation in fact.

I can't help feeling partial to Leningrad, both for its beauty and for its history. And I'm glad that despite various crazes for name changes Nevsky Prospekt remains Nevsky Prospekt. If I were condemned on a return visit to see only one building, I think I would choose the palace that Catherine the Great built for Potemkin that subsequently stabled Paul's horses, housed the Duma, and served simultaneously as the base of operations for the provisional government (in its left wing) and the soviet (in the right) in 1917.

Some explanations at the Hermitage: Rembrandt's life ended in 'tragic loneliness' when 'Holland's culture began to lose its democratic

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character and art began to move away from a realistic tendency'. The Impressionists worked well with light, colour, and observation of changing nature, but their fixation with the impressions of the pure observer 'lost them the possibility of addressing themselves to a larger ideative work'. Picasso's work, even though subjective, didn't take a vacation from the real world, but his 'enthusiasm for formalistic problems . . . more than once led to the loss of a generally understandable language in many of his works'. He illustrates the basic contradiction of a progressive contemporary artist in the capitalist world.

The Soviet officials on the Finnish border couldn't have shown less interest in what I was taking out of the country. The only thing they wanted to see was any books I had bought in the Soviet Union. They were more exacting with Soviet citizens going out, and they lifted all the seats to inspect the storage space underneath. 'Are they looking for stowaways?' whispered one Russian woman who had lived in Odessa long enough to have acquired a Ukrainian accent but had never heard of Babel.

A DAY IN BIROBIDJAN

Daniel Lourie

WHEN we got out of the plane at Khabarovsk I was met by my guide, Luda, a pleasant young girl who turned out to have been born in Birobidjan. I immediately announced that I would like to visit Birobidjan since it was so near. She said she would see if it could be arranged. It was Sunday so she would have to wait for the following day. The Russians who stood around watching the passengers arriving looked just like Russians in European Russia. The only difference was that they were all young, in their twenties and thirties. This was the impression made by all the 170 people on the TU114, and it was exactly the same in the city of Khabarovsk—almost everyone Russian, very few Asiatics, and most people in their twenties or thirties, or else young children. Many of the older people might have been Jews.

My guide suggested that we take a walk along the river bank. On the way we met some gypsies. Luda said that they move on every few months. She also said they have a theatre in Moscow. As for Birobidjan, she explained that this is a region where Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews live together. There was nothing particularly Jewish to see there. She had left Birobidjan in 1948 when her father, who had been director of the State Bank, had been appointed to a post in Khabarovsk.

The main street of Khabarovsk looks like a provincial town in Western Russia. As such it is not without a certain charm. At the far end is a huge square around which are situated various institutes of higher learning. The city is spread out along the banks of the broad river Amur. It is growing in a planned and orderly way, without the haphazard sprawl of older cities.

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At the Amur end of the main street, Marx Prospect, there is a large memorial to the heroes of the Russian Civil War. Luda explained that there was no memorial to the Second World War since no battles took place in Khabarovsk. Later on in Birobidjan I saw a memorial to the soldiers of the region who had died fighting fascism. When I returned to Khabarovsk I pointed this out, and Luda agreed it was unusual. It was almost as if Birobidjan had dedicated a memorial to the Jews who had died in the European holocaust.

Next day Luda informed me at 9 a.m. that permission had been denied for my trip to Birobidjan. She said she had pleaded for me, but to no avail. However, at 11.30, while we were touring the Institute of Railway Engineers in Khabarovsk, a phone call came and Luda came back and announced that permission had been granted. We took a bus to meet the director of Intourist. He was a young, active, friendly man, who gave me the times my trains would depart and return. At 3 in the afternoon I was on the train. Luda found a young man who was going to Birobidjan and asked him to see that I got to the hotel, saying it was near the station. She suggested some of the important things to see in Birobidjan: the new House of Culture, the machine parts factory, the park. The young man on the train turned out to be a Jew who spoke Yiddish. He wore an aviator's cap and said he was on *kommandirovka* to fix a plane in Birobidjan. He said he had never been to Birobidjan before. He had heard there was nothing Jewish about it, but nevertheless the Jews were proud that there was a region in their name.

We crossed the railway bridge and were now in the Jewish autonomous region. The first place we passed, Pokrovka, was some sort of port. After an hour the train halted for ten minutes at a town called In. This town had a sign in Yiddish and Russian. It was the first town we passed which had a sign in Yiddish. The signs in the other villages had all been in Russian only. After In, Yaakov, the young man, pointed out that many of the villages had Yiddish names transliterated into Russian.

At In I asked a woman selling newspapers and magazines if she had anything in Yiddish. She seemed surprised and said she had not. A man came up to me and asked me angrily why I wanted Yiddish magazines. 'Go to Birobidjan. You will find enough Jews there. Where are you from?' I replied 'London'. He walked off in disgust.

As the train passed through the Jewish autonomous region, as it is always called there, the landscape appeared green and pleasant. There were birch trees everywhere. The farms looked like Russian farms anywhere else.

A LITTLE before six the train pulled into Birobidjan city. Yaakov wanted to take a taxi to the hotel, but I told him the guide had said the hotel was about two streets from the station and that we should walk. We came to the Hotel Vostok, a two-storey affair. I entered and asked for a room. The receptionist said the hotel was full. I said I had to

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have one. An elderly chambermaid arrived. I thought she was Jewish and started speaking to her in broken Yiddish. She immediately became friendly and told the woman at the desk to give me a room. The receptionist asked if I would mind sharing a room; I replied I would not mind. However, in the end I had the room to myself. Later on I noticed the chambermaid taking two mattresses into the manageress' office and spreading them on the floor. This was for the two people whom I had evidently done out of their room. The price of the room was cheap compared to the usual Intourist rates, only one ruble, ten kopeks (ten shillings, or $1.40).

It would soon get dark and I was anxious to find the library as quickly as possible. I walked down Lenin Street on which the hotel and many of the older cultural institutions of Birobidjan city are situated. I eventually came to the library which was named after Shalom Aleichem, but it was already seven and closed. Some other people had also come to the library to return books, but were too late. I noticed that all the books they were carrying were in Russian, none in Yiddish.

Before this I had gone to the post office and bought out their supply of the Yiddish language newspaper *Birobidjaner Stern*, three copies. This was the first sign I had seen of this paper. It was soon evident that most people read the Russian language *Birobidjanskaia Zvezda*. There were no local views of Birobidjan on sale either at the post office or railway station, only standard Russian greetings cards with flowers. The guide in Khabarovsk was later surprised at this. The postcard machine got stuck. I reported this to a post office employee and she hurried to open it. A curious feature of the stamps on sale was that the four kopek one was a picture of General Gamarnik, the brother-in-law of the Hebrew national poet, Bialik; Gamarnik died in 1937. Later on in New York some one told me that people there had heard of this stamp but no one had seen a copy until I had put one on the postcard to my friend.

I looked in to the office of the *Birobidjaner Stern* and the *Zvezda*. The office on the third floor of the *Stern* was empty. But I took note of the magazines on the shelves. They were *Bolshevik*, *Agitator*, and one book in Yiddish, an old edition of the *Short Course of the History of the CPSU*. There was a note in Yiddish on the desk. Downstairs was the printing press sent by well-wishers in the United States in 1936.

Near the library I passed the museum which still has a sign in Yiddish, saying 'Regional Museum', and also another sign in Russian saying 'Closed for repairs'. Most of the buildings on this street were wooden. Two streets further down, Shalom Aleichem street, were new four-storey apartment buildings. There was also a large clothing factory.

The 'Roll of Honour' at the town square lists the Vostok restaurant for good food, but I went to the station restaurant. There I encountered my friend Yaakov, who had, he said, come to fix a plane. A sad faced young Russian sat at my table. He proved to be the doctor of

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the village of Bidjan, 80 kilometres to the south. He had been there only a month and this was his first visit to Birobidjan city. He came originally from Baikalia. He said the population of Bidjan was 1,500, almost all Russians though there were a few Jews. I now realised that Jews had for the most part left the villages in the region. Most of them were now in Birobidjan city, where they number between a third and a half of the population. The other centre for Jews was Obluchye, further to the west. There were still Jews living in the village of Waldheim, I was told.

During the evening the young people strolled up and down one of the main streets by the cinema, as they do everywhere. The cinema, formerly the Jewish theatre, closed in 1948, still has 'Kino' in faded Hebrew and Russian letters on top of it.

I asked a Russian to direct me to the new House of Culture. This he did. When I asked the lady in charge if she spoke Yiddish she replied 'Why should I, since you speak Russian?' My Russian is very broken, so I realised she just did not want to speak Yiddish.

Later on I asked two Jewish boys to direct me to the synagogue. They seemed pleased to do this, and immediately asked me if I was from Israel. I replied no, from England. They asked what I thought of Professor Bernal, the scientist. They had no idea who the prime minister of England was, had vaguely heard there was a Queen, and had heard of Harold Wilson whom they liked. In America, their hero was Cyrus Eaton, and in Israel Mikunis, the leader of the communist party.

The synagogue, as expected, was far out, on Chapaev street. It was a wooden structure slightly bigger than expected. One of the boys explained he had a Hebrew name. He hoped to leave the region to study, and said that all the young people wanted to do that.

When I went to bed I tried to sort out my first impressions of Birobidjan city. There really was nothing Jewish about the place, although there were plenty of Jews. Economic conditions seemed to be quite good. The younger generation felt no special loyalty to the region and wished to leave it in order to study. A conversation in Yiddish with the elderly chambermaid revealed the sadness of an older person that the Jewish region really wasn't very Jewish at all. She had been there twenty-seven years, and had been one of the earlier settlers. She had come from Vinnitsa in the Ukraine, which really had been a Jewish city. As for the younger people, how could they learn Yiddish if they had closed the Yiddish school? In any case why should they learn Yiddish?

The following morning I got up at six because I had to leave on the 8.20 train, and I wanted to take photographs. There was not much light yet for photographs. I took one of the House of Culture in black and white. I had one more picture to finish off my reel of twelve pictures. At 7 a.m. I mounted the railway bridge and took a view of Birobidjan city. However, when I came down a militiaman approached me and in a very friendly way asked me to come to the police post at the railway station as I should not have taken a photograph from the bridge. There

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I spent an hour conversing with the policemen, at least two of whom were Jews. The Jewish policemen wanted me to sign my confession in Yiddish that I had taken the picture, but I thought it was safer to sign it in Russian. The policemen confiscated the film, and let me go. They hoped I had nothing against them.

On the train I found the same young man who had said he had come to fix a plane. It all seemed such a coincidence.

Back in Khabarovsk I did not tell Luda that I had been arrested. She had told me not to take a picture of anything I shouldn't. She said, 'You see there is nothing to see there'. I told her that there was something to the place. She replied that it was a good place for a rest.

At 6 in the evening, a guide on the Khabarovsk-Nakhodka train handed back to me my film, developed, minus the one offending shot of Birobidjan from the railway bridge.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

PHILOSOPHY: THE NEW PROFESSIONALISM

Eugene Kamenka

SOVIET PHILOSOPHY, WE USED TO SAY, is anti-philosophy. The dialectical materialist was not a thinker, but a megaphone; Soviet philosophical books and journals showed complete unwillingness to distinguish between the technical discipline of philosophy and the crudest kinds of political ideology; when communist writers did treat philosophical questions they did so with blinkered partisanship, alternating between naïve exhortation and vile abuse.

'Philosophy', Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (4.112), 'is not a body of doctrine but an activity.' The main quarrel of Western philosophers with their Soviet counterparts was precisely on this issue: the conclusions reached by dialectical materialists were dogmatic in the worst possible sense and the activity by which they reached them was, for the most part, not philosophical. In Soviet philosophical writing, argument played a subordinate, often almost insignificant, role; the 'creative developments' of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism were patently political, and not philosophical or intellectual, creations. The standard Soviet response to a serious philosophical criticism was normally an *ignoratio elenchi*, coupled with a systematic attempt to shift the argument to a non-philosophical plane by linking the opposing view with a political motive or climate and thus 'reducing' it to a crude philosophical *ism* of the past, to which it did not on the face of it belong. In these circumstances, having the correct political attitude easily became an acceptable substitute for philosophical acumen and philosophical knowledge. The fact that some of the older philosophers under Stalin had a certain amount of (fairly traditional) philosophical knowledge provided some embellishment for their work, but not an obvious impetus to it.

The vices of the official, dogmatic Soviet philosophy erected on the intellectual corpses of the warring schools of the 1920s were still displayed—all too clearly—in the third edition of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary*. This was edited by the two faithful Party dogmatists, M. M. Rosental and P. F. Yudin, in 1951, and issued in a printing of 1,200,000 copies. That edition devoted fifteen columns to Stalin, compared with three each for Lenin, Marx, Hegel, and Aristotle, two for Plato and one for Socrates; it gave eight columns to Mao Tse-tung and six columns to the Stalinist expert on cultural matters, A. A. Zhdanov. Boris Souvarine has said some justly scathing things about it in *Preuves* (August 1952 and May 1964). He noted that it described Bertrand Russell as 'the English reactionary philosopher . . . militant ideologist of Anglo-American imperialism; sworn enemy of the Soviet Union and an enemy of the anti-imperialist democratic camp . . . one of the inciters towards a new world war, appealing for the destruction of the Soviet

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Union and the people's democracies through the use of atomic weapons'. John Dewey was 'a reactionary bourgeois American pedagogue, confirmed idealist; ideological sword-bearer for American imperialists seeking world hegemony, participant in dirty campaigns of calumny against the Soviet Union', and the brief reference to Karl Jaspers (under *Existentialism*) said that 'many of the propositions of his philosophy are to-day taken over directly into *revanchist* ideology in Western Germany'. In that same third edition there were no entries for Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, for Zeno, Protagoras and Leucippus (not to mention Diogenes Laertius or Diogenes the Cynic), for William of Occam, Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, for Machiavelli, Pascal, Boehme, Jacobi, Goethe, and Herder (as Souvarine noted). But there was an entry, still there in the fourth edition of 1954–55, for Khachatur Abovian, nineteenth century Armenian writer, 'democrat-enlightener . . . who underwent the beneficial influence of Russian democratic culture'(!)—though not, as far as one can see, of any serious philosophic training or thought.

Other times, other customs. In the fourth, revised edition of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* of 1954–55, prepared after Stalin's death but before Khrushchev's secret speech, the entry on Stalin was already reduced to nine columns and that on Marx increased to six. Aristotle still had two and a half columns against Zhdanov's five, but Bertrand Russell was now 'the famous English logician and philosopher, one of the leaders of contemporary idealism . . . one of the creators of *logistics* (q.v.), one of the leaders of *neo-realism* (q.v.) and later of *logical positivism* (q.v.). The philosophy of Bertram Russell is one of the varieties of subjective idealism, very close to Machism . . . . In sociology . . . Russell ignores the decisive role of the class struggle in history and operates with metaphysical abstractions, "man in general" (with unchangeable instincts and inclinations) and "society (or the State) in general". Of late, Russell has been advocating the banning of atomic weapons and the reduction of international tension'. Dewey, still thoroughly out of favour, was nevertheless treated more intelligently and more politely—he no longer participated in 'dirty campaigns' but only 'masked his struggle against the scientific, materialistic view of the world in a pseudo-scientific phraseology'. The philosophy of Jaspers was still only mentioned in the article on Existentialism and remained a weapon 'in the armoury of German imperialism.'

NOW, YET ANOTHER NINE YEARS LATER, we have before us the new (in effect, fifth) edition of what used to be the *Short Philosophical Dictionary*. It is still edited by Rozental and Yudin, but has a somewhat gayer cover and a new title: *The Philosophical Dictionary*.[1] The internal arrangement and format is much the same: the number of two-column pages has fallen from the 700-odd of the third edition to 542 (the fourth had 567); but the size of type has also been reduced, so that column for column the number of words is about the same in each edition. The 9-15 columns on Stalin, and the frequent references to him in other articles, have completely disappeared: the only mention of Stalin I could find was in the (new) entry on *cult of personality*; the

[1] M. M. Rozental and P. F. Yudin (eds.), **Filosofskii Slovar.** Moscow, 1963. U.K. price: 20s.

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mention was not favourable. Zhdanov and Mao Tse-tung (Mao still had seven columns in 1954–55) have been erased from the dictionary; so have Dimitrov and Kalinin and the 'democrat-enlightener' Khachatur Abovian. Marx now has four columns of fairly straight factual biography, listing works, activities, and places of residence in a tone of subdued admiration. The entry on Bertrand Russell now begins: 'English philosopher, logician, public figure. R. made a considerable contribution to the development of mathematical philosophy. He developed the logic of relations and improved the language of logical symbolism . . .'. A page earlier we now find an entry on Gilbert Ryle: 'English philosopher, one of the leading figures of so-called *linguistic philosophy* (q.v.), Professor of Philosophy in Oxford. For Ryle, the only task of philosophy is the solution of problems that arise from the incompleteness of our understanding of our means of cognition. Ryle believes that the grammatical form in which we express our thoughts in a series of cases inevitably disorientates us and leads us into category mistakes. In his main work, *The Concept of Mind* (1949), Ryle puts forward a view very close to *behaviourism* (q.v.)'. A few pages later we find a (new) entry on Hans Reichenbach: 'Philosopher and logician, Professor of Physics at Berlin University. In his early works he analysed the nature of geometry and the logical structure of the theory of relativity. In the 1920s, R. was one of the organisers of the Society for Scientific Philosophy in Berlin, which, together with the *Vienna Circle* (q.v.), laid the foundations for the movement of *logical positivism* (q.v.). After the victory of fascism in Germany, he emigrated to the USA. R. occupied himself with the analysis of probability, of scientific laws, of the relation between probability and certainty, of statistical and dynamic laws, etc. Though R. supported logical positivism, in some of his works (e.g. *Experience and Prediction*, 1938) he comes very close to materialism.'.

Here, indeed, is a new tone that has resulted in what is truly a new dictionary—a work that reads for the most part like a philosophical dictionary and not (as the previous editions did) like a compendium of dogmatic pronouncements, dogmatic blessings, and dogmatic denunciations. The striking difference between the past editions and the present one is just that: the new dictionary has a professional and not a purely political air. In most entries it seems more concerned to give information than to provide an authoritative guide for denunciation and approval. Under the letter A, for instance, we find 65 new entries, considered unworthy of inclusion in earlier editions. The list of new entries is instructive:

The *Absolute*; *absolute and relative* (as philosophical categories); *abstract and concrete*; *abstractionism* (as a 'basic tendency in bourgeois art', the item giving a brief but fair account of its historical development and a rather pejorative account of its principles); *Averroism*; *autogenesis*; *automat* (with reference to cybernetics); *automation* ('the highest stage of technological development, connected with the appearance of the conveyor belt, of automatic factories and units, and with the use of the contemporary computer and the logical governing machine . . . makes possible improvement in working-conditions, the elimination of the distinction between physical and intellectual labour, and the raising of the cultural and technical level of the working-man');

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autonomous and heteronomous ethics; *authority* (necessary in the period of socialist construction, but abused can lead to the *cult of personality*); *Agrippa*; *ajivaka* ('unorthodox ancient Indian teaching, denying the existence of the soul'); *A. J. Ayer*[2]; Plato's *Academy*; *axiom*; *axiom* (or principle) *of the syllogism*; the *axiomatic method* in mathematical logic; *actualisation* (in Aristotle and scholastic philosophy, being the passage from possibility to actuality); *actual and potential infinity*; *algebra of logic*; *Samuel Alexander* (author of *Space, Time and Deity*); the *Alexandrian School* (of philosophy, numbering among its adherents Origen and Clement); the 19th century Argentinian politician-philosopher *Alberdi*; *Albertus Magnus*; *Al Kindi* (9th century Arab Aristotelian); *alternative* (in argument, explained as a foreign loan-word); *amphibole*; *Anaximander*; *Anaximenes*; *analytic philosophy* (Quine, Goodman, and Morton White); *analogue*; *analogy*; *analogia entis* (in Roman Catholic philosophy); *D. S. Anichkov* (18th century Russian enlightener); *annihilation* (of particles, in modern physics); *Anselm of Canterbury*; *anti-communism* (described, with comparatively restrained disapproval, as denying the socialist character of the Soviet economy and calling that economy 'state-capitalist', as asserting, in the realm of politics, that the Soviet Union is 'totalitarian' and world communism 'aggressive', and claiming that human life is 'standardised' in the Soviet Union and man 'dehumanised'); *antilogism*; *antinomy* (especially in Kant); *Antisthenes of Athens*; *anti-particles*; *anthropogenesis*; *anthroposophism* ('decadent mystical teaching, variety of theosophy'); *anthroposociology* (Gobineau and other racial theories of social organisation); *apagogic proof*; *apodeictic proof*; *apathy* (in Stoic philosophy); *apeiron* (Anaximander's infinite); *apologetics*; *apophasis* (judgment in Aristotle); *approbative ethics* (with reference to the theologians Barth, Brünner and Tillich); *argument* (in logic); *areopagitics* (the letters ascribed to Dionysius, Bishop of Athens; there is—need one say 'of course'—no reference to Milton's *Areopagitica*); *Aristarchus of Samos*; *Arcesilaus* (organiser of the Middle Academy); *asceticism* (Marxist ethics, we are told, is opposed to it, but earlier working-class movements often preached it as a way of protesting against the luxury of the upper classes); *associationist psychology* (from Locke, Hobbes, and Spinoza, through Hartley and Priestly to James Mill and J. S. Mill); *association*

[2] The reader may recall the trouble that was caused when the Soviet Journal *Voprosy Filosofii* invited Professor Ayer to contribute an article setting forth his views on philosophy and then published it with a polite and not unintelligent reply. *Kommunist* promptly denounced the editors for failing to accompany his article with a *vigorous* (read *rude*?) reply that would make clear the anti-Marxist nature of his views. The entry on Ayer is therefore worth quoting in full, especially since it seems not to have been dictated by *Kommunist*: '*Ayer*, Alfred (b. 1910)—Engl. philosopher, representative of neo-positivism, Professor of Metaphysics (*sic*) in the University of Oxford (since 1959). Became known through his book *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), in which he came out as a propagator of the views of the *Vienna Circle* (q.v.). In more recent works (*The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, 1940; *Thinking and Meaning*, 1947; *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, etc.) A. departs from the orthodox form of *logical positivism* (q.v.) and reveals the strong influence of *linguistic philosophy* (q.v.). He attempts in these works, from a positivist standpoint, to investigate philosophical problems (the certainty of our knowledge, the relation between material objects and "sense-data", etc.) by analysing the corresponding concepts, by translating them into "logically clear" terminology'.

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(in psychology, being the real relation between 'psychic elements' discovered by Pavlov); *astronomy* (general account of; there is a separate entry for the *red shift*); *ataraxia*; *atomism* (in philosophy); *affect* (in psychology); *affecting* (as a technical term in Kant—*affizieren*—used by him when he says that things-in-themselves 'affect' the sense-organs; the entry fails to note that he uses the same term—in a somewhat different sense?—to describe the action of the noumenal self on the phenomenal self).

Greek terms and personalities are no doubt somewhat over-represented in the entries under letter A, but by and large every section of the dictionary reveals the same trend towards briefer and more numerous entries, far more objective in content and professional in tone. Above all, one repeatedly finds a serious attempt (within the compass of such a dictionary) to get to grips with genuinely contemporary and genuinely significant thinkers in the West; such thinkers are no longer treated as mere pegs for the hanging of a Marxist message. Karl Jaspers now has a column to himself; all but the last two sentences, which note that he has in recent years come out as an opponent of communism, are devoted to a serious summary of his views. Among more than 50 new entries under K, we find articles on Albert Camus, Rudolf Carnap, Ernst Cassirer, the German physicist R. J. M. Claudius, and Hermann Cohen of Marburg; we also find such technical terms as quantification of the predicate, quantifiers, logical classes and combinatory logic. The latter are explained, without comment, in the purest Western 'formalist' terms; the entry on combinatory logic reads as though it were taken almost directly from Quine's *Mathematical Logic*. Under K, too, we now find Kropotkin, Kierkegaard, Victor Cousin and Thomas Carlyle, as well as a number of aesthetic and artistic concepts: dramatic conflict, the comic, critical realism (in art, distinguished from critical realism in philosophy, which has a separate entry). Elsewhere we now find Thomas Aquinas and Arnold Toynbee, Emile Durkheim and Heisenberg, Martin Heidegger and Wright Mills. Pascal is in at last; so are Gustav Wetter and I. M. Bochenski ('neo-Thomist, Dominican, ideologist of anti-communism . . . specialises in the falsification of Marxism and Soviet philosophy'). The Soviet 'scientific attitude' has not yet extended to the discussion of Western Sovietology, though the *Dictionary* does also mention that Professor Bochenski 'works in the field of the history and theory of logic', and that Professor Wetter attempts to maintain a 'neutral' position between materialism and idealism in the form of 'neo-Thomist realism' (which is, in reality, we are told, 'a teleological form of objective idealism').

IT IS NOT DIFFICULT, OF COURSE, to leaf through this dictionary and still find examples of 'non-objective reporting', of Marxist simplification (as in the entry on Wetter), of patently political inclusions and omissions. But to do so would be to fail to notice a forest because one is looking for shrubs. In our vain search for Trotsky (still a non-person) we should not miss such new entries as Antonio Labriola, Charles Lyall, Paul Langevin, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *lemma* (in logic and mathematics, leading to dilemma, trilemma, etc.), the pre-revolutionary Russian positivist philosopher V. V. Lesevich, John Lilburne, linguistic philosophy, Carl

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Linné, personal property, personality, individual and society, the logic of relations, the logistic method, logical and empirical truth, logical semantics, logical symbolism, logical errors, logical forms, logical atomism (Russell's), logical positivism in ethics (separated from logical positivism generally), logical syntax, logical empiricism (mentioning Carnap, Reichenbach, Feigl, Hempel, Bergman, and Frank), logical implication, logistics (search for logical foundations of mathematics), logos, falsity, *lokayata* (ancient Indian materialist teaching), etc., etc. (And though Trotsky is still out, Lunacharsky—God bless us!—is in, given a whole column as a 'major organiser of socialist culture'.) Close by comes an entry on the Lvov-Warsaw school of logicians (of whom Lukasiewicz and Tarski have separate entries) and half a column on Martin Luther.

Messrs. Rozental and Yudin, then, have indeed presented us and the Soviet public with a *new* philosophical dictionary, one that reaches standards far higher than any of the previous dictionaries edited by them, and which reflects a very marked change indeed in the attitudes behind this form of Soviet philosophical activity. The editors themselves, in a brief preface, give four reasons for producing what they confess is virtually a new dictionary: 1) the decisions of the CPSU 'mercilessly criticising the cult of Stalin', 2) the new programme of the CPSU, 'providing a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the entire development of the contemporary world and exposing the dialectic of this development'; 3) the massive developments in science and technology that have taken place in recent years; and 4) the fact that the dictionary no longer has to serve as a popular exposition of philosophy, there now being a number of such expositions to supplement it.

'The massive developments in science and technology' in fact account for comparatively few of the new entries; only cybernetics and the terms associated with it can be regarded as natural entries in 1963 but not in 1954, and even that may be stretching a point. The new programme of the CPSU with its 'profound analysis' seems fortunately to have had very little influence on the dictionary. 'The merciless exposure of the cult of Stalin' has had the obvious effect that Stalin and his works[3] are no longer mentioned in the dictionary, and that his 'dogmatist' friends have become unpersons. Are we also to understand that this exposure is what enabled Soviet philosophers in this dictionary to write reasonably objectively about Carnap and Quine, Russell and Tarski? The editors do not say.

The true changes that make this a new dictionary are—characteristically for the Soviet Union—not mentioned directly by the editors at all. The many new entries are composed, for the most part, of technical terms in logic, metaphysics and mathematical logic, of previously ignored thinkers of the past and of contemporary Western figures who have contributed to the growth of contemporary (non-Marxist) philosophical movements. There has also been a marked expansion of entries relating to the disciplines of sociology, aesthetics, and ethics, which the dictionary now treats as quasi-autonomous departments of philosophy

[3] In the 4th edition of 1954, there were 4½ columns on Stalin's article 'Anarchism or Socialism' (1906–07), nearly five columns on his 'Economic Problems of Socialism' (1952) and three columns on the *Short Course*.

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and not as mere practical applications of Marxism-Leninism. Finally, there has been an expansion of the attention paid to Russian academic philosophers of the past (whether materialists or idealists) and to Asian and Latin American thought. Though the editors have deleted Mao, they have devoted four columns to a new entry on Chinese philosophy, two columns to Indian philosophy and yet another column to Hinduism. Most of the important Indian schools of thought, and most important Chinese classical thinkers, have separate entries as well.

Professor Bochenski and his colleagues in the Institute of East European Studies in Fribourg have been persuading Western philosophers for some years that Soviet philosophy has been showing marked improvement and *professionalisation* since 1948, and especially in the past six years. From the communist side, Professor Bochenski's reward is to be called 'a falsifier of Marxism and Soviet philosophy'. But this dictionary, above all, bears out his words. It appears to take as its premise the (revolutionary) plea of Academician P. N. Fedoseev at the Moscow conference on philosophical problems of science in 1958, when he stressed the impropriety of importing 'methods appropriately used against hostile ideology' into scientific discussions. Academician Fedoseev had in mind quarrels between Marxists, but his attitude, in this dictionary, has been extended even to Western philosophers, save in so far as they directly attack communism. For the first time in decades, the Soviet Union has issued a philosophical work of a popular character that strives to inform more frequently than it strives to indoctrinate.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT the dictionary is one that would be hailed as a good philosophical dictionary if it were published in the West. None of the entries displays more than the routine knowledge expected of any philosopher interested in the relevant field; many of the descriptions of contemporary philosophical schools and of contemporary philosophers betray a certain remoteness from the intellectual climate in which these schools and philosophers function. The Russians find it easiest to expound schools of formal and mathematical logic; they have a certain understanding of logical positivism, but their account of Ryle and of linguistic philosophy is not so much partisan as couched in an utterly inappropriate philosophical language. There are also some signs that the 200-odd authors who collaborated on this dictionary did not have access to an abundance of Western materials: the list of publications by contemporary Western philosophers occasionally reads like a list of books 'to hand'. (The barbarous restriction that allows most Soviet academics precisely 25 rubles a year for the purchase of books paid for in foreign currency makes them almost entirely dependent, for sustained study outside libraries, on gifts and exchanges of books through correspondence with academics abroad.)

Neither have Soviet philosophers and the compilers of this dictionary accepted completely the distinction most Western philosophers would want to make between philosophy and ideology, or between the philosopher on the one hand and the agitator, the 'democrat-enlightener' or the 'sage', on the other. The editors of the new philosophical dictionary have not deleted all the earlier entries that do not relate to things we would regard as philosophical. The new position

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in the Soviet Union is not that 'philosophy' has now been confined to what Anglo-Saxons would call philosophy; it is rather that what Anglo-Saxons call philosophy has at last become *part* of what Soviet philosophers are interested in. Sages, enlighteners, and political ideologists are still in; so (more happily) are most important personalities and conceptions in the history of science.

The compilation of philosophical dictionaries is an aid to philosophical activity, not a substitute for it. Soviet philosophy is still better at compiling dictionaries than at thinking out philosophical problems and making genuine philosophical contributions. The dictionary under review displays bibliographical competence and reasonable capacity (in the circumstances) for re-stating someone else's view, rather than insight and critical scholarship. But it also displays a professionalism that is concerned to understand and know, and not merely to parrot dogma. It is in this respect that the new dictionary steps away from the old, and it steps entirely in the right direction. So far, such steps have been taken in books printed in 8,000 to 10,000 copies; this dictionary has a printing of 400,000.

THE ANGLO-SAXONS

Ronald Hingley

THIS BOOK * FALLS OUTSIDE the main stream of Professor Kiparsky's achievement as an expert on Slavonic philology who has, amongst other things, charted the misdemeanours and hesitations of the Russian stress accent throughout the ages in his *Wortakzent der russischen Schriftsprache*. Beside that elusive material the antics of English and American characters in Russian literature must have seemed like child's play. But this new book remains much more than a mere sideline in the work of a scholar whose main achievement is in a different field.

The present topic is richer than might be thought. 'A Russian novel [Professor Kiparsky writes] without a West European or, at least, a Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish or Caucasian character, is almost as rare as a West European novel containing a Russian character.' And English and Americans have been among the favourite choices for foreign characters, partly because Russian readers had such a wide knowledge of English and American fiction, both serious and popular. Without claiming to have been exhaustive, Kiparsky does maintain that he has missed little of importance among the 400,000 Russian books in the library of the Slavonic Department of Helsinki University, and the claim is not likely to be challenged.

Kiparsky takes the subject from its beginning with a certain 'Milord George', who appeared in a story by Matvey Komarov published in 1782 and was the first English character in Russian fiction. He takes us through the period of 'Anglomania' in the early nineteenth century to the Crimean War—and there the material really begins to thicken up. The systematic treatment of the subject ends in the middle 1950s, but

* Valentin Kiparsky, **English and American Characters in Russian Fiction.** Osteuropa Institute of the Free University of Berlin, Publication No. 31.

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an *Addendum* gives some tit-bits up to 1963. These include an account of Fedor Panferov's novel *On Behalf of the Young One*, containing two British characters, the M.P.s Hughes and Wood. It is perhaps worth adding that 'Wood' turned out, on close scrutiny in Oxford, to be a thinly disguised portrait of one of Mr Panferov's hosts during a visit to Britain made shortly before the novel was published. This was my colleague Mr Max Hayward, a well-known contributor to this journal, who was surprised to find himself portrayed on Panferov's pages as an unsuccessful pimp. Cultural cross-fertilization can indeed produce some odd sports.

In the first part of his book Professor Kiparsky deals with 'English' characters. The Celtic fringe will have to put up with being lumped under *anglichane*, not by Kiparsky himself, who knows that there are such things as Scotsmen and Welshmen, but by Russian writers in general, who don't. The second part is devoted to Americans, and the survey as a whole affords the Anglo-Saxon world a good opportunity to see itself as others see it.

Some of the findings are predictable in general, though always interesting to follow out in detail. That Russians should think the English strait-laced (their usual word is *choporny*) will come as no surprise, and indeed this impression is fully reinforced throughout the material. Some of it is very eloquent. There is reference to the 'sour' expression on the Englishman's face, his way of speaking through his teeth (stiff upper lip?), sudden wooden laugh, and the fact that he never smiles. As early as 1790 Karamzin was suggesting that all Englishmen seemed to be wearing a gag, or that there must be a heavy tax on the opening of English mouths. 'They hardly open their teeth and rather whistle or give hints than speak.' Their language, as we learn elsewhere, sounds like the twittering of birds. They have 'glassy eyes and long rabbit-teeth and droopy whiskers'.

There are times when one seems to be dealing with creatures from outer space, rather than one's own fellow-countrymen, especially as Russian authors nowhere specifically point out that the English mostly possess the usual complement of legs, arms, eyes, etc., and do not walk on all fours. But the continual references to English lack of feelings, lack of warmth, and to our haughtiness and arrogance are so universal that they cannot just be put down to prejudice—any more than the English refusal to mix with foreigners, also noted here (the 'Wogs-begin-at-Calais' complex). And then there was the British habit of treating White officers during the Russian Civil War as 'natives', which naturally rankled.

Do we recognise ourselves? I fear so. And we can usefully ponder the lessons contained in this section of the material, which Professor Kiparsky himself is too polite to draw. To some extent the 'strait-laced' impression is due to social convention, since Russians happen to regard the open expression of emotions as praiseworthy, and we don't. The fact that one's emotions may not be perpetually spilling about all over the place does not necessarily mean that one has no feelings, of course. And attractive as Russian expansiveness can be, it also has dangers of its own, as that prevalent type, the Soviet *faux bonhomme*, too well illustrates. There are times when even rabbit teeth and stiff upper lip can make a welcome change.

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PREDICTABLY, AMERICANS HAVE a somewhat different press, though the first American businessman in Russian fiction—the creation of Chernyshevsky in *Chto delat*?, was thought by his Russian friends to have 'fish blood in his veins'. But on the whole their fictionalised Americans are more hail-fellow-well-met. They tend more strongly to be polarised, at least in the Soviet period, into great 'friends of the Russian people' or sinister villains. According to Kiparsky, no Englishman is ever shown to be a 'friend of the Russian people' in this squalid propagandist sense, but I fear Soviet fiction does us more honour than we deserve.

Kiparsky's general comment on the 'Anglo-Saxons' is that the Englishman is more 'human' than the American because he is a more plausible mixture of good and bad qualities. For besides the 'strait-laced' stuff, Russian authors have been willing to praise the British as sober, hard-working, efficient, and self-reliant. English managers have often been employed in Russia and are always shown to be better than French or German where a comparison is made. Tribute is also paid to American 'know-how' and technical competence. The Anglo-Saxons, however, are usually shown to be obsessed with making money —an image which now forms the basis for one of the stalest items in the apparatus of Soviet propagandist cant.

On the whole both English and American types have tended to become downgraded with the passage of time. Of course official Soviet pressures, as Kiparsky points out, have had something to do with this. The British sailor was once looked up to, but now his superior skill is no longer admitted. The British army, curiously enough, always has been despised as lacking in courage. It seems, though, that this is due to different conventions about when a soldier should sacrifice his life needlessly. Even the Charge of the Light Brigade wasn't dashing enough, it seems, by Russian standards. Anyway, no one there thought it particularly worth notice. The British spy, too, has been downgraded to a point where he must now always be caught, and the British clergyman is usually villainous.

A special position is occupied by the detective story. Russians have always been fascinated by Sherlock Holmes, but I had not realised that they wrote original Sherlock Holmes stories in which the great detective and Doctor Watson are shown functioning on Russian soil, and making some pretty inept deductions too, to judge from one quoted here. Professor Kiparsky lists three such titles for the years 1908–09. For domestic reasons, however, a policeman (as opposed to a private detective) has never been able to figure as the hero of a Russian work of fiction. But then he never does in the Sherlock Holmes stories either—witness the unfortunate Lestrade and his bungling colleagues at the Yard.

One useful by-product of the book is commentary on comparative customs. Professor Kiparsky's remarks on sport, for example, are especially illuminating. On Russian soil organised sport is a recent Soviet creation and real sport in the modern sense was introduced into Russia by Englishmen, who incidentally achieved the first ascents of several Causasian mountains. What of cricket? Some Russians have recognised its importance. 'Whenever four Englishmen meet, be it in Africa or Asia, they immediately organise a cricket match,' wrote a certain A. Lvov in 1909. Still, Russians are slow to learn and dictionary

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after dictionary continues to define our national game roughly as follows: 'a ball game, in which the players, divided into two groups, strive to drive the ball through their opponent's goal with a stick' (*Slovar russkogo yazyka*, 'Akademiya nauk', vol. II, 1958—but see also other dictionaries published in recent times). After this how can you expect them to know anything about 'fair play'? But things are changing. Russians used to be 'completely void of team spirit or organisation'. Now, of course, they have both—perhaps too much of the latter, and in one game, chess, they lead the world. Chess, incidentally, is surely the only sphere in which a Soviet 'drive' has met with total, annihilating success, but it naturally does not figure in this book.

As I have tried to show, Professor Kiparsky's work is a mine of fascinating material, from which one could go on quoting such items as the Russian admiration (of Dostoevsky and others) for Englishwomen as the most beautiful in the world, their loathing of Disraeli and their distrust of Queen Victoria. (American readers will find similar comments to interest them.) The material has been effectively selected and presented by a scholar of high international repute, and will give both pleasure and instruction.

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